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Abstract
This dissertation examines the nature of Jacksonian class politics through a study of Tennessee
from 1768 to 1830. White Tennesseans, including Andrew Jackson himself, embraced
commercial development, material improvement, and market transactions, despite political
rhetoric that praised agricultural independence and denounced monied corruption. Opposition to
banks and internal improvements usually emerged from political rivalries, not ideology.
Economic downturns, such as the Panic of 1819, produced temporary reactions against the
market economy. When Andrew Jackson was elected President of the United States in 1828, no
popular discontent existed against money and commerce generally, or against the Bank of the
United States in particular. Jackson himself initiated the Bank War for political and personal,
not economic, reasons.
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Introduction

The Jacksonian Ethos

On July 10, 1832, the Senate of the United States received from President Andrew
Jackson a veto of the bill rechartering the Bank of the United States. Jackson’s message
accompanying the veto attacked the Bank on several grounds—it maintained a monopoly,
enjoyed exclusive privileges, received investments from foreign stockholders, and created a
monied interest dangerous to liberty. Most importantly the Bank was unconstitutional,
exercising no necessary or proper function for the federal government. The Bank, Jackson
believed, had allowed the rich and powerful to influence governmental policy for private gain.
All societies had distinctions in wealth and talent, “but,” said Jackson, “when the laws undertake
… to make the rich richer and the potent more powerful, the humble members of society—the
farmers, mechanics, and laborers—who have neither the time nor the means of securing like
favors to themselves, have a right to complain of the injustice of their Government.” Although
the Bank had until 1836 before its present charter expired, any hope that the veto could be
overcome was quashed when Jackson was reelected in November of 1832. The United States
would not have another central bank until Congress created the Federal Reserve system in 1913.1
Historians ever since have used Jackson’s “Bank War” as the central event in
interpretations of Jacksonian class politics. The motivations and intentions of Jackson himself,

Andrew Jackson, “Veto Message,” July 10, 1832, in James D. Richardson, comp. and ed., A Compilation of the
Messages and Papers of the Presidents (1897; reprint, New York: Bureau of National Literature, 1911), 2: 1153.
1
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of his advisers and associates, and of his supporters throughout the country speak to the essence
of Jacksonian Democracy. In destroying the Bank of the United States, did Jackson and
Jacksonians demonstrate an antipathy toward all banks? Did they oppose the increasingly
commercialized economy of market exchange and credit relations? Did their debates among
themselves and with their political opponents reflect class divisions or personal and political
animosities? To answer these questions is to understand whether the inheritors of the American
Revolution welcomed enterprise, seeking to participate in a competitive economic order that
promised gain, or resisted it, seeking to rectify capital’s exploitation in order to preserve the
independence of farmers, craftsmen, and laborers.2
Arthur Schlesinger Jr.’s The Age of Jackson provides the foundation for all modern
historiography of Jacksonian America. Schlesinger argues that American history cycles between
capitalist dominance and democratic dominance. Capitalists expand the economy but initiate
crises by gathering excessive power and wealth. Democracy responds, challenging the
established order and instituting reforms that more equitably distribute the benefits of growth.
Schlesinger argues that the Jacksonian Era, and the Bank War in particular, was such a time of
reform. Jackson’s political support in this effort came from eastern workers, southern planters,
and intellectuals. By destroying the Bank, the business community was checked, and Jackson
saved capitalism from itself. Schlesinger’s Jackson as liberal reformer and Democratic man of
the people has held up well. John Ashworth’s ‘Agrarians’ and ‘Aristocrats’: Party Political
Ideology in the United States, 1837-1846 argues that “more obviously anti-entrepreneurial than
entrepreneurial, more nearly anti-capitalist than pro-capitalist, and more overtly radical than

Although dated, James Parton’s three-volume biography of Jackson is an excellent primer on his life and the
Jacksonian era. See James Parton, Life of Andrew Jackson, vols. 1-3 (New York: Mason Brothers, 1860-1861).
2
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conservative, Jacksonian Democracy was an avowedly egalitarian movement which sought to
utilise the power that democracy gave to the individual in order to resist those social and political
forces which took it away.” Robert V. Remini’s three-volume biography of Jackson, as well as
his Andrew Jackson and the Bank War, avows Old Hickory’s affinity for common people and his
commitment to reforms in government. Sean Wilentz’s The Rise of American Democracy:
Jefferson to Lincoln is, in general, the latest synthesis of the liberal interpretation of Jackson as
Democratic defender of the laboring classes.3
Charles Sellers’s The Market Revolution: Jacksonian America, 1815-1846 interpreted
Jacksonian Democracy as a radical rejection of capitalism. Rather than capitalism and
democracy existing in tension, the two were antithetical. Rural farmers and urban workers,
argues Sellers, “rallied around enduring human values of family, trust, cooperation, love, and
equality,” in self-defense against a capitalist hegemony that forced all Americans into
competitive effort, burying human freedom under a relentless commodification of labor.
Capitalism’s ascendency was perfected during the Panic of 1819, as capitalists conquered the
economy, politics, and culture. Jackson’s election was a violent yet ineffectual reaction against
the new order.4

3

Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Jackson (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1945), 521-522; John
Ashworth, ‘Agrarians’ and ‘Aristocrats’: Party Political Ideology in the United States, 1837-1846 (London: Royal
Historical Society, 1983), 51; Robert V. Remini, Andrew Jackson and the Course of American Empire, 1767-1821,
vol. 1 (New York: Harper and Row, 1977); Robert V. Remini, Andrew Jackson and the Course of American
Freedom, 1822-1832, vol. 2 (New York: Harper and Row, 1981); Robert V. Remini, Andrew Jackson and the
Course of American Democracy, 1833-1845, vol. 3 (New York: Harper and Row, 1984); Robert V. Remini, Andrew
Jackson and the Bank War (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1967); Sean Wilentz, The Rise of American
Democracy: Jefferson to Lincoln (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2005), 359-374.
4
Charles Sellers, The Market Revolution: Jacksonian America, 1815-1846 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991),
6-7
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By contrast, some historians have interpreted Jackson as leader of a “market revolution.”
Thomas Perkins Abernethy’s From Frontier to Plantation in Tennessee: A Study in Frontier
Democracy explores Jackson’s early years as land speculator and businessman in Tennessee.
The rise of democracy had nothing to do with Jackson, Abernethy argues. Instead democracy in
Tennessee emerged in reaction to a social and economic system that enriched speculators,
including Jackson, but did little for the public good. Jackson became president because he used
the democratic impulse for his own ends. Paul Michael Rogin’s Fathers and Children: Andrew
Jackson and the Subjugation of the American Indian argues that Jackson’s most substantive
influence on American development was his warring against the Native Americans. His
victories in these campaigns secured land for white settlement, development, and enrichment.
Cotton in particular became the commodity by which the land that once supported game for
hunters instead became the land that spurred economic growth in both South and North. What
Jackson did as president mattered little, for the real change had already taken place.5
Other historians reject that Jacksonian Democracy was a manifestation of class conflict.
Bray Hammond’s Banks and Politics in America from the Revolution to the Civil War argues
that the impetus behind Jackson’s economic policies, especially his destruction of the Bank of
the United States, originated among businessmen eager to cast off the Bank’s restraint on credit
expansion. In this interpretation the Bank was not a victim of Jackson and his followers; it was a
victim of the money power on Wall Street, who used Jackson and democratic sentiment for their
own ends. Thomas Payne Govan’s Nicholas Biddle: Nationalist and Public Banker, 1786-1844,

5

Thomas Perkins Abernethy, From Frontier to Plantation in Tennessee: A Study in Frontier Democracy (Chapel
Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1932; reprint, Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1967);
Michael Paul Rogin, Fathers and Children: Andrew Jackson and the Subjugation of the American Indian (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1975).
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by contrast, argues that the Jacksonians were not knaves, but fools. Jackson and his advisers
were uncritical anti-bank ideologues, and Jackson himself stirred public sentiment against the
Bank where little had existed before.6
Daniel Walker Howe’s What Hath God Wrought: The Transformation of America, 18151848 is a more recent critique of Jacksonian Democracy. Indeed, Howe laments that the
moniker “Jacksonian” has been applied to the era. He argues that the National Republicans, later
the Whigs, upheld a progressive vision for the nation. Most Americans appreciated the benefits
of a market economy and believed in improvement. Jackson’s rhetoric of corruption in
government often served as an excuse to appoint political cronies. His Bank War proved
counterproductive, as state banks, paper money, and speculation proliferated because of the lack
of a moderating central institution.7
Few studies, with Abernethy’s being one exception, have explored the origins of the
Jacksonian era in Tennessee during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Out of this
state’s political milieu did Jackson emerge, and the history of its economic development can
illuminate Jacksonian political economy. From the start white explorers and settlers of the
Tennessee Country, eventually including Jackson himself, possessed a fundamental outlook of
improvement with respect to the land inhabited by the various Indian nations. These explorers
were motivated by the pursuit of gain, being land speculators themselves or being employed by
such investors. They hoped to make the land productive and profitable, and their goals

6

Bray Hammond, Banks and Politics in America from the Revolution to the Civil War (1957; reprint, Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1991), 287; Thomas Payne Govan, Nicholas Biddle: Nationalist and Public Banker,
1786-1844 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1959), 115, 125.
7
Daniel Walker Howe, What Hath God Wrought: The Transformation of America, 1815-1848 (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2009), 330-333, 373-395.
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inevitably created conflict with the first inhabitants. However difficult and tragic this history is,
the fact remains that white settlers hoped to repurpose the land for both agricultural subsistence
and surplus trade. John Henry Eaton wrote of Jackson’s Indian campaigns that “were [the
Indians’] extensive wilds gradually reduced, so, in proportion, would the benefits resulting from
hunting, and wandering through the forest, subside, until prompted at last by necessity, they
would resort to industry and agriculture, as the only certain and lasting means of support, and
thus imperceptibly be forced into a different and more advantageous course of life.” This was
enlightened opinion for the time, but not all whites brought with them the message of uplift. In
Tennessee began events that begot the Trail of Tears.8
White Tennesseans believed agriculture the best way to pursue economic betterment.
Early nineteenth century Tennessee newspapers carried editorials that waxed lyrical on the
blessings of agriculture. Typical is a writer in The Review (Nashville) who argued that “all
wealth is derived from the produce of the earth and labor,” and that “a wise government will
endeavor to attach as much riches to the soil as possible.” Jackson believed that the agricultural
interest of the country “is so essentially connected with every other and so superior in
importance to them all.” Commerce and manufacturing could, however, be a part of a healthy
political economy. John Sevier, Tennessee’s first governor, believed that “western commerce …
must ere long be equal if not greatly superior to any in all America, may I not say in the whole
world!” Jackson spoke of commerce and manufacturing as beneficial insofar as they augmented
agricultural value. Tennessee’s politicians and editorials echoed the same sentiments.9

John Henry Eaton, The Life of Andrew Jackson […], (Philadelphia: Samuel F. Bradford, 1824), 201.
The Review (Nashville), November 24, 1809, Microfilm, Calvin M. McClung Historical Collection, The East
Tennessee History Center, Knoxville (hereinafter cited as “McClung Collection”); John Sevier to Andrew Jackson,
Joseph Anderson, and William C. C. Claiborne, November 26, 1797, in “The Executive Journal of Governor John
8
9
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Belief in agriculture’s supremacy was rooted in a republican ideology shared by virtually
all white Tennesseans. Republican thought emerged from political conflicts during the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in Great Britain. During the seventeenth century
Parliament consistently appealed to limitations on the prerogative power of the monarchs James
I, Charles I, Charles II, and James II. The culmination of these conflicts was the Glorious
Revolution of 1688, which established definite limits on royal power. But the monarchy’s
attempts to gain influence in Parliament continued during the eighteenth century, primarily
through bribery from the treasury. A “country party” opposition emerged against royal
influence, the monetization of the public debt, and the Bank of England. The oppositionists
believed that power constantly sought expansion. Vigilance and virtue among the people were
required to check corruption. Oppositionist thought became the framework through which
Americans interpreted British designs during the Revolutionary Era, and it became the
foundational political ideology for Jeffersonian Republicans and Jacksonian Democrats.
Jacksonian demands to extinguish the national debt, end the Bank of the United States, strip the
monied aristocracy of special privileges, and maintain states’ rights originated from similar
oppositionist demands in Great Britain.10

Sevier,” ed. Samuel C. Williams, The East Tennessee Historical Society’s Publications, no. 3 (1931): 161
(hereinafter cited as “ETHS Publications”); Andrew Jackson, “First Annual Message,” December 8, 1829, in
Richardson, Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 2: 1013; Knoxville Register, November 23,
1816, Microfilm, McClung Collection; John Rhea to His Constituents, April 8, 1806, in “Correspondence of General
James Robertson,” The American Historical Magazine 5, no. 2 (1900): 177.
10
Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1967); Jack P. Greene, The Constitutional Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2011); Jack P. Greene, “Political Mimesis: A Consideration of the Historical and Cultural Roots of
Legislative Behavior in the British Colonies in the Eighteenth Century,” American Historical Review 75, no. 2
(1969): 337-367.
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Oppositionist thought influenced republican ideology’s emphasis on the preeminence of
agriculture in political economy. Jacksonians believed that agriculture best supported a virtuous
citizenry, in that agriculture involved the true independence found in land ownership. The
danger in commerce and manufacturing was their tendency to receive special privileges from
government, enlarging the national debt and artificially enriching a few monied capitalists with
the public revenue. Banks chartered by government, or manufacturing establishments protected
by government, allowed capitalists to make inordinate profits while exploiting debtors or
laborers. If economic activity was left alone, Jacksonians believed, then the agricultural interest
would naturally emerge superior, with commerce and manufacturing receding to their proper
stations in support of agriculture. For this reason I have avoided the term “capitalism,” as the
word did not yet exist during this time, and Jacksonians would not have understood themselves
to be creating such a system. I have used the word “capitalist,” a Jacksonian pejorative that
described bankers, brokers, and other “non-producers”; Jackson would be horrified to know that
some modern historians credit his efforts with contributing to a capitalist order. I have also
avoided the term “market revolution,” as it carries interpretive baggage that I do not wish to
carry. The Jacksonians, and Jackson, were improvers, seeking to develop lands, establish
commerce, and secure markets on proper principles.11
Republican ideology could also become political propaganda. Indeed, where ideology
ended and interest began is difficult to parse. Use of republican language became blatant during
Tennessee’s first experience with state banking from 1807-1819. During this time hardly any
ideological opposition to banking appeared, even from Andrew Jackson, but that is not evident

11

Ashworth, ‘Agrarians’ and Aristocrats’, 20-34.
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from the political rhetoric surrounding the banking debates. Tennessee’s political factions over
the banking issue—which I have identified as “state concentrators,” “state unifiers,” and
“national unifiers,”—used terms like “corruption” or “monied aristocracy” to describe each
other’s banks, while portraying themselves as defenders of the common people. Republican
rhetoric was especially popular in attacking the Bank of the United States, but some of the
loudest republican ideologues were also some of Tennessee’s most prominent state bankers.
Perhaps all Tennessee politicians who opposed the Bank engaged in cynical propaganda, but it is
more likely that there existed a range of motivations among them—Pleasant M. Miller, for
example, appears as an opportunist, while Hugh Lawson White appears as a principled actor,
although both men served as officers in Tennessee’s second state bank, the Bank of the State of
Tennessee, chartered in 1811. Whatever their motivations, their debates over politics and
banking laid the foundation for Jackson’s Bank War in Tennessee.
The Panic of 1819 caused reconsideration and retrenchment. Support for banks declined
in Tennessee as they proved unable to alleviate the crisis and, indeed, did much to create and
prolong it. Even so, the state legislature created a publicly owned bank in response to the crisis.
Support for this new bank came from debtors seeking relief and from potential borrowers
seeking long-term credit for their ventures which they had been unable to obtain from the
previously chartered state banks. Ideological opposition to banking became more prominent
during the 1820s as the new bank failed to meet expectations. But white Tennesseans never
rejected the improvement ethos. Internal improvements especially became popular substitutes in
place of banks.

9

When Jackson became president, his republican viewpoint compelled him to undertake
the Bank War. He did not seek to overturn the credit system or reverse the market developments
that his own efforts as an Indian fighter had helped create. He had come to appreciate some of
the benefits that a national bank could provide, including a national currency and emergency
funds during wartime. During the first two years of his administration he considered alternatives
to the Bank of the United States in order to produce as little disturbance to the nation’s
commerce as possible. Tempering his initiation of the Bank War was also the lack of overt
political hostility to the Bank of the United States among the general populace and among
Tennesseans. The Bank by this time had established a branch in Nashville and, by its beneficial
operations, had quelled the discontent in the state that had been so prominent a decade earlier. It
was Jackson, not popular discontent, that began the Bank War. Latent hostility against the Bank
existed, but it took Jackson’s popularity and prodding to make that hostility politically viable.
But the commercialized economy was already as much Jackson’s doing as it was the doing of
any bank, capitalist, or National Republican.
A final historiographical note is in order. In recent years some historians, the most
prominent being Edward E. Baptist, Sven Beckert, Walter Johnson, and Seth Rockman, have
begun to interpret the economic development of the early Republic as based in unfree labor.
Economic historians, according to this view, have incorrectly melded capitalism, democracy, and
freedom into a story of progress in which Americans maximized human liberty, and they have
unjustly downplayed slavery and other forms of unfree labor as contradictions or ambiguities
within capitalism which would eventually disappear as economic development progressed. The
new historians of unfree labor, by contrast, argue that slavery should be understood as a
10

constitutive element of American economic development. Some Americans enjoyed the benefits
of self-making, consumerism, and enterprise precisely because other Americans did not. As
Rockman writes, “economic freedom for some and economic unfreedom for others were not
coincidences but were inextricably linked.”12
The history presented here lacks the new perspectives provided by the histories of unfree
labor, race, and gender. I have written primarily from the perspective of political actors—both
politicians themselves and their constituents—and virtually all such actors were white men
during this period of American history. Even my examination of relations between Native
Americans and white settlers in Chapter 1 bears this perspective and, although it is not a
romantic portrayal of conquest, it is not meant as a history that encompasses a full portrayal of
what happened. My sanguinity with respect to market development reflects, I believe, the
sanguinity of white Tennesseans, namely, the people who would almost all identify themselves
as Jacksonian by 1824. I am responding to the traditional historical questions posed by
Jacksonian Democracy, but I do not mean to hide the fact that market development inevitably
carried with it conflict, enslavement, and general misery for many.

Seth Rockman, “The Unfree Origins of American Capitalism,” in The Economy of Early America: Historical
Perspectives and New Directions, ed. Cathy Matson (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press,
2006), 338-339. See also Edward E. Baptist, The Half Has Never Been Told: Slavery and the Making of American
Capitalism (New York: Basic Books, 2014), Sven Beckert, Empire of Cotton: A Global History (New York: Alfred
A. Knopf, 2014), and Walter Johnson, River of Dark Dreams: Slavery and Empire in the Cotton Kingdom
(Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2013).
12

11

Chapter 1

Speculative Beginnings

Writing an official report of the war given his namesake, the colonial governor of
Virginia, Lord Dunmore, attempted to justify his actions to the Earl of Dartmouth, the secretary
of state for the colonies in London. Dunmore placed the origins of the war on the peculiar
character of the Americans. “They acquire no attachment to Place,” he wrote, “But wandering
about Seems engrafted in their Nature … they Should for ever imagine [sic] the Lands further
off, are Still better than those upon which they are already Settled.” Revulsion against
governmental authority, so much stronger than in England, was a natural consequence. Native
Americans bore the brunt of their avidity. Dunmore noted that American frontiersmen
considered the aborigines “as but little removed from the brute Creation.”1
American restlessness, as described by Dunmore, was rooted in the pursuit of gain and
material improvement. One of the first areas affected by western expansion was the
transmontane region of North Carolina. The state’s land claims across the Appalachian
Mountains gradually acquired the name “Tennessee,” after one of the leading Cherokee towns.
This region became the central focus of Virginia and North Carolina land speculators looking to
profit from settlement. Three areas piqued their attention. In the eastern part of Tennessee
lands, the Tennessee River flowed south and curved in a great “Bend” that afforded fertile lands

1

Lord Dunmore to the Earl of Dartmouth, December 24, 1774, in Reuben Gold Thwaites and Louise Phelps
Kellogg, eds., Documentary History of Dunmore’s War 1774 (Madison: Wisconsin Historical Society, 1905), 371.
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for agriculture and possible locations for commercial centers. In the middle part of Tennessee
lands, the Cumberland region boasted rich soil and several rivers. Finally, the western part of
Tennessee lands adjoined the Mississippi River, a transportation route that would come to be
coveted by all expansionists. Land speculators and their agents would be the primary actors in
shaping Tennessee’s development. Their aim was private aggrandizement, and their ambition
and greed would produce political conflict, Indian warfare, and fraudulent speculations. Yet
their ambition also worked as a benefit to those who chose to uproot themselves and stake their
chances in the West. Those individuals who had the greatest stake in western lands also
undertook the most difficult endeavors. They organized settlement defenses, led military
campaigns, and advanced material life on the frontier. It was in this milieu that Andrew Jackson
and his inner circle rose to prominence. The origins of Jackson’s presidency lay in land
speculation.
The settlement of Tennessee lands began in Virginia. Since the 1740s, hunters had
wandered west, lured by the abundance of game and the potential for trade. Some of these
hunters, in turn, also acted as explorers and surveyors for land speculators. One of the most
prominent investors in exploration was a Virginian named Dr. Thomas Walker. Walker himself
had explored western lands in the 1750s as a member of the Loyal Land Company, whose
partners included the father of Thomas Jefferson. Under the company’s direction, Walker named
Cumberland Gap, in addition to many creeks and rivers. His efforts were disrupted by the
French and Indian War, but the return of peace renewed the potential for profit. Walker gained
title to Powell’s Valley in southwestern Virginia and sent Joseph Martin in the spring of 1769 to
settle it. Martin reported that the land had “very good springs—Bold creeks, big enough for
13

mills—great quantities of cane sufficient to support great stocks for many years.” He was
eventually driven off the land by Cherokee Indians, but he would figure prominently in
Tennessee’s development in the coming years.2
Colonial governments supported private ventures. Unable to enforce the Proclamation
Line of 1763 and fearing war between white settlers and Indians in the Ohio Country, the British
met with the Iroquois Confederacy at Fort Stanwix in New York in October 1768. William
Johnson, superintendent of Indian affairs for the Northern District, negotiated with the Iroquois
to acquire all lands south of the Ohio River down to the Tennessee River. John Stuart, the
superintendent of Indian affairs for the Southern District, made a similar deal with the
Cherokees, who ceded their rights to Kentucky down to the mouth of the Kanawha River.
Finally, in the 1770 Treaty of Lochaber, Stuart confirmed the Cherokee title to much of the
country ceded by the Iroquois at the Treaty of Fort Stanwix. John Donelson, whose daughter
would later marry Andrew Jackson, surveyed this treaty line the following year, but he
negotiated with the Cherokee chief Little Carpenter to extend the southern boundary to the south
fork of the Holston River. None of the parties involved consulted the Shawnee, Mingo, or
Delaware tribes who hunted in Kentucky. It is probable that the Cherokee and Iroquois tribes

“Deposition of David Hall,” 1810, in Lyman Copeland Draper, comp., Draper Manuscript Collection (Madison:
State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1944-1949), 4C126, Microfilm, Hoskins Library Storage and Reading Room,
The University of Tennessee, Knoxville (hereinafter cited as “Hoskins Library”); Harry W. Wellford, “Dr. Thomas
Walker, His Uncelebrated Impact on Early Tennessee,” Tennessee Historical Quarterly 34, no. 2 (1975): 130-135,
138; Archibald Henderson, The Conquest of the Old Southwest: The Romantic Story of the Early Pioneers into
Virginia, the Carolinas, Tennessee, and Kentucky, 1740-1790 (1920; reprint, Spartanburg: The Reprint Company,
1974), 113-114; Joseph Martin to a Friend, May 9, 1769, in Draper, Draper Manuscript Collection, 3XX4-7,
Microfilm, Hoskins Library.
2
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sold the land, which they did not use for hunting, to channel settlement away from their main
hunting and living grounds.3
These treaties heightened interest in the settlement of the West. Numerous petitions were
received by the Virginia House of Burgesses asking for land in this newly acquired territory.
Most petitioners were part of syndicates seeking to claim tens of thousands of acres. Prominent
Virginians such as Thomas Jefferson and Patrick Henry eagerly anticipated the growing strength
and prosperity of western Virginia and the Ohio country. John Donelson and William Cocke,
who were to be influential in settling Tennessee lands, requested 50,000 acres from the mouth of
the Louisa River to the Ohio River. Dunmore himself held Ohio lands. In 1772, he convinced
the House of Burgesses to create Fincastle County, which encompassed Virginia’s western
claims from the Appalachian Mountains to the Mississippi River. For the next two years, he sent
surveyors into Kentucky. These large purchases of land encouraged many families to move west
between 1769 and 1773.4
Watauga became the first settlement in what was to become Tennessee in the fall of
1768. The land lies between the Holston River to the north and the Watauga River to the south.
The center of the settlement became known as Sycamore Shoals, near present-day Elizabethton,

3

William R. Nester, George Rogers Clark (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2012), 13-14; Stanley J.
Folmsbee, Robert E. Corlew, and Enoch L. Mitchell, Tennessee: A Short History (Knoxville: The University of
Tennessee Press, 1976), 49-50; R. Douglas Hurt, The Indian Frontier, 1763-1846 (Albuquerque: University of New
Mexico Press, 2002), 12-13, 17; Thomas D. Curtis, Riches, Real Estate, and Resistance: How Land Speculation,
Debt, and Trade Monopolies Led to the American Revolution (Chichester, United Kingdom: John Wiley and Sons,
2014), 99-104; “Treaty of Lochaber,” October 18, 1770, in Draper, Draper Manuscript Collection, 1CC147-153,
Microfilm, Hoskins Library.
4
“Petition to Take Up Land West of the Allegany Mountains, January 1769,” in William P. Palmer, ed., Calendar of
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Tennessee. Watauga began as a speculative venture by a wealthy North Carolina attorney named
Richard Henderson. Educated at home in Granville County during the 1740s, Henderson
assisted his father Samuel, the sheriff of the county, and he went on to obtain a law license and
acquire an extensive practice. His practice earned enough income to employ several agents,
including the famed backwoodsman Daniel Boone, to conduct explorations of Kentucky and
Tennessee lands. In the late 1760s, Henderson employed another resolute backwoodsman named
James Robertson to actually establish a settlement. Robertson, having visited the area in the
spring, returned with his cousin Charles and ten families in the fall of 1768. They planted corn
and surveyed suitable lands for cultivation. Other prominent settlers included Evan Shelby and
his sons Isaac and John from Maryland, Valentine Sevier and his son John from Virginia, John
Carter and his son Landon from Virginia, and John Tipton, also from Virginia. These families
were crucial in shaping western development in Tennessee.5
Although most of these land managers possessed similar economic standing, they did not
necessarily form cohesive interests. Evan Shelby, for example, purchased his land along the
Holston from Virginia speculators. After he arrived at the Watauga settlements near the end of
1770, he wrote to his sons, who were still in Maryland, and instructed them “to Purchis all
officers and Soldeirs Rights you Can Possible Git So that Git them to go with you to the
Collonels of the Redgments and to git a proper Sartifycatt that the warrents may be obtained.”
Shelby was also surveying land for a colonel back home, and the colonel had promised to pay
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Shelby with one-third of the lands granted from his surveys. Shelby would later become one of
the leaders of a prominent political faction in opposition to John Sevier. From its inception,
frontier development portended conflict among speculators.6
Donelson’s extension of the boundary line during the Treaty of Lochaber was done to
give sanction to Watauga. By 1771, the first settlement at Watuaga had enabled the
establishment of three other settlements. One lay south of Sycamore Shoals along the
Nolachucky River. Its proprietor was a man named Jacob Brown, who had come with the
original settlers. He negotiated a purchase with the Cherokees for land along the river to
establish a store. Brown in turn sold small parcels of land to settlers to finance his purchase from
the Indians. Another settlement lay at the Long Island of the river. The Shelby family, Anthony
and Isaac Bledsoe, John Anderson, and William Cocke were the most prominent residents. The
last settlement lay west of the North Holston settlement in Carter’s Valley, so named for John
Carter. All of these settlements were believed to be within Virginia’s land claims, although
neither Virginia nor North Carolina moved to exercise any authority over them.7
The Wataugans adopted a simple form of government. The settlers met in a convention
and signed a written constitution that created a semblance of a county court. Five commissioners
would adjudicate all disputes, and a clerk and a sheriff were appointed. James Robertson was
one of the commissioners. Virginia’s legal system was adopted. It is unclear if this association

6

Evan Shelby to John and Isaac Shelby, January 3, 1771, in Draper, Draper Manuscript Collection, 16DD4,
Microfilm, Hoskins Library.
7
George Christian to Lyman C. Draper, June 24, 1842, quoted in Katherine Keogh White, The King’s Mountain
Men: The Story of the Battle, with Sketches of the American Soldiers who Took Part (1924; reprint, Baltimore:
Genealogical Publishing Company, 1966): 79-80, Hodges Library Special Collections, The University of Tennessee,
Knoxville (hereinafter cited as “Hodges Library”); A. V. Goodpasture, “The Watauga Association,” The American
Historical Magazine 3, no. 2 (1898): 103-107.

17

exercised authority over all the settlements, or if it merely governed the settlers south of the
Holston River.8
Britain’s restrictive Indian policy placed the burden of preserving the settlements almost
entirely on the land speculators. In 1772, Virginia made a new treaty with the Cherokees that
excluded the new settlement from the colony’s boundaries. Alexander Cameron, a deputy agent
for the British crown, ordered the settlers to vacate the land. Instead, the Wataugans selected
James Robertson and John Bean to negotiate a lease with the Cherokees. The two emissaries
gave the Cherokees £5,000-£6,000 of muskets and other goods for an eight-year lease. It is not
known who loaned the money to acquire the goods, but Robertson was involved; he and other
renters funded their lease by selling the land in small parcels for improvement.9
The Cherokee account of this transaction differed greatly. When Cameron ordered the
settlers to move off the land, the settlers begged the Cherokees to remain on the land until the
spring so that they could harvest their crops. Later they brought goods to the Indians and
convinced some of them to give leases in exchange. Many others, however, were opposed to the
transaction, but the Wataugans said that they would stay on the land whether the Cherokees took
the goods or not. Tension with the Native Americans existed from the very beginning, and
violence would, in time, determine the outcome.10
White settlement began to reshape trade and land use. Market activity introduced a
simple, yet growing, economy on the frontier that brought necessities and luxuries. Evan Shelby
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in 1772 made a journey to Maryland and returned via Fort Pitt. He returned to Watauga having
purchased blankets, linen, colored cloth, oznaburgs, tea, sugar, saddles, buckles, and cotton. For
Valentine Sevier he brought back “1 woman’s hat black silk.” Shelby purchased land from
Charles and James Robertson on January 24, 1773. He paid John Cox for improvements made to
his lands. He also hired James and William Elliott to “grub,” or clear, twenty acres of his land at
nine shillings per acre, but he docked their pay because they only managed to grub nine acres
and fifty-seven rods. Trade was the activity by which the settlers elevated their material
condition.11
John Carter introduced market activity in his valley through a store and land dealing.
Carter operated the store as a partnership with Robert Lucas. They probably sold the kinds of
frontier necessities, and perhaps luxuries, that Shelby brought with him. Carter also facilitated
land cultivation. Individuals emigrating to Natchez or other lands along the Mississippi River
would stop for a year or two along the Holston River to clear land, grow crops, and then sell their
produce and improved land to Carter or other speculators. The speculators would then flip the
land to other immigrants looking for a permanent settlement, demanding a price for the improved
land and the right of preemption.12
In December 1773, perhaps the most important figure in early Tennessee history
emigrated from Shenandoah County, Virginia. John Sevier had lived as a middling planter
before coming west. Only glimpses are available of his early life, but the evidence that does
exist points to involvement in market activity. His father, Valentine Sevier, traded with London
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firms for luxury items such as pewter, silk, and other “assorted goods.” John himself wrote
several promissory notes to various individuals, probably for tools, implements, and other goods
necessary for farming. The exchange of paper augmented a specie-poor Virginia economy.
Sevier recorded several business transactions around the time that he emigrated. He etched into
the debt column of his account books such necessities as sugar, salt, West Indian rum, and
buckskins. He also paid workers to carry tobacco and deerskins to Alexandria, Virginia, and
Baltimore, Maryland. On the credit side, he recorded cash received for tobacco, skins, butter,
and from “Andrew Stager, butcher in Baltimore.” He was assiduous in his bookkeeping; his
debits and credits balanced.13
These settlers viewed slavery as integral to development. It is difficult to ascertain how
many slaves came with these first settlers. Joseph Martin and his party brought slaves to
Powell’s Valley in 1769. Sevier’s activities in Virginia included boarding slaves for a fellow
planter. Later, many of these settlers described themselves as laboring to establish their
“plantations.” The commercial activity emerging on the western frontier would be based on
slave-produced agricultural staples.14
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New settlements on western Virginia and North Carolina lands were only a small part of
a larger movement of white settlement along the Appalachian Mountains. The various treaties at
Fort Stanwix, at Hard Labour, and at Lochaber had been British attempts to maintain an orderly
empire and stabilize Indian relationships. Instead, the treaties opened more territory for
settlement. Borderland clashes between the Ohio Indian tribes and white settlers in Virginia and
Pennsylvania began during 1774. Prominent Virginians such as George Washington, Patrick
Henry, William Preston, William Byrd, Arthur Campbell, and Andrew Lewis had large
landholdings in the Ohio Country and, in general, sought to do what the Watuagan settlers were
doing—bringing agriculture, commerce, and “improvement” to the land. Approximately 50,000
whites had moved beyond the mountains at the behest of these speculators or simply as squatters,
and the British Empire had lost the ability to control them. The coming of the war also reflected
competition among Virginian and Pennsylvanian land speculators for control of Kentucky and
Ohio lands. Indeed, some British officials, including Lord Dunmore himself, were complicit in
these dealings.15
Land agents throughout the western backcountry succeeded in keeping frontier outposts
stable during Lord Dunmore’s War. They organized defenses against Indian raids during the
summer of 1774. Daniel Smith, a militia captain under William Preston and a future settler of
Tennessee, traveled up and down the backcountry reporting to Preston about frontier conditions.
He wrote that “the constant Rumor of the Indians being just ready to fall on the Inhabitants hath
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feared away almost the whole Settlement at the head of the north fork of Clinch and Bluestone.”
He was able to convince some men to stay after they removed their wives and children from the
area. The Wataugans also oversaw construction of several stations, the most prominent being
Evan Shelby’s Station at Sapling Grove. The inhabitants came to these forts in times of danger
to better defend themselves against Indian attacks. At one point, the Watuagans successfully
defended against a raid led by a Mingo chief.16
The precipitating clash for Lord Dunmore’s War occurred on April 30, 1774, when a
group of militiamen at Wheeling, West Virginia, killed the relatives of an Ohio Indian chief.
The Ohio Indian nations of the Shawnees, the Miamis, Delawares, Wyandots, Mingos, Ottawas,
and Illinois confederated to resist further encroachment by whites. Lord Dunmore organized two
militia forces—one led by Colonel Andrew Lewis and the other led by Dunmore himself—to
march to the forks of the Ohio River and gain control of this crucial access point to the West.
Virginia men like Daniel Smith spent the summer recruiting troops and fortifying frontier
defenses. Among the men who volunteered were Evan Shelby, James Robertson, and Valentine
Sevier; about fifty Wataugans in all joined the Virginians. The decisive confrontation came on
October 10, 1774, when a Shawnee force of about 1,000 warriors led by Chief Hokoleskwa (or
Cornstalk) attacked Colonel Lewis’s militia of 1,100 men at the confluence of the Kanawha and
Ohio Rivers. The Battle of Point Pleasant lasted for a day, but Hokoleskwa was forced to retreat

16

Daniel Smith to William Preston, March 22, 1774, in Draper, Draper Manuscript Collection, 1QQ15, Microfilm,
Hoskins Library; Daniel Smith to William Preston, July 8, 1774, in Draper, Draper Manuscript Collection, 1QQ57,
Microfilm, Hoskins Library; James Robertson to William Preston, July 19, 1774, in Draper, Draper Manuscript
Collection, 1QQ66, Microfilm, Hoskins Library; James Robertson to William Preston, August 1, 1774, in Draper,
Draper Manuscript Collection, 1QQ69, Microfilm, Hoskins Library; Daniel Smith to Unknown Recipient, October
4, 1774, in Draper, Draper Manuscript Collection, 1QQ114, Microfilm, Hoskins Library; Folmsbee, et al.,
Tennessee: A Short History, 58. The James Robertson in these letters is probably a different person from the one
who came to Watauga, but it seems that both were involved in the war. See “Account of Governor Isaac Shelby
‘Early Times in Tennessee,’” in Draper, Draper Manuscript Collection, 11DD82, Microfilm, Hoskins Library.

22

back across the Ohio. At the ensuing Treaty of Camp Charlotte, Lord Dunmore forced the
Indians to recognize the land cession of 1768.17
Speculation began in earnest following Lord Dunmore’s War. One of the boldest strokes
came from Richard Henderson. In August 1774, Henderson, along with John Williams, Thomas
Hart, Nathaniel Hart, James Hogg, John Luttrell, and William Johnston, formed the Louisa
Company to purchase a large territory along the western waters from Indians. The partners
agreed to share equally the expenses and shares of the property. By the beginning of the next
year, Henderson changed the name of the company to the Transylvania Company and added
David Hart and Leonard Henly Bullock as partners. The proprietors agreed to purchase
Cherokee land bounded by the Ohio River to the north, the Cumberland River to the south, the
Louisa River to the east, and the Mississippi River to the west. The proprietors could divide
their land as they desired. Thomas Hart, for example, included his cousins John Gray Blount and
William Blount in the purchase. The Blounts, however, also had designs on Tennessee lands.
They would come to shape events in their own time.18
Henderson and the other investors wanted a private, proprietary colony devoted to
commerce. To encourage settlement, they planned to raise fifty men as soldiers to protect the
settlers until November 1, 1776. These soldiers would receive 500 acres of land each as a
reward. Each settler who raised corn or employed himself “for the good of the Community” by
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September 1, 1775, would receive five hundred acres for himself and two hundred fifty acres for
every tithable person he brought with him. Any person who established an iron works would
receive five thousand acres of land. The builder of a salt manufactory would receive one
thousand acres of land. Anyone who raised a grist mill or saw mill within one year would
receive five hundred acres of land. The farmer who could raise the greatest amount of corn
would receive five hundred additional acres, and the shepherd who produced the greatest number
of sheep would receive five hundred additional acres.19
Daniel Boone, at the instruction of Henderson, had traveled among the Cherokees during
the winter of 1774 and 1775 to encourage them to attend a treaty for the purchase. The meeting
place was to be at the Sycamore Shoals among the Wataugans. The Cherokees began gathering
there in January, and by March they numbered between 1,000 and 1,200. The leading chiefs
were Attakullaculla (Little Carpenter); his son Tsi-yugunsini (Dragging Canoe); Oconostota
(Great Warrior), a prominent war chief and precarious ally of Attakullaculla; and Savonooka (the
Raven). The Transylvania Company was represented by Henderson, John Williams, Thomas
Hart, and Nathaniel Hart. Among the Wataugans, James Robertson, Charles Robertson, John
Sevier, and Isaac Shelby attended. Joseph Martin served as an interpreter. After the purchase,
he returned to Powell’s Valley, this time for good.20
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The purchase occurred between March 14 and March 17, 1775. On the first day,
Henderson asked if the lands were indeed claimed by the Cherokees. After a brief conference,
they said yes. They then attempted to sell Henderson a 500-acre tract of land, but Henderson
refused—he stated flatly that he was not interested in small areas. The next day, the Cherokees
offered to sell lands north of the Kentucky River. Henderson replied that Virginians already
claimed these lands and added that if he could not get the lands he wanted, he would keep his
goods. At this warning, Dragging Canoe became angry, pointed to the northwest, and
proclaimed the land the “bloody ground” that would be “dark and difficult to settle.” He left the
treaty and many Cherokees followed him. He would later make good on his promise and form
the aggressive Chickamauga tribe to fight white encroachment. Despite his efforts, the treaty
continued for the next two days, and Henderson was able to make his purchase with £10,000
value of trading goods, which primarily consisted of powder and firearms. Henderson’s new
estate encompassed about 35,000,000 acres, with most of them located in present-day Kentucky
and extending down to present-day Nashville, Tennessee, along the Cumberland River.21
Attakullaculla, Oconostota, and Savanooka found the trade irresistible. The Cherokees
had recently been defeated by the Chickasaws because they had exhausted their supplies. So
strong was their desire to renew their strength that the chiefs ignored an agreement made with
England in 1730 that stipulated that the Cherokees had no right to cede lands to any buyer except
the crown. Perhaps the chiefs also sold the land because it encompassed the Cumberland River
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Valley. This area had been wrested from the Shawnees by the Chickasaws and Cherokees in
1715, but the Shawnees still claimed it.22
The Transylvania Purchase enabled the Watauga residents to make a deed of their own
with the Cherokees on March 19, 1775. Oconostota conveyed the Wataugan leases in fee simple
to Charles Robertson, who paid £2,000 in the “Lawful money of Great Britain.” The purchase
began on the southwest of the Holston River six miles above the Great Island. Residents who
wished to claim title to their leases had to obtain a warrant from Charles Robertson, who acted as
a de facto chief land surveyor. Robertson would then send surveyors to survey the claimed lands
and return a plat. Finally, Robertson would issue a patent, or grant. John Sevier, Jonathan
Tipton, John Carter, Andrew Greer, and James Robertson bought thousands of acres. Henderson
also negotiated a separate deed with the Cherokees, allowing a road to be constructed between
the Transylvania settlements and Watauga. To these settlers, trade was a crucial step toward
improvement.23
The Wataugans, however, could not rely on the Transylvania Company to maintain their
title. Henderson, along with his agent Daniel Boone and several other settlers, had success in
establishing the town of Boonesborough, near the confluence of the Kentucky River and the Red
River. The town itself survived, but Henderson’s purchase did not. After the colonies declared
their independence, the Virginia state legislature revoked the deed given to Henderson. The
revocation ended Henderson’s proprietary claim to Kentucky lands. The settlers scrambled for
state protection, especially since the outbreak of the Revolutionary War portended difficulties
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with the British and with hostile Indian tribes. The residents living north of the south fork of the
Holston, along with those living near the Long Island and those in Carter’s Valley, petitioned to
join Fincastle County, Virginia. The original Watuagan settlers initially petitioned to join
Virginia also, with the petitioners extra-legally styling themselves as representatives of the
“Washington District,” thus signaling their loyalty to the Patriot cause. Having been rebuffed by
Virginia, on July 5, 1776, Wataugan leaders sent a petition to the Provincial Council of North
Carolina asking to be annexed to that state. The petitioners pledged loyalty to the colonies and
hoped that North Carolina’s laws would strengthen the efficacy of their local courts. James
Robertson, Elijah Robertson, Charles Robertson, John Carter, Landon Carter, Valentine Sevier,
John Sevier, William Been, Andrew Greer, John Tipton, and 103 others signed the petition. The
council authorized the Wataugans to elect delegates to the forthcoming state constitutional
convention.24
The North Carolina convention gave the Wataugans definite legal and political
recognition. Delegates to the convention authorized each county to establish a county court and
provide for the election of justices of the peace. Subsequently the new North Carolina state
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legislature reorganized Washington District into Washington County, which at the time
encompassed North Carolina’s entire land claim west of the Appalachian Mountains. John
Carter was made colonel of the county, John Sevier was made lieutenant colonel, and Charles
Robertson was made first major. James Robertson became the superintendent of Indian affairs to
the Cherokees. A road was constructed from Burke County, North Carolina, to the courthouse of
the new county. Two years later the legislature created Sullivan County and appointed Isaac
Shelby its county colonel, and it created the town of Jonesborough to be the county seat in
Washington County.25
Frontier leaders bolstered their counties’ new political existence with military force. The
Revolutionary War temporarily created unity among them. These leaders, in turn, created unity
among the general populace. Virginia and North Carolina conducted joint operations against the
Cherokee Indians almost every year of the war. Arthur Campbell acted as commander-in-chief
of the frontier militias, while James Robertson, John Sevier, John Tipton, Evan Shelby, William
Cocke, and Joseph Martin oversaw the construction of stations, organized the defense of
settlements from attack, and mounted expeditions into Cherokee territory. Robertson continued
his supervision of Indian affairs. These positions enabled the settlements to develop. One
military officer implored Martin to “encourage the People in your parts not to fly and abandon
the Country, assure them I will use … my Power … to send them relief.” On another occasion,
Martin informed Virginia Governor Patrick Henry that “great will be the distress of the frontier
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Inhabitants soon if something vigorous are not soon set foot to subdue the [Cherokee] nation.”
The expeditions against the Cherokees succeeded in burning their towns, destroying their crops,
and killing some of their warriors. Each expedition resulted in a treaty with the Cherokees by
which white settlers claimed more land. In one of the last campaigns, Arthur Campbell, John
Sevier, and Joseph Martin threatened the Cherokees, saying that they hoped the latest attack
“may convince your nation that we can distress them much at any time they are so foolish as to
be engaged in a war against us.” Arthur Campbell explained to Thomas Jefferson that “never did
a people so happily situated, act more foolishly in loosing their livings, and their Country, at a
time an advantageous neutrality was held out to them but such is the consequence of British
seduction.” These developments convinced many Cherokees that accommodation with the
whites was impossible. Tsi-yugunsini formed a large number of Cherokees into a separate
nation and moved to the Nickajack area near present-day Chattanooga. This tribe became known
as the Lower Cherokees or Chickamaugas. Attakullakulla and Oconostota remained the
principal chiefs of the Overhill or Upper Cherokees.26
Military coercion succeeded in reappropriating the land for expanded market activity.
Arthur Campbell hoped to establish a permanent garrison at the confluence of the French Broad
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and Holston Rivers because, he argued, it would keep the Cherokee nation “always at our mercy,
and prevent our enemies from sending emissaries among them.” It would also enable the settlers
to open trade relations with the Chickasaw Indians and thereby gain access to the Mississippi
River. As the British threat diminished, desire for the free navigation of the Mississippi
increased among these western settlers. Their first step, however, was to oversee the first
attempts to create trade networks. In Washington County, for example, the county court
regulated all sorts of economic activity. It regulated an open range domain, in which livestock
were allowed to roam free and crops were fenced in. The court recorded the marks of sheep,
hogs, and cattle to differentiate between owners so that the owners could periodically drive their
animals to market. The court also directed the clearing of roads. Some roads connected
individual plantations, especially if a plantation lay along a creek or river. For example, Andrew
Greer was appointed overseer of the road from John Sevier’s house on the Watauga “to a place
within two miles of Solomon Smith’s house.” Other roads went from the courthouse to
individual residences or to creeks. One went from the courthouse to a mill; another went from
Watauga River to the county line. By the late 1780s, the court had overseen the clearing of two
wagon roads, with both originating at a central point on the Watuaga River and leading to
different creeks. The court authorized the overseers of each road to draft inhabitants near the
route to clear and maintain them.27
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The county court also authorized the construction of mills. Grist mills began to dot the
landscape along creeks, and roads connected them with central locations. The court typically
restricted the time period allowed for an individual to build the mill to encourage rapid growth.
It is difficult to tell precisely if the mills were for the personal use of the owners, or if they
intended to offer their services to the surrounding farmers. The termination of many roads at
mill locations, however, indicates some sort of desire to connect with larger markets.28
Regulation of economic activity limited the bounds within which trade operated. North
Carolina, along with virtually all of the other states, regulated the fees charged by ferry
operators, the prices charged by tavern owners, and the entry of individuals into these ventures.
The Washington County court made annual adjustments to the prices that tavern owners could
charge for rum, whiskey, brandy, beer, breakfast, dinner, and lodging.29
Westward expansion came to the Cumberland region, present-day Middle Tennessee, in
1779. The origins of this settlement lay with the erstwhile owner of the Transylvania lands,
Richard Henderson. When Virginia voided Henderson’s Transylvania purchase, this did not
affect his claim to that portion of the Transylvania lands lying in the Tennessee country, as
Tennessee lands were subject to North Carolina’s jurisdiction. Indeed, North Carolina’s
legislature appointed Henderson and James Smith to extend the boundary of the state with
Virginia westward to the Mississippi River; Virginia joined by appointing Thomas Walker and
Daniel Smith. The North Carolina commissioners separated from the Virginia commissioners
after they reached the north fork of the Holston River because Henderson feared their course had
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become crooked and would include the Cumberland region within Virginia’s jurisdiction. He
thenceforth ran a parallel line two miles north, and the Virginia commissioners continued with
their line. As it turned out, even the line run by Walker and Smith placed the Cumberland region
within North Carolina’s jurisdiction. Henderson’s land was temporarily safe.30
In February 1779, James Robertson resigned his post as superintendent of Indian affairs
for Washington County and led eight men, including a slave, to a sulfur spring known as the
French Lick near present-day Nashville. They planted a field of corn, left three men to protect
the crops, and returned to the Watauga settlements to retrieve their families. Some of the
explorers from the 1760s came in the spring. In December, John Donelson took a large party
from Fort Patrick Henry on the Long Island and endured a four-month journey down the
Tennessee River, eventually disembarking near the Ohio River and crossing overland to the
mouth of the Cumberland River. As they passed up the Cumberland, they met Henderson
running a boundary line between Virginia and North Carolina. He assured them he had
purchased corn for the settlements. Donelson’s expedition finally arrived on April 24, 1780. In
all, between two and three hundred individuals settled on the Cumberland lands. The settlers
named the location “Nashborough,” after the North Carolina General Francis Nash.31
The Cumberland settlers found themselves in a similar situation to the Wataugans. They
formed their own government under the “Cumberland Compact,” a constitution primarily written
by Henderson. It provided for governmental authority in a committee of twelve judges, the
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members of which were to be elected by the freemen of each station. Three were to be elected
from Nashborough, two each from Gasper’s and Eaton’s, and one each from Bledsoe’s, Asher’s,
Stone’s River, Freeland’s, and Fort Union. Any station could hold a recall election for its judge.
The court had jurisdiction over disputes concerning land entries, the trial of civil suits, criminal
prosecutions, and the organization of the militia. A land office was opened to sell the claims of
Henderson’s Company, pending North Carolina’s recognition of the company’s title.32
Robertson is due much of the credit for the survival of the Cumberland settlements. For
the remainder of the Revolutionary War, the settlers faced incessant attacks from the Chickasaw
Indians. No corn was planted in 1781, and by 1782 the situation was desperate. Many returned
to the East. Even John Donelson fled with his family and moved to Kentucky. John Haywood
reported that “the common custom of the country was for one or two persons to stand as
watchmen or sentinels whilst others labored in the field; and even whilst one went to a spring to
drink another stood on the watch with his gun.” Many settlers deserted Cumberland in 1782, and
Robertson with difficulty persuaded enough to stay so that the stations would remain viable.33
The Cumberland settlements also received strength from official state recognition.
Nearing the end of the Revolution, the North Carolina Assembly in 1782 passed “An Act for the
Relief of the Officers and Soldiers in the Continental Line, and for Other Purposes Therein
Mentioned.” The state, burdened by wartime debt, wanted to pay its soldiers in western lands.
Each soldier would be issued a negotiable certificate that verified his service and indicated how
much land he could claim. The Assembly also provided preemption rights to anyone who settled
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around the French Lick before June 1, 1780. Because the lands were reserved in this way, the
legislature also revoked Henderson’s title. As compensation, the state awarded his company
200,000 acres of land outside the military reservation, stating that “the purchases which they
have made may save the State some expence in attaining peaceable possession of the Lands from
the Indians.” Peaceable possession would be overseen by the commissioners Absalom Tatum,
Isaac Shelby, and Anthony Bledsoe, who were tasked with recording those settlers who had
preemption status. Bledsoe, Shelby, and Tatum found a primitive frontier community around the
French Lick. The settlers depended on trading furs in exchange for goods brought by French
merchants from Illinois. Many settlers had cleared land in anticipation of establishing
plantations and commerce. The commissioners made 484 entries, and each listed 640 acres of
land. Frederick Stump, for example, obtained 640 acres on a branch of the Cumberland River
where he had made his plantation in 1780. It extended up the creek to where “Stump’s road
crosses the creek at a Rocky ford.” Many other entries make note of preemptions that included
an “improvement,” which most likely indicated land that had been cleared for cultivation.34
The negotiability of soldiers’ certificates commenced the first stirrings of land
speculation in the Cumberland region. Many of the individuals who moved to “Nashboro” had
the means to engage in land speculation. A typical entry reads, “Benjamin Logan [assignee] of
William Montgomery [assignee] of Alexander Pamelin who is [assignee] of Edmund Newton
obtained a preemption of 640 acres of land.” Most prominent among these speculators were
James Robertson, his brothers Elijah and Mark, his cousin Charles, John Donelson, William
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Cocke, Isaac Shelby, Daniel Smith, and Isaac Bledsoe. Many of these settlers bought from the
soldiers’ military certificates. The purchasers became the “assignees.” Wealthy land speculators
and their well-to-do agents, rather than poor squatters, initiated western expansion.35
Speculative ventures quickened with the end of the Revolutionary War. North Carolina’s
speculators anticipated the growth of Tennessee lands, and no speculator became more
influential than William Blount. Born in 1749, Blount came from a family of Cavalier descent
and professed the practical conservatism of John Dickinson. In 1771, he and his father Jacob
assisted North Carolina’s colonial government in defeating a tax rebellion by inhabitants of the
central counties. During the Revolution, he had held important state offices. By 1782 he was
representing North Carolina in the Continental Congress. Blount’s involvement with the
Transylvania purchase had whetted his appetite, and he quickly perceived the potential that
independence created in profiting from western lands. While still serving in the Continental
Congress, Blount began to work for a cession of North Carolina’s western lands to the national
government.36
Blount and his brothers John Gray and Thomas already operated several ventures in
North Carolina. Their pursuit of wealth was unbounded. His cousin Thomas Hart wrote him, “I
Remember you told me whenever you heard any person [complaining] against Others, for
making Money too fast, you looked on him as an envious man, who was disturb’d Only with his
Own [mis]fortune.” The three brothers were immensely successful. They performed mercantile
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activities during the 1770s, and in 1783 they formed the company John Gray and Thomas
Blount, Merchants, to better organize their affairs and finance their western land schemes. Their
economic activities indicate what they envisioned for future western development and mirror
what transmontane settlers were already doing on a smaller scale. Thomas ran a store in
Tarborough, where he traded goods like rum, salt, sugar, coffee, and iron for North Carolina’s
agricultural staples—tobacco, turpentine, tar, pitch, lumber, wheat, and corn. John Gray
operated the main trading house at Washington, where he received agricultural produce from
Thomas’s store and surrounding planters. The Blounts also used their own slaves to extract these
staple crops. Their firm hired ship captains to bring produce to markets in Philadelphia, New
York, the West Indies, and Europe in exchange for manufactured goods and the foodstuffs at
Thomas’s store. They employed apprentices, many of whom had little hope for schooling and
whose mothers asked that their sons be given the chance to find opportunity by working for the
captains of Blount-owned vessels. The Blounts owned several grist mills, sawmills, and
distilleries. They established at least one academy in Greeneville to teach reading, writing,
arithmetic, geography, and Latin. Their connections with the North also made them aware of
potential innovations, especially as they pertained to new agricultural implements. The Blounts
would strengthen the imperative of improvement already pervading the settlements along the
Watauga and the Cumberland region.37
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The combination of business and politics began during the spring session of the North
Carolina Assembly in 1783. Blount resigned from the Continental Congress, won election to the
state House of Commons as a representative from Bertie County, and maneuvered himself onto
the steering committee. His brother John Gray served as a representative from Beaufort County.
A series of laws passed by the assembly created the conditions by which small-scale speculation
metamorphosed into big-stakes real estate investment. The first law passed emitted £100,000 in
new currency. Each pound was equal to $2 ½ Spanish milled. The currency was made legal
tender. The act provided that commissioners were to grant to the continental line the printed
certificates that would bear 6% interest until paid in specie.38
Next, the assembly modified the original act that established the Cumberland region as a
military reservation. The new law moved the southern border of reservation north because of the
Indian threat. It also established a land office in Nashville with Martin Armstrong as its chief
surveyor. Davidson County was established to encompass the entire reservation.39
Finally, the assembly opened a land office “for the Redemption of Specie and Other
Certificates, and Discharging Arrears Due to the Army.” This act, introduced by John Gray
Blount, opened a more expansive operation. All land west of the Appalachian Mountains to the
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Mississippi River was opened for purchase and survey, except those lands claimed by Indians.
Claimants would pay £10 in specie, or specie certificates at their face value, or certificates for
currency as rated by law, for every 100 acres entered. The land office was opened at
Hillsborough, and John Armstrong, Martin Armstrong’s brother, was appointed entry-taker.40
Both offices followed lengthy procedures for validating grants. Regarding the Nashville
office, a soldier was to receive a warrant for survey from the secretary of state of North Carolina.
The secretary was supposed to verify that the claimant had served, or a former officer could
verify that a claimant had served if no documentation could be found. Once the soldier had
received his warrant, he had two choices. First, he could send the warrant to the Nashville land
office. The office would then assign a surveyor to find the required number of acres and produce
a plat of the land. The surveyor would return the warrant and the plat to Armstrong’s office, and
Armstrong would send them to the secretary of state’s office. The secretary would prepare a
grant and countersign it with the governor. Alternatively, the soldier could simply endorse the
warrant and sell (or assign) his rights to anyone. Most soldiers chose this second option, for they
had neither the means nor the ambition to go west.41
John Armstrong’s land office in Hillsborough differed only in that it was open to all
comers. First, the speculator or an agent would explore an area of western land and mark out
boundaries desired. This survey was called an “entry.” The speculator submitted this entry to
the entry-taker—John Armstrong. Armstrong would record the entry and issue a warrant to the
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claimant. At this point, official surveyors connected with the office would use the warrant to
survey the land and create a plat. The entry-taker would then submit a warrant and its
corresponding plat to the secretary of state, who would issue a grant with the authorization of the
governor. Finally, the speculator gained title when the grant was recorded in the county office
where the land was located.42
Such a process guaranteed that the western land would become a massive commodity for
speculation. Prominent frontier names appear in John Armstrong’s entry book: Robertsons,
Blounts, Tiptons, Donelsons, Shelbys, Carters, Bledsoes, McDowell, Hezekiah Balch, John
Sitgreaves, Andrew Ross, Thomas Hutchins, John Haywood, Willie Jones, Thomas Person,
William Davie, and Joseph Martin received entries for hundreds of thousands of acres of western
North Carolina land. Robertson also became Blount’s personal agent and surveyor. On October
13, 1783, the two men entered an agreement whereby Blount would “purchase the Rights of as
many Officers and Soldiers as He conveniently can probably Fifty thousand Acres [or possibly]
one hundred thousand acres.” He agreed to send these rights to James Robertson in Davidson
County, which Robertson would then locate and survey. Blount allowed Robertson to claim onefourth of the land surveyed in fee simple as payment. They also agreed that Blount would “enter
immediately forty thousand acres of Land lying on the South West side of the River Tennessee,”
for which Robertson would again receive one-fourth in fee simple.43
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Time favored the speculators. Warrants purchased from soldiers or entered via individual
entries could be held for an indefinite amount of time. Even if some speculators acquired
warrants for land within Indian territory, everyone expected that Indian claims would, as a matter
of course, be extinguished. For example, North Carolina Governor Alexander Martin in 1782
instructed the commissioners who had been appointed to hold a treaty with the Cherokees to
“agree upon a western line by which they and you shall be sacredly bounded, which confining
and contracting their settlements, they will soon be circumscribed by white Inhabitants and their
power reduced to the harmless and inoffensive situation of the Catawbas.” Speculators expected
to have their choice of lands eventually. Belief in the warrants’ value meant that they were even
used as money.44
The speculative binge encouraged fraudulent schemes. Blount was foremost in such
activity. He shielded his activities well, never speaking of land transactions via a letter when a
private conversation would do. He officially owned the maximum 5,000 acres allowed by law.
But Blount and many other speculators took advantage of a crucial omission from the land office
laws; the assembly failed to prohibit a surveyor from making a union of several surveys in one
entry. The only practical limit that existed for land ownership, therefore, was the speculator’s
ability to pay. Blount’s employment of Robertson demonstrates how agents could be used to
defy such restrictions without public embarrassment, and he probably established a similar
arrangement with John Donelson’s son, Stockley.45
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Extra-legal technicalities, however, paled in comparison to illegal schemes. According to
a later investigation of these land offices, North Carolina’s secretary of state, James Glasgow,
delivered “these warrants to any person who applied for them on behalf of the claimant without
requiring the Applicant to shew his authority to draw the warrant.” Officers submitted false
certificates in order to falsely acquire military warrants. Surveyors were bribed to alter warrants
which indicated the name of rightful assignees. One warrant holder, Michael Rogers, wrote to
John Gray Blount complaining that he saw a warrant for 274 acres ostensibly signed by him and
endorsed to John Gray and Thomas Blount, who then sold the warrant to James Robertson.
Rogers angrily wrote that “I Never Conveyed that Property to any person Neither was it in my
hand Writing,” and threatened a lawsuit if not paid immediately. Indeed, the firm John Gray and
Thomas Blount was one of the worst offenders, although virtually everyone participated in the
sordid affair. Thomas Person, a political opponent of the Blount brothers, acquired soldiers’
warrants without any evidence of an assignment. John Sevier also probably caught the fever,
although his schemes would not be revealed for several years. Speculation had two faces—one
provided real impetus and security for white settlement, while the other brought personal
aggrandizement through fraud, bribery, and corruption.46
Despite these machinations, the emission of currency and the opening of the land office
attracted support from a broad base of the assembly members. Regarding the currency act, most
legislators understood the need for North Carolina to issue some kind of currency to pay the
Continental Line. Some legislators undoubtedly hoped to economically benefit from the new
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currency. Blount and like-minded merchants and speculators perhaps hoped that the fiat paper
would provide a medium to purchase specie certificates and other state securities, which in turn
could purchase land from the state land office. Richard Caswell, for example, a close friend and
mentor of Blount and the speaker of the Senate, planned to purchase state securities circulating at
one-fifth to one-fourth of their face value. Purchases of these securities were usually done on
credit, payable in cash at three months, six months, nine months, or a year. As long as the
market value of these securities remained depreciated, and as long as the law allowed the
payments for land at the face value of these securities, the potential for profit boggled the
imagination. Others, like Timothy Bloodworth, held no western lands but still stood to gain from
the law’s provision that all confiscated property from Loyalists would be set aside exclusively as
a fund to redeem the new currency. Regarding the land office bill, almost all the members hoped
that western lands would be used to retire state certificates. Governor Alexander Martin and
Thomas Person, who became leading opponents of Blount and his coalition, held thousands of
acres in western lands. Person himself fraudulently acquired military warrants. They had no
objections to a land office, although they were leery of the individuals behind it.47
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Blount’s primary project was the settlement of the Great Bend of the Tennessee River, or
the Muscle Shoals region. But at the same legislative session in which the land office was
established, the commissioners that were sent in 1782 to survey the lands for the military district
returned and presented a report. From them Blount learned that the Great Bend lay south of
North Carolina’s border with Georgia. He thus formed a company for the purpose of colonizing
the land. The company had six proprietors—Blount himself, Richard Caswell, Griffith
Rutherford, Joseph Martin, John Donelson, and John Sevier. Martin, Donelson, and Sevier
already had extensive knowledge of the western territory, to which Martin and Donelson added
their longstanding relationships with various Indian tribes. Indeed, Martin had been serving as
Virginia’s agent to the Cherokees since 1776. In 1783, the North Carolina Assembly appointed
him to the same position for their state.48
The company began on a promising note. Martin and Donelson initiated the company’s
operations in the fall of 1783 by making a purchase from the Cherokee Indians for lands near the
Great Bend. They made this private purchase while also acting as commissioners for Virginia in
establishing a treaty with the Chickasaw Indians. In their official capacity as Virginia diplomats,
they managed to convince the Chickasaws to recognize the legitimacy of the Cumberland
settlements. In February 1784 Blount visited the Georgia assembly and convinced its members
to establish a new county in the Bend area. It was to be governed by a commission of seven
men—four Georgians, Martin, Donelson, and Sevier. Donelson was additionally appointed
surveyor. The commissioners were empowered to grant warrants of survey for the land, with the
plats created by the surveyors to be sent to the Surveyor General, who in turn would issue a grant
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for the land. Purchasers could buy land at one-eighth of a dollar per acre, but no individual could
obtain more than 1,000 acres. Blount instructed Martin to make surveys as soon as possible. He
wrote that “what will most readily influence the Georgia Commissioners to grant a large quantity
of Acres will be an appearance of many People being about to go immediately to that Country to
settle therefore you will necessarily keep up a Report of as many being about to go as you
possibly can whether true or not.” Blount freely admitted using Anthony Bledsoe’s name
without his permission, explaining that “he was known to be an over Mountain Man and of much
Influence consequently in the Eyes of the State of Georgia gave Weight to the Petitioners, you
[Joseph Martin] will please mention the circumstances to him.” Blount hoped to increase the
real demand for western lands by creating the illusion of increased demand for western lands.49
State politics disrupted the company’s operations in 1784. Although most of the
members of the North Carolina Assembly had supported the previous year’s legislative program
of paper currency, land offices, and speculation, the question of how to dispose of the western
lands proved more contentious. At the General Assembly’s session in April 1784, this conflict
came to a head. William Blount again took the lead in shaping western land policy, hoping to
place the final touches on his speculative schemes. First, he introduced bills that created the
counties of Sullivan and Greene, and he introduced a bill that created a town at James
Robertson’s settlement on the Cumberland River—Nashville. Two days later, Blount introduced
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a bill for ceding North Carolina’s western lands to the United States. The lands encompassed the
future state of Tennessee. The bill passed its first reading, and the next day the assembly closed
the land office opened in 1783. Prior to the second reading of the cession bill on May 18,
William R. Davie and Thomas Person led an attempt to narrow the extent of the territory. Blount
and his coalition were able to restore the original boundaries on May 19, and the bill passed its
second reading. Four days later, the third and final reading of the bill passed by a margin of
fifty-two to forty-three, and the measure became law.50
The vote superficially reflected class conflict. Blount’s coalition contained eastern
speculators, eager to profit from western settlement, and eastern conservatives, eager to rid the
state of unruly western settlers who incessantly agitated Indians. The opposition was more
fractured. North Carolina’s western representatives, excluding those from the transmontane
region, generally opposed the cession; the transmontane representatives were divided. Some
easterners had their conservative sensibilities offended by the grubby business. William R.
Davie, an easterner, entered a protest in which he asserted that the bill sacrificed the general
interest of the state to “the aggrandizement of a few Land Jobbers who have preyed on the
depreciated credit of their Country and the necessities of the unfortunate citizen.” All the
cession’s opponents signed this petition. The cession bill may have been a speculative grab by
land jobbers, but land jobbers also led opposition to the bill. In fact, almost 60% of the bill’s
opponents were speculators in Tennessee lands, while only 40% of its supporters had speculative
holdings. The opposition stemmed more from concerns over the readiness of western settlers to
establish their own government, rather than a concern over wealthy speculators directing the
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course of western settlement. Conflict over the cession act reflected the efforts of disparate
speculators to control western development, rather than rival classes contending for control of
the government. Thomas Person hoped that North Carolinians would buy up all the western
lands and deny Congress the ability to claim them. He believed that the western country would
become a separate state, and he planned to emigrate. The question over western lands was more
political than economic.51
The 1784 assembly also divided Tennessee lands into three sections and elected three
chief surveyors—Stockley Donelson was elected to manage the land between Greene County
and Cumberland Mountain; William Polk would manage the land between the Cumberland
Mountain and the Tennessee River; and William T. Lewis would oversee the land between the
Tennessee River and the Mississippi River. Donelson acquired enormous holdings, much of
them concentrated near present-day Chattanooga—a key site for the Muscle Shoals
speculation.52
Conflict over the cession of western lands carried over into the next session of the
assembly in October. Blount’s western program was in danger. He worried that “every Person I
have seen here envied us the Purchase and wished to own a Part of the Bent of Tenesee.”
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Speculators had entered lands which lay outside the bounds of North Carolina and within the
bounds of the Muscle Shoals purchase, hoping to receive grants from North Carolina anyway.
Blount’s fears proved correct. The anti-cession delegates, especially Person, Davie, and
Alexander Mebane, had spent the summer campaigning against the cession act, accusing Blount
and his coalition of bribery, corruption, and an improper influence over Congress. Person and
Mebane no doubt kept quiet about their own immense estates. Hugh Williamson, a member of
the Confederation Congress, an associate of Blount, and another western speculator, also
attacked the cession act on the grounds that it did not provide for the assumption by Congress of
the cost of North Carolina’s Indian wars. They did their work well, and their cause was
strengthened when Congress dithered in accepting the cession. Enough new representatives
were elected to the Assembly to assure the cession act’s repeal, even though Blount remained the
Speaker of the House and Caswell remained the Speaker of the Senate. Pro-cession speculators
tried to save some of their program, but the final outcome was never in doubt. The repeal of the
cession passed with a vote of 19-11 in the Senate and 37-22 in the House. Although the
Assembly contained new representatives, the yeas and nays over the repeal act reflected a similar
intermixture of economic interests as in the passage of the original cession bill. In the Senate,
approximately 50% of the members who voted “yea” held western lands, while 73% of the
members who voted “nay” held western lands. In the House, 59% of the members who voted for
the repeal held western lands, while 64% of the members who voted against it held western
lands. The difference over the cession of western land stemmed from differences over how the
West should be settled, and who would manage its settlement.53

53

William Blount to Joseph Martin, October 26, 1783, in Draper, Draper Manuscript Collection, 4XX17,
Microfilm, Hoskins Library; “House Journal October 1784,” in Clark, State Records of North Carolina, 19: 717-

47

While the North Carolina assembly wrestled with the fate of western lands, transmontane
settlers began to fight a similar battle to determine their own fate. The ill-fated state of Franklin
would be the result. News of the cession act reached the western counties of Washington,
Greene, and Sullivan over the summer. The settlers wasted no time in exercising selfgovernment. County residents at first elected two representatives from each militia company to
assemble as a committee. The committee called for a convention of delegates from the counties,
and an assembly met on August 23, 1784. From Washington, the representatives included John
Sevier, Charles Robertson, and Landon Carter. Sullivan County’s representatives included
Joseph Martin, Gilbert Christian, William Cocke, and Stockley Donelson. Greene County’s
representatives included Alexander Outlaw and David Campbell. Sevier was appointed
president, and Carter was appointed clerk. The assembly at this moment merely decided to
support the laws of North Carolina for their temporary government. The assembly also resolved
that “if we should be so happy as to have a separate government, vast numbers from different
quarters, with little encouragement from the public, would fill up our frontier, which would
strengthen us, improve agriculture, perfect manufactures, encourage literature and everything
truly laudable.” No anger was expressed at being cast off from North Carolina’s protection. On
the contrary, the report concluded that “the Assembly of North Carolina, by their late cession
bill, opened the door, and by their prudent measures invite us to it.” The convention met again in
November, only to break up in confusion over the repeal of the cession act. Yet on December
14, 1784, five delegates from each county met in convention, agreed to establish a constitution

760, 805, McClung Collection; “Senate Journal October 1784,” in Clark, State Records of North Carolina, 19: 400427, 460, McClung Collection; the names of the western speculators can be found in Griffey, Earliest Tennessee
Land Records, 74-426.

48

within the next year, and decided that in the meantime a legislative assembly should be elected.
The assembly met in early 1785, elected Sevier governor, appointed David Campbell a judge of
the superior court, and appointed Joshua Gist and John Anderson assistant judges. Landon
Carter became the Speaker of the Senate, and William Cage became Speaker of the Commons.
Prominent frontier leaders that joined this faction included William Cocke, Alexander Outlaw,
and Stockley Donelson. The state of Franklin was born. The assembly asserted its authority by
creating three more counties—Caswell, Spencer (present-day Hawkins), and Sevier.54
North Carolina attempted to allay this discontent. The same assembly that had repealed
the cession act organized the westernmost counties of Davidson, Greene, Sullivan, and
Washington into the Washington District. Judge David Campbell was appointed to preside over
a superior court. The militiamen of the new district were formed into a brigade, and John Sevier
was appointed brigadier general. Provision was given for a treaty with the Cherokee Indians to
reconcile the seizure of their land under the 1783 land act. At first, Sevier seemed satisfied with
these concessions. On December 14, 1784, the day that the people came together in Washington
County to elect deputies to the Franklin convention, Sevier announced from the steps of the
courthouse that “the grievances which the people complained of are redressed, and my
recommendation to them is that they proceed no farther in their design to separate from North
Carolina.” Yet by March he changed his mind again, probably because the force of his

54

Haywood, Civil and Political History of the State of Tennessee, 150-152, 154-155, 161; Alexander Martin to John
Sevier, December 1784, in Clark, State Records of North Carolina, 17: 109, McClung Collection; “A Talk
Delivered by the Old Tassel to Colonel Joseph Martin for His Excellency Alexander Martin, Esquire, Governor of
North Carolina, for Himself and Whole Nation,” October 10, 1784, in Clark, State Records of North Carolina, 17:
175, McClung Collection.

49

popularity had propelled him to the governorship. Franklin’s statehood had gained too much
support to be stopped.55
Governor Alexander Martin issued a manifesto on April 25, 1785, in an effort to rally
Franklin inhabitants back to North Carolina. Martin accused Franklin’s leaders of “a restless
ambition and a lawless thirst for power … by which the persons concerned therein, may be
precipitated into measures that may, at last, bring down ruin, not only on themselves, but our
country at large.” Martin asserted the right of the state to control its vacant territory, with which
it could pay its public debts, and in this argument he joined with the assembly members who had
voted to repeal the cession act. The Franklinites themselves were divided on this question; both
John Tipton and Evan Shelby wrote to Governor Martin, assuring him that they remained loyal
to North Carolina.56
Initially, however, Sevier remained popular. He wasted no time in using his position as
governor to enlarge Franklin’s territory, again at the expense of the Cherokees. Sevier’s
consolidation of power came at a fortunate time too, for Attakullaculla and Oconostota had died
in 1780 and 1782, respectively. A peaceful chief named Onitositah (Old Tassel), aided by
another Cherokee chief named Scolacutta (Hanging Maw), had assumed the responsibilities of
the nation. Onitositah well understood the lust for land that drove white settlers. He once
remarked that “truth is, if we had no lands, we should have fewer enemies.” Yet he acted
unwisely when Sevier invited him to meet Franklin representatives on Dumplin Creek for “A
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Treaty of Amity and Friendship.” Instead of attending himself, Onitositah sent Ancoo of Chota
and other young chiefs to negotiate. The meeting occurred on May 31, 1785. Sevier, Outlaw,
Joshua Gist, and other Franklinites probably tricked the inexperienced chiefs into signing a
document that they did not fully understand. The lands fraudulently acquired by the whites at
this meeting extended south to the present site of Knoxville, Tennessee.57
The doings of the Muscle Shoals speculators regarding the beginning of the state of
Franklin are shrouded in mystery. On December 4, 1784, Blount wrote to Sevier, Martin, and
Donelson relaying his hopes that a land office would be established at the Long Island on
Holston for the entry of Muscle Shoals lands. He intended to attend an upcoming treaty between
North Carolina and the Cherokee Indians, and he hoped to delay the opening of the office so that
he could attend the beginning of the land sales in person. Of the Franklin movement, Blount
cryptically said that “it is the Opinion of many well-informed People in this quarter that
notwithstanding the repealing act if Congress accepts the Cession in the Time limited by the
Cession Act that the Soil will become the Property of the United States.” It is possible that
Blount wanted the new state to stand because it would ensure the territorial integrity and political
existence of the ceded lands under the authority of the United States. In addition, it seems that
Sevier played an influential role in convincing the western inhabitants to form their own state.
Martin, informing Sevier of the North Carolina assembly’s decision to repeal the cession act,
wanted to know if Sevier “intended to persist in establishing a government or let it lay over.” It
was at this point that Sevier vacillated, only to re-commit to the Franklin movement in early
1785. By October, after Franklin’s government had been established and the Treaty of Dumplin
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Creek had been ratified, Sevier wrote to Blount regarding the Muscle Shoals speculation, saying
that he believed the project was “quite Safe, and almost in Our Own hands as to the Settling of
that Rich and fertile Country.” Regarding Franklin, Sevier added that “I suppose Much Will be
said in your Assembly Respecting our New State—I hope there Will be Gentlemen enough in
that body possessed of Just and Liberal principles to Support and Defend Any thing that will be
Said against Us.” And the state of Franklin certainly benefitted from the election of Richard
Caswell, who replaced Governor Martin in 1785. It seems that the speculators initially viewed
the Franklin movement with some unease, but finally decided that a new state would not harm
their designs for the Muscle Shoals region.58
The Muscle Shoals speculation almost became reality in December 1785. Sevier and
Donelson joined a party of ninety men in an effort to establish a settlement. The commissioners
opened a land office, which proceeded to issue warrants. They remained two weeks, but the
Chickasaw Indians threatened imminent attack unless the settlers moved off the land.
Tuskyatook, King of the Chickasaws, ensured that white settlers stayed off the land and made it
impossible for the Muscle Shoals speculators to return.59
An additional hindrance to the Muscle Shoals speculation came from the Treaty of
Hopewell, ratified by the United States and Onitositah and Scolacutta. On November 18, 1785,
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the United States representatives Benjamin Hawkins of North Carolina, Joseph Martin of
Virginia, and Andrew Pickens of South Carolina met with the chiefs. Onitositah presented his
grievances concerning the state of Franklin. He also attempted to reclaim much of the territory
ceded to the Transylvania Company. The United States commissioners agreed with the first
grievance that much of the territory claimed by the state of Franklin should be Cherokee land.
Respecting the second proposition, someone produced the Transylvania Company’s deed signed
by Attakullaculla and Oconostota, and the chiefs relented. Nevertheless, speculator interests
were endangered by the treaty as finally agreed to on November 28. Blount, attending as an
agent of North Carolina, vainly entered a protest in which he asserted that North Carolina had
not given up its right to the soil recognized in the state constitution of 1776. The treaty went
through, and Blount, having again been elected to serve in the Confederation Congress, would
bide his time in New York.60
Martin’s participation in this treaty seemed incongruous, given his interest in Muscle
Shoals lands. His interests, however, were many. Martin had since the Revolution acted as an
agent for Patrick Henry, and his loyalty to Henry remained firm. Henry was concerned that the
aggressive Franklinites would engulf all the southern states in an Indian war for which they were
ill-prepared. To Henry and Martin, Franklinite leaders had played demagogues attempting gain
political power. Henry preferred that judicious agents like Martin oversee western expansion.
The difference was one of degree, rather than of substance. Henry was a heavy speculator in
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western lands, and he sanctioned violence against the Indians when he deemed it appropriate.
Martin’s ambivalence also stemmed from his close connection with a Cherokee clan. Despite
having a wife and children in Virginia, Martin had married a Cherokee woman when he was
appointed Virginia’s agent to the Cherokees in 1776. The woman’s clan protected Martin during
negotiations, and at times he seemed to sympathize with the Cherokees’ situation when they
encountered the deceit and violence practiced by the Franklinites. Nevertheless, Martin, along
with virtually all whites interested in western lands, believed that assimilation of the Indian tribes
was the only realistic outcome of western development.61
The Treaty of Hopewell was highly unpopular among Franklin inhabitants. Many abided
by the Treaty of Dumplin Creek and continued to push south of the French Broad River. Two
more counties were created in this region, with one named Sevier and the other named Blount.
By the spring of 1786, the Cherokees began attacking the encroaching whites, in accordance with
the Treaty of Hopewell’s stipulation that the Cherokees could deal with trespassers as they
willed. Sevier raised a company of 160 volunteers, marched to the Hiwassee River, destroyed
three Cherokee towns, and killed fifteen of their inhabitants. Sevier then forced Onitositah and
Scolacutta to sign the Treaty at Chota Ford on July 31, 1786, despite the chiefs’ insistence that
their towns had nothing to do with the Cherokee raids. The extra-legal treaty asserted the right
of white settlers to settle all land north of the Little Tennessee River. Sevier also threatened the
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Cherokees with destruction unless the murders along wilderness roads ended and the stealing of
horses ceased.62
But Franklin’s lack of unity doomed it from the start. Its political structure was bizarre.
County courts operated under the authorities of Franklin and North Carolina; militia officers
called out the militia in the name of the two governments; laws and taxes were imposed by both
the Franklin Assembly and the North Carolina Assembly, though each faction ignored the other’s
laws, and neither faction paid the taxes. Colonel John Tipton emerged as the leader of the
opposition to Sevier, and the opponents of the state of Franklin became known as Tiptonites. At
one point in 1786, Tipton took a posse and invaded the Washington County Court at
Jonesborough, taking away the papers from the clerk and throwing the justice of the peace into
the street. Sevier in response marched with his own party to the Washington County Court
operating under North Carolina’s jurisdiction and treated its clerk and justice of the peace in like
manner. Sevier and Tipton eventually had a personal encounter in Jonesborough. Violent insults
were exchanged, whereupon Sevier struck Tipton with his cane, and a brawl ensued. At this
point, onlookers and friends separated the combatants, but civil discord often turned into contests
of martial prowess among allies of each political faction.63
Franklin’s political turmoil reflected personal animosities and differences of opinion over
the readiness of the western counties for independence rather than economic tensions. Sevier and
Tipton had known each other from their earlier residence in Virginia, and Tipton had served in
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the Revolutionary War with Sevier. Indeed, Tipton’s military competence had come under
scrutiny during the 1781 campaign. He was in command of 150 mounted infantrymen with
orders to burn a Cherokee town, but, as reported by Arthur Campbell, “the officers of the Horse,
by an unmilitary behavior failed in crossing the River.” Sevier perhaps felt contempt toward an
officer who had failed in his duty. Their feud could also have been animated by a competition
for land. Tipton, like Sevier, was a planter. Both men and their families owned large tracts of
land, although the Sevier holdings exceeded the Tipton claims by tens of thousands of acres in
the counties of Greene, Sullivan, and Washington.
Both factions promoted market development. Tipton became the deputy clerk of the
Washington County Court under North Carolina’s authority and oversaw the construction of
wagon roads. By 1792, John Tipton’s brother Jacob owned a wagon, various kinds of livestock,
pewter dishes, plough irons “with clevises and geers,” and “1 weavers Loom and 2 slays with
Shuttles.” Other Tiptonites worked to enlarge trade. The judges who served on the court that
Tipton clerked for—John McMahon, James Stuart, and Robert Allison—all held land in
Washington, Sullivan, and Greene Counties. Evan Shelby, whom North Carolina had appointed
Brigadier General of Washington District when Sevier vacated the position to become Franklin’s
governor, spoke to Governor Caswell of his desire that peace should prevail and of his wish that
Caswell would join him in the western country. Shelby also inquired of the status of several land
warrants he had sent to North Carolina’s land grant office. The state of Franklin thus partly
represented a competition among land speculators, as had the contention over the original North
Carolina cession bill.64
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The Franklinites were not outdone in promoting material improvement. The Franklinite
Thomas Amis, for example, operated several business ventures in Hawkins County. He owned a
tavern, and many of the debts he recorded were for whiskey, rum, and brandy. Stockley
Donelson especially appreciated a good drink after long weeks of surveying lands. Amis also
debited clientele for manufacturing and mending axes, hoes, plows, and saws, and for purchasing
materials like salt, nails, lead, and iron. Much of Amis’s clientele were wealthy; they typically
paid for his goods and services in North Carolina currency, or they traded valuable goods of their
own like saddles, bridles, shoes, pots, kettles, and dutch ovens. Amis noted in one entry that a
schoolmaster named William Evans was indebted to him for pork, corn, potatoes, salt, and
tobacco. Amis wrote on the credit side of the ledger that Evans in February 22, 1784, “begun to
keep s[c]hool at £25 per year” and thereby balanced his account. Poorer clientele also utilized
Amis’s services. Customers like Edmund Boaz or William Fitzgerald, who did not have ready
access to cash, paid their debts in animal skins, livestock, or bushels of various crops.65
Even Sevier’s expansionist aims remained popular. His extralegal treaties and Franklin
land claims were in part an effort to secure Muscle Shoals land, but speculators hardly
represented a devilish cabal that manipulated western inhabitants. Joseph Martin reported to
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Caswell in March 1787 that Franklin had opened a land office for the lands lying below the
French Broad River. He worried that “the people are Settling as far as the Banks of the
Tennessee and have Improved on the South side of the river to the great disquiet of the Indians,
in short they seem to take every step that appears most productive to a war with them [sic]
people.” One week later, Scolacutta complained to Martin that “fair promises [were] always
made that the white People Should not come over but we Always find that after a treaty they
Settle much faster than before.” Onitositah appealed to Martin and the governors of Virginia and
North Carolina to contain the Franklinites. He complained that Sevier only met with young men
who had not authority to speak for the tribes, and he charged that Sevier deliberately
misconstrued their words in order to claim land.66
The Franklinites’ invasion continued. In November 1787, they responded
enthusiastically to a joint expedition with the state of Georgia, planned by Sevier’s initiative.
Sevier had reached an agreement with Georgia whereby the state of Franklin would supply 1,500
troops in exchange for an assurance from Georgia that the Muscle Shoals lands would be
reserved for the Franklin volunteers. Privates would receive 640 acres of land, and higher ranks
would garner more acres. Sevier hoped that his soldiers “would be animated with the Idea That
they are now Capable of winning the World.” He continued that “this Great and Liberal
Encouragement will Certainly induce numbers to come Out on the Expedition, which will not
only be something handsom for themselves but will have the honor of assisting a very generous
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and friendly Sister State to chastise … an insolent, barbarous and Savage Nation of Indians.” On
the one hand, Sevier’s efforts were a cynical ploy to rally political support by stoking racial
prejudice against the Indians. On the other hand, it seems that many Franklinites needed little
convincing. Of a total population amounting to approximately 25,000 people, Sevier was able to
meet the volunteer quota in a week. And although the intricate details of his schemes were
perhaps largely unknown, it was widely known that Sevier was a land dealer and that he had an
interest in the Muscle Shoals region. Sevier profited from western expansion, but his leadership
and fighting ability assisted that expansion.67
These efforts came to nothing because the state of Franklin continued to weaken during
1787. Its dimming prospects probably stemmed from the conciliatory stance of the North
Carolina legislature and the desire of land speculators to reset the move for western states. In
1786, the North Carolina Assembly had passed an act of pardon for Franklinites willing to take
an oath of loyalty to North Carolina, and it obviated all taxes due from the western counties for
the years 1784 and 1785. The assembly also resolved that “although a separation is at this time
impracticable, yet whenever the wealth and Numbers of the Citizens on the western waters so
much increase as to make the same necessary, that then we are free to say a separation may take
place upon Friendly and reciprocal terms and under certain compacts and stipulations.” It
renewed these overtures in 1787. The western counties also began electing members to the
North Carolina Assembly. David Campbell’s election to the House of Commons from Greene
County was especially significant, in that Campbell had heretofore been a staunch Franklinite
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and ally of Sevier. He did not turn against Sevier, but he seemed interested in restoring
tranquility to the region first before independence. The same assembly appointed him judge of
the Superior Court for the District of Washington. Meanwhile, Governor Richard Caswell,
Sevier’s business partner, always maintained a friendly correspondence but increasingly advised
Sevier to allow Franklin to reunite with North Carolina so that a more unified and constitutional
separation by the western counties could be accomplished. Caswell’s attitude probably reflected
the feelings of his friend William Blount; both men sympathized with the desire for western
independence and looked forward to a day when it could be accomplished, but it had become
clear that the tumultuous state of Franklin only hurt the arguments for independence. Sevier
remained defiant: “We shall continue to Act as Independent and would rather Suffer death in all
its Various and frightful shapes than Conform to any thing that is disgraceful.” Several
Franklinites joined Sevier by writing a petition to the North Carolina Assembly. A young
attorney named Andrew Jackson was among the petitioners.68
Franklinite defiance accomplished nothing. By January 1788, Franklin’s prospects were
all but dead. The northern counties of Washington, Hawkins, and Sullivan had turned against
Sevier and coalesced around Tipton, while Sevier’s support remained stronger in the southern
counties of Greene, Sevier, Caswell, and Blount. Feeling that his position was strong enough to
force the issue, Tipton in early February ordered Sheriff Jonathan Pugh to confiscate Sevier’s
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property as payment for unpaid taxes to North Carolina. Pugh took both Sevier’s slaves and
livestock and moved them to Tipton’s personal residence on Sinking Creek. Sevier at the time
was on the frontiers of Greene County, devising means to defend encroaching white settlements
against Cherokee attacks. Receiving word of Tipton’s impudence, Sevier raised 150 men from
Greene, Sevier, and Blount counties and marched to Tipton’s house, arriving on the afternoon of
February 27. Tipton had only about 45 men and women with him. Sevier surrounded the house,
positioned his men between 200-300 yards from it, and demanded the unconditional surrender of
everyone inside. Tipton said, “fire and be damned!” During the ensuing standoff Tipton
managed to alert a small detachment of Washington County troops under the command of
Captain Peter Parkinson. A small skirmish ensued, Parkinson’s troops were forced to retreat,
and in the confusion, Sevier’s troops shot one of two women trying to escape the Tipton house.
But the day ended without a single fatality.69
The next day, two of Tipton’s men eluded Sevier sentries and succeeded in raising the
Sullivan County militia under the command of George Maxwell. Sevier received word of the
militia’s mobilization, but he remained confident in his position. He sent another flag to Tipton
demanding surrender, which Tipton refused. The Sullivan County troops arrived on the morning
of February 29, drove Sevier from the field, and captured his two sons. Four or five men
suffered wounds, and two died later from injuries, including Pugh. Sevier sent a letter to
Maxwell asking that his life be spared. Maxwell responded with an ultimatum—Sevier must
turn himself in by March 11 and submit himself to the laws of North Carolina. Sevier also lost
his friend Richard Caswell, who resigned from the governorship in April. The new governor,
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Samuel Johnston, had no sympathy for the separatist movement. He immediately ordered Judge
David Campbell to issue an arrest warrant for Sevier on charges of treason.70
Events would soon turn Sevier’s fortunes. General Joseph Martin reported to Governor
Johnston in April that that he “expected nothing but a tiresome, bloody war with the Savages this
Summer.” Cherokee raids had continued during Franklin’s tumultuous end. Onitositah had done
his best to maintain peace, but he could not control the chiefs under him. In one incident, a chief
named Nentooyah (Bloody Fellow) led a few warriors to avenge the deaths of relatives by taking
fifteen scalps along the Dumplin Creek settlement, in addition to stealing many horses and
destroying houses and crops. Even Scolacutta ambushed a surveyor party north of the
Cumberland River. The surveyors escaped, but Scolacutta triumphantly smashed their
compasses, known to the Cherokees as “land stealers.” Both Indians and whites wanted war by
1788. Sevier did not bear the entire blame for the state of Indian relations. Conflict was
inevitable given that everyone involved—from the fiercest Franklinite partisan to the most
strident defender of North Carolina’s sovereignty—took as given the necessity of western
expansion and the consequent dismissal, violent or otherwise, of the Indians. But Martin was
unwilling to act without specific authority from the state of North Carolina. Then in May an
Indian known to the whites as Slim Tom led a small party of Cherokees to the residence of the
Kirk family, who lived twelve miles south of present-day Knoxville. The Cherokees killed the
family, eleven in all, except for the father and one son, who were away from home at the time.
They subsequently returned and, finding their family dead on the ground, gave alarm to the

70

Colonel John Tipton to General Joseph Martin, March 21, 1788, in Clark, State Records of North Carolina, 22:
692-693, McClung Collection; Barksdale, Lost State of Franklin, 134-136. Tipton would later release Sevier’s sons,
and no legal action was taken against them.

62

neighborhood. The militia assembled under John Sevier; the younger Kirk joined their number.
They marched to several towns along the Hiwassee and Tennessee Rivers, killing many
Cherokees and burning their towns. When the militia came upon the town of Chilhowee, its
members invited Onitositah, Scolacutta, and a chief named Oskuah (Abraham) to a negotiation
for peace. The chiefs and their sons gathered in a house, and one of the commanding officers
conducted Kirk inside, whereupon he took vengeance with a tomahawk by splitting the skulls of
everyone inside. Fourteen scalps were taken. Sevier perhaps knew of the plan, and he took no
action against the murderers. So began his renewed ascendance. George Maxwell reported to
Martin that the campaign “so raised him in the esteem of the people on the frontier, that the
people began to flock to his standard.” Sevier returned from the campaign and was able to walk
freely in Jonesborough, despite the outstanding arrest warrants. Tipton was able to arrest Sevier
following an episode in which an intoxicated Sevier quarreled with two men and accidentally
shot a bystander. Sevier was transported to North Carolina for trial, but two fellow officers from
the Revolution secured his bail. No further action was taken against him.71
As a result of the assassinations of the chiefs, the Overhill Cherokees moved their capital
from Chota to Ustanali, present-day Calhoun, Georgia. This new capital was east of the
Chickamauga towns, and the Upper Cherokees reunited with the Chickamaugas under Tsiyugunsini. Onitositah’s brothers, Chuquilatague (Doublehead) and Iyahuwagiatsutsa (Pumpkin
Boy), found refuge here, and they would be a source of constant conflict as the western region
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moved toward statehood in the coming years. So would Kenneteag (Little Turkey), Onitositah’s
successor, and Kunoskeskie (John Watts), Onitositah’s nephew.72
Sevier’s popularity increased even more with the failure of Martin to quell the frontier
disturbances. Cherokee attacks continued through the summer. Martin finally felt compelled to
raise the militia from the four western counties in the fall. He marched them to Lookout
Mountain to conduct a campaign against the Chickamaugas living there, but his efforts ended in
defeat. Martin thereafter became an object of derision among white settlers. His hesitancy to act
during the summer had given credence to accusations that he was the Indians’ friend, and the
campaign he finally did pursue ended in humiliation. Martin would gradually fade to obscurity,
attempting to regain influence in his role as Patrick Henry’s agent. Indeed, he wrestled with his
conflicting purposes to his own destruction. He had come west as Henry’s agent, and a land
speculator in his own right. He had engaged in bigamy to secure friendly relations with a clan of
the Cherokee Indians, and at times he seemed to genuinely sympathize with Indians’ plight. Yet
he also worked closely with John Sevier in the Muscle Shoals speculation and, perhaps, the state
of Franklin. He lacked the craftiness of Blount, and his complexities did not allow him to adopt
the conviction of Sevier.73
Hostility was not confined to the former Franklin counties. The Cumberland settlers had
never joined the state of Franklin, but their desire for land was just as strong as any Franklinite.
Cumberland settlements, now consisting of Sumner County in addition to Davidson County,
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suffered attacks from the Creek and Cherokee Indians through the years 1786 and 1787. Then in
May 1787, James Robertson’s brother Mark was killed in an attack. Robertson immediately
assembled 130 men and marched them to a town called Coldwater, near present-day Rogersville,
Alabama, in which French merchants traded with Creek and Cherokee Indians. Two Chickasaws
guided the militia to this location. Robertson’s men encountered 10 Creeks and 35 Cherokees;
they killed twenty of the Cherokees, captured five Frenchmen, and confiscated their goods.
They later released the Frenchmen and sold their goods when they returned to Davidson County.
A familiar pattern of reprisal and counter-reprisal continued for the next two years.74
Robertson and most of Cumberland’s leaders became immensely frustrated with North
Carolina’s lack of protection. Governor Caswell did send militia under the command of Thomas
Evans during the fall of 1787, but Johnston was less accommodating. He merely instructed
Robertson to cultivate friendly understanding. Indeed, he hoped to be rid of the western problem
altogether by a cession of land, even as he managed the return of the Franklin separatists.75
Frontier leaders at first engaged in diplomatic intrigues with the Spanish government in
New Orleans in an effort to secure their habitations from Indian attacks and to establish
economic wealth. Spain’s acquisition of New Orleans from Great Britain following the
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American Revolution had given it the unenviable task of keeping an eye on the restless
revolutionary victors. In an effort to control American migration to the West, Governor Estevan
Miró closed the navigation of the Mississippi River, established diplomatic relations with the
Creek, Chickasaw, and Choctaw Indians, and encouraged separatist movements among the
American settlers. In 1784, Miró and Creek Chief Alexander McGillivray agreed to the Treaty
of Pensacola, which recognized Creek vassalage to the Spanish and made McGillivray an
emissary to the Spanish kingdom. Miró also established correspondence with James Robertson,
Daniel Smith, and other Cumberland leaders through a North Carolina congressman named Dr.
James White, who was himself a landowner in the Cumberland region. Miró promised them
navigation of the Mississippi River and toleration of their religious practices. Robertson, as a
state senator from Davidson County, convinced the North Carolina Assembly in 1788 to form a
new district from the Cumberland counties and christen it “Mero District.” Even Sevier
established his own personal correspondence with several Spanish officials in an attempt to
revive the state of Franklin and the Muscle Shoals speculation.76
Spain’s mutually exclusive goals forced these diplomatic relations to collapse under their
own weight. Miró provided weapons and ammunition for McGillivray’s Creeks in their attacks
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against the Cumberland settlements, but he had no desire to provoke a war with the United
States. Inevitably, McGillivray became too aggressive and too demanding for Miró’s clandestine
operation, and McGillivray eventually turned to the British for support. The Cumberland
leaders, for their part, understood Miró’s diplomatic machinations and never seriously
considered becoming vassals of the Spanish crown. As the Spanish captain general of Louisiana
realized, the people of the United States possessed an insatiable “ambition to expand.” He
believed that “since its People are accustomed to overcome difficulties, there are none, however
great, that seem to them insurmountable, as long as to the human forces there is added no other
which by its nature restrains them.” If Spain would not or could not court the westerners, “this
power will become fearful.” Such ambition was incompatible with Spain’s vision of controlled
commerce.77
The security that western leaders sought came from the new Constitution of the United
States. It was none other than William Blount who made the most of this opportunity to re-assert
his influence amidst the disorder. While he served as one of North Carolina’s representatives to
the Confederation Congress, the state assembly elected him to serve at the Constitutional
Convention, along with Hugh Williamson, Richard Dobbs Spaight, William R. Davie, and
Alexander Martin. Blount, Williamson, and Spaight were the first among North Carolina’s
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delegates to support the Constitution, citing the three-fifths clause, the fugitive slave clause, the
requirement that all imposts be uniform, and the power to regulate commerce. Yet Blount
himself was not warm in his support. He made no motions during the convention. His only
request was that the signing of the Constitution reflect the unanimous assent of the states rather
than of its individual members; he also asked that the signatures be confined to the letter
accompanying the Constitution to Congress. Blount privately wrote to Caswell that “I must
confess not withstanding all I heard in favour of this System I am not in sentiment with my
Colleagues for as I have before said I still think we shall ultimately … be separated and
distinct/Governments perfectly independent of each other.” Blount cared little for the form of
the new national government because he believed that the transmontane region would eventually
become its own country. But the new Constitution seemed to promise a stronger government
whereby the tumultuous West could be quelled.78
The ratification of the Constitution in North Carolina came with difficulty. The state was
unique in that its citizens at first rejected the plan in convention at Hillsborough in the summer of
1788. The anti-Federalist leaders primarily were the same individuals who had opposed the
cession of western lands and had opposed the state of Franklin. They successfully raised the
specter of onerous taxes and aristocratic oppression, as they had regarding the cession act and its
repeal in 1784. The division over the ratification question, however, reflected the divisions over
the major political conflicts of the past decade in North Carolina. In general, those men who had
first voted for the cession of western lands, who had supported the state of Franklin, or who had
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borne the brunt of Indian campaigns supported the Constitution. At the first convention, the
most prominent Federalists were Blount’s brother John Gray, Archibald Maclaine, Thomas
Alderson, Richard D. Spaight, John Sitgreaves, James Winchester, and Abner Neale. Those men
who had taken a state-first approach to the cession of western lands, who had opposed the state
of Franklin, or who had been less active in Indian campaigns opposed the Constitution. The
most prominent anti-Federalists at the first convention were Willie Jones, Timothy Bloodworth,
Joseph McDowell, Thomas Person, Alexander Mebane, William Lenoir, John Tipton, and
Charles Robertson. Notably, Stockley Donelson joined this group in voting nay. The
constitutional question was thus in part a continuation of speculator conflict over how western
lands should be settled, and who should have the predominant influence over that settlement.79
But the state-first politicians were fighting a losing battle. Even before the first
convention met, Virginia had ratified the Constitution, making the formation of the new
government a virtual certainty. The practical reality of the situation convinced many North
Carolinians of the necessity of ratification. If the state remained outside the Union, it would
become an isolated commonwealth, with a raucous western problem, and trade that would be
subject to discrimination from the other states. The anti-Federalists also lost one of their
strongest leaders in Jones, who switched sides given the political reality. North Carolina
Federalists won the 1788 August elections for the North Carolina Assembly. In November, that
body called for a second ratification convention. Their position strengthened during 1789, as the
new government began to operate.80
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Growing Federalist strength in the state assembly also dismissed any remaining tension
regarding the State of Franklin. The 1788 assembly voted to pardon all inhabitants of the
counties of Washington, Sullivan, Greene, and Hawkins. An amendment to the bill added by
William Lenoir and Charles Johnson to exclude John Sevier failed. Those members who
continued to fight for the cession of western lands, like William Blount and James Robertson,
were also the ones who defeated this amendment. The next year, the indestructible Sevier
appeared to take his seat in the assembly as a senator from Greene County. The assembly
promptly absolved him of all past conduct and appointed him the Brigadier General of the
Washington District, the position he had held before he became governor of the state of
Franklin.81
Indeed, Blount associates across the transmontane counties became members of the state
assembly and the second ratification convention. Former Franklinites, including Sevier himself,
managed to defeat the Tiptonites in the county elections for the convention. In the Cumberland
region, James Robertson and William Polk ensured victory for delegates friendly to the
Constitution. One of them even convinced the voters of Tennessee County, recently split from
Davidson County, to elect Blount as one of their representatives. Blount thus held a double
representation, for he was also elected from Pitt County where he resided. As a result, all but
one of the transmontane counties voted for the Constitution. The lone exception was Sullivan
County, and even here the delegates were evenly divided; Joseph Martin and John Rhea voted
yea, while William Nash and John Scott voted nay. A coalition of eastern conservatives,
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pragmatic “radicals” like Willie Jones, and transmontane land dealers ratified the Constitution by
as wide a margin as it had been rejected by in the first convention.82
Although a great deal of political machination produced North Carolina’s ratification,
transmontane support of the Constitution reflected more than clever deception by a handful of
land speculators in convincing the majority of the people to vote against their economic interests.
It is true that the transmontane delegates to the first convention almost wholly opposed the
Constitution, but many things had changed during the year. Congress had taken a more
conciliatory approach to western interests, appointing commissioners from North Carolina, South
Carolina, and Georgia to make a new treaty with the Cherokee and Creek Indians. The new
treaty would supersede the Treaty of Hopewell. Although nothing came of the effort, Congress’s
intentions perhaps worked to the political benefit of the Federalists, in that the national
government showed some concern with western interests. The proposed treaty coincided with
Sevier’s successful Indian campaigns and Martin’s failed Lookout Mountain campaign. In
January of 1789, a group of men from the former Franklin counties proposed a new committee of
safety, similar to the one adopted by the Wataugans, arguing that Martin had become unworthy
of their confidence and North Carolina had proven itself incapable or unwilling to defend its
frontier. They called for adoption of the Constitution, and in the meantime they wanted Sevier as
commander of the frontier inhabitants. By the summer, the inhabitants of the Cumberland region
also felt insecure. James Robertson wrote to Daniel Smith that the people were very dispirited
because of Creek attacks, and he believed that the settlements were in as much danger as they
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had faced in 1781. Transmontane inhabitants surely took these factors into consideration when
choosing delegates for the second ratification convention, and the men they chose had been the
most capable defenders of the settlements during the previous decade.83
Entrance into the Union assured that North Carolina would cede its western lands to
Congress. The first assembly that met under the new government passed a cession bill with
insignificant opposition. Only Thomas Person and a handful of other land speculators opposed
the measure as written. They introduced their own plan to grant independence to the
transmontane people and establish a new land office for the sale of western lands by the state.
But the majority of the assembly wanted nothing more to do with the West. Its members
defeated Person’s amendments, and they carried the cession bill. The terms of the cession were
the same as those passed in the original cession of 1784. All claims previously recognized by the
state remained valid; North Carolina would continue to honor the claims of continental soldiers;
if the military reservation did not contain enough good land to satisfy the soldiers’ warrants, then
any other land within the ceded territory could be used for the same purpose; and the act
recommended that a state or states be created out of the ceded territory in due time. The domain
would henceforth be governed by the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, except in one particular—
North Carolina’s cession bill prohibited the abolishment of slavery without the consent of the
people.84
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On February 25, 1790, North Carolina’s senators in Congress, Samuel Johnston and
Benjamin Hawkins, executed a deed of cession of North Carolina’s transmontane lands to the
United States. On April 2, 1790, Congress accepted the deed. The new territory was officially
designated as the Territory of the United States of America South of the River Ohio. Its
colloquial name became the Southwest Territory.85
After almost a decade of intense political conflict and even petty civil war, North
Carolina’s transmontane people ended up in 1790 as they had in 1783. The foundational events
that eventually led to the creation of the state of Tennessee represented in part a sordid tale of
competitive land speculators attempting to shape western land expansion. Their greed led them
to undertake fraudulent schemes in the acquisition of land warrants, as in the case of William
Blount, or it led them to practice deception and violence against the Indians, as in the case of
John Sevier. Yet the same materialistic spirit that encouraged such base activity was the origin
of western expansion in the first place. Land speculators like Richard Henderson, William
Blount, John Sevier, James Robertson, Evan Shelby, John Tipton, and Thomas Person all sought
to establish themselves as a new economic elite. Their pursuits, however, did not preclude them
from accommodating the general interests of the westerners who lived among them. The
disputes over the cession act and the state of Franklin represented a commitment to what each
individual believed was in the best interest as much as it represented their individual interests.
Furthermore, the land speculators performed activities which only men of influence could
accomplish. They organized settlement defenses, undertook military campaigns, constructed
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internal improvements, and stimulated trade. These developments, combined with a new
territorial status and the promise of eventual statehood, gave settlers on Tennessee lands reason
for optimism with respect to material improvement of their lives.
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Chapter 2

Commercial Adventures

By the time of the Southwest Territory’s creation, white settlers had all but secured
preponderance of the Tennessee region. Washington District, consisting of the counties of
Washington, Sullivan, Greene, and Hawkins, contained the bulk of the population. A few also
lived in an unorganized area south of the French Broad and Holston Rivers. White men
numbered 13,453, and white women numbered 12,647. Free black individuals totaled 293, a
small number relative to the 2,314 black slaves who remained in bondage. Mero District,
consisting of the counties of Davidson, Sumner, and Tennessee, had come far since the days of
the Robertson expedition and the Donelson voyage. There lived in this district 3,095 white men,
2,718 white women, 68 free black individuals, and 1,161 black slaves. They braved (or were
forced to brave) extreme isolation and the brunt of Indian attacks. This arrangement would
change within two decades. As indicated by the higher proportion of slaves relative to
population, West Tennessee was an attractive region for large-scale plantation agriculture, and
Nashville’s favorable location on the Cumberland River offered large trade potential.
Competition between East Tennessee and West Tennessee would soon become a fixture of
territorial and state politics. Inherent to all political aspirations was a fundamental belief in
material improvement. Political leaders sought to integrate the Southwest Territory,
subsequently the state of Tennessee, with regional, national, and international markets. Their
constituents followed them, spurred by the promise of gain. Belief in prosperity for all was
75

rooted in a democratic experience. Political democracy had existed since the beginning of
settlement west of the mountains, and it was enshrined in the constitution of the new state of
Tennessee. Political democracy in turn was rooted in widespread land ownership among settlers.
Most western settlers had reasonable expectations of acquiring land and getting ahead. The
challenge they faced was placing prosperity on an enduring basis. They yearned for the capital
to make permanent improvements. The capital was not forthcoming, not in the amounts desired.
The state had little infrastructure and little money. Creating such bulwarks of a commercial
society became Tennesseans’ predominant focus for the next three decades.1
The politics of improvement began with the Territory South of the River Ohio. Politics
and profits entangled from the start. And where politics and profits entangled, William Blount
was sure to be enmeshed. In 1789 three land companies—the South Carolina Yazoo Company,
the Tennessee Yazoo Company, and the Virginia Yazoo Company—had purchased 16,000,000
acres of land for a pittance from the state of Georgia. Individual Georgia legislators received
generous bribes for their commitment to cheap land. These purchases produced keen interest in
the new territory, for it was contiguous with the Yazoo lands. Patrick Henry, head of the
Virginia Company, was especially desirous that his agent Joseph Martin receive the
governorship of the territory. Sevier, a proprietor of the Tennessee Company, frustrated the
Virginians at every turn. He had an agent named Bennett Belue negotiating private leases with
Cherokee tribes, which leases infringed on the Virginia Company’s claims. He also produced
damaging letters between Martin and McGillivray, making it appear as if Martin had become too
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close to Creek interests. Sevier’s popularity seemed to guarantee him the position, but he was
outmaneuvered by William Blount. Blount secured the support of several influential
congressman, including John Steele, Timothy Bloodworth, and Hugh Williamson. Blount’s
strengths must have become apparent to President George Washington while considering these
candidates. Blount, unlike Martin, was a native of the state that ceded the land and was not
marred with Indian friendship, and he, unlike Sevier, had no apparent connection to Franklin
separatism and was not marred by Indian massacre. Washington also probably knew Blount
from their joint attendance at the constitutional convention. So Blount was chosen. Other top
officials selected were Daniel Smith as territorial secretary, and Joseph Anderson, David
Campbell, and John McNairy as territorial judges. The Senate confirmed their commissions on
June 8, 1790. On February 22, 1791, Washington appointed Sevier and James Robertson
brigadier generals of Washington District and Mero District, respectively.2
These officers exercised extensive power. The governor acted as the territory’s
commander-in-chief of the militia and as its chief executive. He appointed all militia officers
except the generals, and he appointed all county officers. He also served as the Indian agent of
the territory. The governor and the judges could adopt any laws enacted by any of the original
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states, subject to a veto by Congress. The secretary was charged with keeping the records of the
territorial government, and he would serve as governor in the event of the governor’s death,
removal, or temporary absence from the territory. The judges acted as a court with common law
jurisdiction.3
Blount arrived in the territory on October 10, 1790, taking up residence in the private
home of William Cobb, a resident of Washington County, until he could build his permanent
mansion. He used his appointment power in a way that generally benefitted former Franklinites.
For example, he refused to appoint Tipton colonel of Washington County because of his
opposition to the cession of land to the federal government back in 1784. Blount instead
appointed Landon Carter. Other former Franklinites were appointed to numerous county offices.
Even so, Blount made a tour through the territory, and he was generally greeted with cordiality.
He was not excessively petty, as he later worked to conciliate the Sevier-Tipton feud. He also
kept a watchful eye on Sevier, who represented both a valuable ally and a potential political
contender. For the moment, he told John Gray, “Sevier appears open, friendly and candid and so
does Carter.” Blount expanded his bureaucratic influence through the appointments of Andrew
Jackson as the Attorney General for Mero District, William Cocke to the same position for
Washington District, and John Overton, David Allison, and Jackson as attorneys in the courts of
law and equity. He appointed as his private secretaries his half-brother Willie (pronounced as
though it was spelled Wylie), and Hugh Lawson White, son of Colonel James White, a surveyor
who lived on the future site of Knoxville. There is a strong possibility that White acted as a
surveyor for Blount himself. Blount appointed William Tait and George M. Deaderick as
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government contractors to supply goods for the militia and the Indians, respectively. All of these
men formed a powerful political coalition that would dominate government and business for two
decades. Their patron Blount, so adept at pulling strings as a member of the North Carolina
General Assembly, now held power through executive influence.4
Opportunities for the new territory seemed boundless with territorial status, at least to the
speculators of the Blount group. Daniel Smith received a congratulatory letter from Benjamin
Hawkins. Smith no doubt agreed with Hawkins when he advised Smith to “impress as early as
possible on your Citizens the necessity of attending to their home manufactures, your relative
situation with the commercial part of the United States is such that this is indispensable to your
prosperity. You can raise fruit trees of all sorts grapes of all sorts for wine—salt Iron and
clothing of cotton flax wool and silk.” For his part, Blount wrote to a friend that “my Western
Lands had become so great an object to me that it had become absolutely necessary that I should
go to the Western Country, to secure them and perhaps my Presence might have enhanced there
[sic] Value.”5
More than personal gain was at stake. Territorial leaders hoped to create a society in
which individuals could distinguish themselves in myriad ways. Such opportunities, as they
believed, were inherent in civilization. In fact they juxtaposed this belief with descriptions of the
lesser state of the various Indian peoples. Smith believed that the Cherokees continually
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perpetrated attacks for two reasons: “First, their mode of education. They know that not one of
their nation can distinguish himself but by feats of war. 2nd To the influence of the Spaniards,
who have lately made it their object to disunite them from us and attach them to themselves.”
He concluded that “peace is not to be had without a war to convince them of the strength and
dignity of our government.” Blount expressed similar sentiments. Of the Cherokees in
particular he remarked that they still possessed 5-6 million acres of hunting ground, concluding
that “this is an indulgence for which they ought to be thankful instead of complaining without a
cause of encroachments.” Sevier for his part had no use for indulgences. He said that “By the
law of nations, it is agreed that no people shall be entitled to more land than they can cultivate.
Of course no people will sit and starve for want of land to work, when a neighbouring nation has
much more than they can make use of.” There existed no doubts about this cause. Material
aspirations in part drove the familiar and tragic pattern of treaties and abrogations that defined
Indian affairs. Blount formed the first federally sanctioned treaties in the southwest, beginning
with the Treaty of Holston in 1791, in which the Cherokees ceded the future site of Knoxville.6
Internal improvements, however rudimentary, eased trade difficulties. Blount’s
appointees in the territorial government continued the practice of using county courts to sponsor
internal improvements. Private citizens obtained licenses to operate public ferries and taverns.
County courts also authorized the construction of saw mills and grist mills, and they oversaw the
clearing of roads. The federal government constructed a road from Nashville to the Pierre River
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in the Mississippi Territory. Improvement of this kind decreased overland transportation costs.
Most goods came to Knoxville and Nashville via Philadelphia and Baltimore. Travel was
perilous and cumbersome. Teams of six horses each drew wagons with about four tons of goods
per team. Tennessee merchants paid $10 per 100 pounds for necessities and luxuries. Exports
were likewise burdened with obstacles. Cotton, for example, often went to Baltimore at $5 per
100 pounds. The possibilities of trade with New Orleans had yet to be fully realized, as that city
would remain under Spanish rule, and then French rule, until the Louisiana Purchase in 1803.7
Trade eased life for the western settlers. Manufacturing and commerce provided outlets
for agricultural produce. Farmers found a plethora of consumables that improved their standard
of life. John Hague advertised his cotton manufactory in Manchester in the Mero District. He
announced that “The subscriber has his machines in order for carding, spinning, and weaving;
and is in want of a number of GOOD WEAVERS. The greatest encouragement will be given to
such as are acquainted with the weaving of Velvets, Corduroys, and Callicoes.” More common
were mercantile stores. John Sommerville and Company advertised its store along German
Creek; they promised to sell goods for cash, and they promised that “the highest price will be
allowed for good Linsey, seven hundred Linen, Bees-wax, Bearskins, Deerskins, Fur skins, of all
kinds, Rye, Corn and Oats.” Nelson and Company established a similar store in Rogersville.
They promised to purchase local produce and skins on the best terms, but they were more
specific with the goods they sold—cloths, coatings, buff denim, cotton stockings, Callicoes, hats,
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powder, lead, flints, tea, coffee, bibles, saddles, bridles, knives and forks, needles, pewter, and
playing cards. By 1793, Peter McNamee advertised a tanning yard on Second Creek in
Knoxville. He would pay three pence for green hides and six pence for dry ones. In 1793, Titus
Ogden advertised kettles, skillets, pots, Dutch ovens, and various castings for beef, cattle, corn,
and bacon.8
One East Tennessee merchant named Thomas Amis kept up a brisk business in several
ventures. Amis’s debits and credits facilitated exchange in all sorts of goods and had since the
days of Franklin. Whiskey remained the most popular drink in his tavern. The citizens of
Hawkins County went to Amis for horse-shoeing, plough-mending, and ax-sharpening. Amis
sold beef, corn, flour, meal, oats, bacon, and potatoes. Some account holders paid for their
purchases in work. John Brooks, Daniel Jones, and Austin Richardson, for example, paid for
their purchases of linen, corn, whiskey, and shoes in this way. William Austin paid in various
iron castings for whiskey, flour, leather, screws, nails, and even schooling—Amis was proprietor
of a school and employed a teacher named Samuel B. Hawkins. But Amis saw fastest growth
among his saw mills. He recorded about 300 transactions involving planks that sold for 4
shillings (about $0.66) per 100 feet. Amis additionally sold mill saws; William Hoard purchased
a 16.5-pound saw “to be [paid] in same [number] of pounds of good steel.” John Hall found
employment transporting, sawing, and selling lumber.9
Blount himself hoped to open an iron works. As soon as the security of the country
improved, he meant to establish a company in Cumberland for that purpose. To Robertson he

8

Knoxville Gazette, November 19, 1791, December 17, 1791, January 14, 1792, April 20, 1793, June 15, 1793,
Microfilm, McClung Collection.
9
Lucy Kennerly Gump., trans, Amis Ledger D (1794-1801) Interpretive Transcription of an East Tennessee
Business Record Book (Johnson City: 1997), 18, 24, 37, 63-64, 72-73, 105, 54, 65, 97-98, Hodges Library.

82

said: “if you have any Bank of Iron Ore I advise you not to sell it unless you could sell to People
of Capital enough to erect Works immediately and I presume none such can yet appear at
Cumberland.” He estimated that a furnace and forge would need a $10,000 investment, or
perhaps more given the exposed nature of Mero District’s frontiers. It was not Blount, however,
but Robertson who established the Cumberland Iron Works in present-day Dickson County.10
Attempts at improvement also encompassed education. In the territorial assembly’s
August 1794 session, James White introduced a bill to establish a university in Greene County.
The assembly passed the bill and appointed Hezekiah Balch, a Presbyterian minister, its
president; Robert Henderson, Balch’s son-in-law, became secretary of the board of trustees.
Balch and Henderson wrote a memorial to Congress asking for financial assistance for the
college’s operation. They wrote that “many parents in this territory who on account of their
circumstances are unable to send their children abroad for an Education; could supply what
might be necessary to have them educated provided there was a Seminary near home.” William
Cocke introduced a bill that established another college in Knoxville. The assembly gave it the
name “Blount College.” David Allison sold Greek and Latin books to the academy from
Philadelphia, and he offered to purchase whatever supplies the school might need. Something
like common schools were available in some measure to educate younger children. Two
travelers said that “English schools are to be found everywhere, and the youth learn, at least, to
read and write and the fundamentals of figuring.”11
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Improvements faced one significant limitation. Cash was scarce in the Tennessee region,
as it was in the West generally. Little money was to be had either as a medium of exchange or as
a source of capital for permanent improvements. Thus did the mercantile establishments operate
predominantly on barter and prospective investors like Blount face difficulties in establishing
manufactures. The scarcity of money originated in part from the mercantile system itself.
Steiner and DeSchweintz said that “whatever money is brought into the country by travellers gets
into the hands of the traders who send it to the seaports for wares.” Some settlers grumbled at
the merchants for this state of affairs, yet no one grumbled about the variety of goods available to
them. Most settlers wanted internal improvements or manufactures to obviate the trade with
Baltimore and Philadelphia. Steiner and DeSchweintz said that “the common judgment of
people is that this region will never attain to real prosperity without manufactures, as it is too far
away from a market.” Calls for autonomous prosperity grew more robust after the territory
attained statehood.12
Belief in prosperity was rooted in a substantive democratic experience. Even though
speculators had dominated western settlement, and even though merchants dominated trade, the
Southwest Territory was soon to become one of the most liberal states in the Union. An
overwhelming majority of territorial residents voted in favor of statehood, despite strong
opposition from the Mero District. The voters here probably feared that they would have little
political power in the new state, for their population was far smaller than that of Washington
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District and Hamilton District to the east. The eastern districts thus carried the measure. Blount
authorized each county to elect five persons on December 18 and 19, 1795, in order to attend a
constitutional convention the following January. All free males 21 years of age and older
qualified as electors.13
Tennessee’s constitutional convention met on January 11, 1796. Several new counties
had been added since 1790; representatives appeared from Washington, Greene, Sullivan,
Hawkins, Sevier, Blount, Knox, Jefferson, Davidson, Tennessee, and Sumner. 55 delegates—5
from each county—appeared in total. Prominent members included Blount and James White
from Knox County, Landon Carter and John Tipton from Washington County, Joseph McMinn
and William Cocke from Hawkins County, and James Robertson and Andrew Jackson from
Davidson County.14
What emerged from the convention was a remarkably liberal constitution. The delegates
formulated an extensive bill of rights, including freedom of worship, freedom of assembly, and
freedom of the press, the prohibition of religious tests to serve in office, a trial by jury, and a
provision that stated “monopolies are contrary to the genius of a free state, and shall not be
allowed.” The legislature would consist of two branches, whose members would be elected
every two years and whose electors remained the same for each house. The only limitation was a
ratio of one senator for every two representatives. Legislators were required to have a freehold
of at least 200 acres of land and to be at least 21 years of age, while the governor needed a
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freehold of at least 500 acres and to be at least 30 years of age. Their electors, however,
benefitted from expansive manhood suffrage, the only limitation being that an elector needed to
possess a freehold and to be at least 21 years of age. The people’s wishes would, in theory,
dominate, for the governor held no veto power and the assembly controlled the judicial system’s
organization and the appointment of justices of the peace for the county courts. The county
courts, in turn, would elect the county officers. All men subject to militia duty could vote for
their captains, subalterns, and field officers. Field officers would vote for their brigadier
generals. Field officers and brigadier generals would vote for major generals.15
Constitutional liberality was never in question, only the degree of its liberality. For
example, a close vote was held on a motion to allow all freeholders and all those liable for militia
duty to be qualified as electors. 25 delegates, led by Alexander Outlaw, McMinn, and Tipton,
voted for this measure. 28 delegates, led by Blount, Robertson, and White, defeated it. On the
other hand a motion was made that stated “no person who publicly denies the being of a God,
and a future state of rewards and punishments, or the divine authority of the old and new
testament, shall hold any office in the civil department of this state.” This was agreed to, but the
convention struck out the words “divine authority” by a vote of 27-26. Those who voted to
strike this phrase out, it can be assumed, would have been disqualified from office if it had
remained. Blount, Robertson, Carter, and Jackson were among this group.16
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Statehood came quickly. The first session of the Tennessee General Assembly formed on
March 28, and John Sevier was certified as governor the next day. Sevier would serve three
consecutive terms from 1796-1802, only relinquishing office because the state constitution
prohibited governors from holding a fourth consecutive term. When he became eligible again,
he served another three consecutive terms. His popularity and influence in early Tennessee were
unmatched. The assembly elected Blount and Cocke as Tennessee’s first senators. Tennesseans
elected Andrew Jackson as Tennessee’s lone representative in the United States House.17
Political democracy reflected the substantive status of Tennessee’s citizens. Opportunity
was not the provincial concern of the elite. Landownership lay within the reach of a sizable
portion of the population. In East Tennessee, tax assessors from the counties of Washington,
Greene, Knox, and Grainger recorded remarkably high rates of landownership. Washington
County held the highest proportion of landowners. Out of 698 taxpayers recorded in 1790, 71%
owned taxable acreage. This pattern did not change much during the next decade. In 1801, out
of 834 taxpayers, 68% owned taxable acreage. During the decade, the number of landowners
who possessed taxable acreage and paid a poll tax remained only a few percentage points below
the total number of landowners. This meant that most landowners in the county actually resided
on the land they owned, rather than acting as absentees. In Greene County in 1809, the numbers
were comparable. Out of 1,201 taxpayers, 69% held taxable acreage. Those who additionally
paid a poll tax, however, were notably fewer—46%. In Knox County in 1804, out of 847
taxpayers, approximately 62% held taxable acreage, while 51% also paid the poll tax. In
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Grainger County the percentage of landowners increased from 44% to 53% between 1799 and
1810, although those paying a poll tax remained stable at 35%. In other East Tennessee counties
during the early part of the nineteenth century, landownership hovered between 40%-70%, while
landowners who held taxable acreage and also paid a poll tax hovered between 27%-62%. These
rates compared favorably with those in western Europe and were nearly identical to those in
Ohio.18
Land ownership rates in West Tennessee were similar. In Wilson County in 1803, out of
467 total individuals, approximately 63% owned taxable acreage, while approximately 31% of
these landowners also paid a poll tax. Of the remainder who owned no taxable acreage, 16%
held other assets in the form of slaves, town lots, or retail stores. Four years later, a total of
1,057 individuals were recorded. Of them, 51% owned taxable acreage, while 34% also paid a
poll tax. Of those who held no taxable acreage, 16% held other assets. In Rutherford County in
1809, approximately 50% of taxpayers owned taxable acreage, while approximately 33% of
these landowners also paid a poll tax. Of those who held no taxable acreage, 25% held other
assets.19
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Looked at another way these numb,ers mean that, on average, 40% to 50% of the
population still remained without land. But opportunity was not closed to them. A significant
minority owned no land but probably hoped to do so through inheritance. In Wilson County in
1807, for example, approximately 25% of those individuals who owned no land shared surnames
with someone who did. In Greene County, 46% likewise shared a surname with a landowner. In
Knox County, 36% did so. A substantial portion of Tennesseans, therefore, owned land or lived
with an expectation of gaining their independence.20
Even residents without land and without family connections stood a chance. Land was
cheap. A Frenchman traveling the frontier described emigrants living near Knoxville whose
clothes were torn and whose children were barefoot—an uncommon sight in America. He
nevertheless explained that “the riches of the inhabitants of the Western Country do not,
however, consist in money; for I am well convinced that a tenth of them do not possess a single
dollar: but each man lives on his own freehold, and the money arising from the sale of a horse or
a few cows is always more than sufficient to procure him all those secondary articles, which
come from English manufactories.” It was not all bluster when Blount, three years before he
died, told John Gray that “it is certain that every Man who arrives here and determines to become
a Citizen appears to feel and I believe does in reality feel and [sic] Independence and
Consequence to which he was a Strainger in the Atlantic States.”21
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Equality of land ownership would diminish somewhat over the next two decades. The
origins of this development lay in the continued issuance of Revolutionary military land warrants
by North Carolina for Tennessee lands, as established in North Carolina’s cession to Congress in
1789. Disputes arose between North Carolina and Tennessee as a matter of course, as Tennessee
wanted the power to issue land warrants within its own borders. The two states worked with the
federal government in 1806 to create a compromise. The North Carolina warrants would still be
honored, although Tennessee would now administer the warrants and subsequent grants.
Tennessee also gained the power to grant lands in the following three districts of the state: the
District South of French Broad and Holston Rivers, the Hiwassee District, and the Ocoee
District. The Hiwassee District, a region in the southeastern portion of the state, was currently
occupied by Cherokee Indians, but it would affect the state’s banking system when the
Cherokees agreed to a cession in 1819. As a final part of the compromise, Congress reserved to
the United States all lands south and west of a line called the “Congressional Reservation.” All
the land between the Tennessee and Mississippi Rivers, plus a small region east of the
Tennessee, came under federal authority.22
Congress placed restrictions on Tennessee’s power in the three districts that the state
administered. Certain lands were to be reserved for the use of schools and academies. Occupant
settlers could protect their land and improvements by purchasing claims at $1.00 per acre. The
remaining lands were to be sold at a minimum of $2.00 per acre, the same price established by
Congress for United States land offices. Tennessee devised a credit system that ostensibly
enabled purchasers to meet this mandated minimum. The system worked tolerably well during
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prosperous times. When economic times worsened, as they did in 1819, the whole system
collapsed. Petitions for relief usually came from the French Broad and Holston District.23
These developments created a debtor-interest faction, but the debtors were not necessarily
tenants in the grip of landlords. As early as 1799 several individuals living south of the French
Broad River petitioned the state legislature, writing that “we your petitioners humbly Beg Leave
to shew to your honorable body that the [situation] of our Country is such that it Contains a great
quantity of pore Barren Land which we through Necessity have been forced to settle on and
which in fact is not fit for Cultivation.” Some of these petitioners were perhaps squatters who
had been pushed off their land by speculators. Others actually were speculators themselves. Of
the 24 individuals who signed this petition, at least 9 had obtained grants for Tennessee lands. A
petition in 1809 from residents of the same area asked for a law suspending executions of
judgments against property for defaulters. These petitioners were not without means. They had
heavily invested their means in cotton production, suffered from two seasons of bad harvest, and
struggled to finance their ventures because of the scarcity of money.24
Tennessee’s land grant system continued to use surveyors to mark bounds. The
compromise of 1806 did not systematize state land into rectangular sections, as Congress had
done with the Northwest Territory in 1787. Litigation over land claims resulted. Here too the
advantage speculators held over squatters is muddled. Many cases brought before the county
courts and the superior court involved plaintiffs seeking payments from delinquent debtors or
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seeking to eject current occupiers of land claimed by the plaintiff. Thus some inhabitants of the
District of Mero complained that “many of the Citizens of this state are detered from Seeking
[judgment] on account of the great cost attending [court disputes] and we assert that the
Chiefeast in a Suit is the witnesses attendence.” They claimed that court costs “Generally falls
on the party least [able] to pay instances where there is only one hundred Dollars in dispute.” On
the other hand, one group of speculators thought the state laws too lax in regard to squatters.
They sent a petition to the legislature complaining of the inability to certify titles purchased from
delinquent taxpayers and of the difficulty of removing squatters under the current law. They
wrote that “the Lands so sold for Taxes are held up as great Bargains and in fact a Purchaser
[often] Loses his money, under the present Law and Circumstances for want of a mode pointed
out to do Bussiness of that Kind, and a Number of those Claims so sold from their vagueness and
the want of living Witnessess they Cannot be Established.” They asked that a “Law may be
passed to authirise any Person that have become a purchaser or May hereafter become a
purchaser to be at full liberty to remove the [whole] or apart whether the oldest or youngest
Enterer or Granted.”25
Speculators sued each other with at least as much fervor as they did squatters.
Conflicting land titles born of murky surveys and duplicate warrants produced endless litigation.
Take the cases of Joseph Ore v. John Matlock and, subsequently, John Matlock v. Joseph Ore.
The origins of these two cases lay in the land law of 1783. In that year, two men named Francis
Dyer and Thomas King, desiring to secure land for entry from the new land office, settled along
the Holston River in Greene County, later Grainger County. Dyer and King made improvements
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on the land by building cabins and clearing trees. They established a line between them to
properly delineate their property claims. Both made entries into the land office and received
grants. King received his grant for 300 acres in January 1792, but Dyer decided to sell his land
to James Parkbery, who in turn sold the land to Joseph Ore. Four years later, King sold his tract
to Matlock. Matlock asserted that Ore understood the original property boundaries as first
established between Dyer and King. Matlock charged that, despite this understanding, “after
your Orator had lived there sometime and made valuable improvements there on said Joseph
pretended to have a title for more than one half of the said tract of three hundred acres which he
purchased from said Thomas, and produced a feigned platt & Certificate of survey, and a Grant
which he pretended had been issued thereon in the name of James Parberry also pretended that
said James Parberry had made to him a Deed of conveyance for the land contained within the
bound of said Grant.” Ore then brought an ejectment suit against Matlock in 1799 and won.
Matlock countersued but lost. Ejectment cases like this one occurred with as much regularity
between speculators as they did between speculators and squatters. Even John Overton found
himself a defendant in at least one case (he was found not guilty). Given the confused state of
the land business, it would have been virtually impossible for the court to determine with
absolute certainty which party possessed the legitimate claim.26
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The Superior Court and the county courts, on the whole, did the best they could in such
circumstances. Ejectment cases often resulted in the plaintiff being awarded a writ of
possession, but by no means did the court ignore the pleas of defendants. It was not uncommon
for a jury appointed by the court to return a verdict of not guilty, or to remained deadlocked and
thus produce a mistrial. Several defendants, for example, successfully defended themselves
twice from the prosecution of Thomas Blount. The wealthy merchant George M. Deaderick also
lost a case of ejectment. Cases in which the plaintiffs sought to collect a debt from the defendant
almost always resulted in damages being awarded to the plaintiffs. These cases, however, again
hardly demonstrated a universal tendency to wipe out the assets of a poor farmer. Moreover,
plaintiffs who brought debt suits were themselves sometimes the defendants in other suits. All
settlers shared a sense of turbulence and uncertainty.27
Widespread land ownership produced general optimism. Tennesseans, like most
Americans, extolled agriculture as an occupation. Yet their admiration for hardy farm life always
pointed to commerce and manufactures as the benefits that would flow from agriculture. One
editorial in The Review (Nashville) stated that “all wealth is derived from the produce of the
earth and labor.” It proclaimed that “a wise government endeavor to attach as much riches to the
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soil as possible.” Then internal improvements, commerce, and manufactures would flourish.
The Knoxville Register printed an editorial from the National Register entitled “Superiority of
Agriculture.” The writer asserted that “in a moral and political point of view … the superiority
of agriculture over all other occupations must be readily acknowledged, and the happiness, the
wealth, and the freedom of a nation will never be lost while husbandry forms its principal
support and dependence.” But other economic activities had their place. “We conceive every
class productive which adds to the national wealth by contributing to the increase of individual
riches. The facilities which the mercantile class affords to the agricultural, by taking away their
surplus produce and giving them in exchange that which will enable them to enlarge their
territorial boundaries, add to their cultivation, and purchase machinery, may be considered
equally conducive to national wealth.” John Rhea, while serving as a representative in Congress,
affirmed this commitment to diversified endeavors: “Agriculture and commerce mutually assist
each other; agriculture supports commerce, commerce gives vigor to agriculture. Agricultural
industry confined to the necessaries of life only would be languid and feeble.”28
Diversified improvement became the focus of Tennessee’s leadership. In one of his first
messages to the General Assembly, Sevier encouraged its members to provide funding for a
wagon road over the mountains, connecting South Carolina and North Carolina with Greene
County, Tennessee. The assembly obliged by granting Charles Robinson of Greene County the
right to clear a road to enable a wagon with four horses and 1,500 pounds to pass. Many
investors subscribed funds after the state could not provide an appropriation. Sevier noted “the
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great tendency it will have to induce emigrants into the State, besides opening an eaisy and ready
communication with the sea ports and trading towns in the neighbouring States, wherein many of
the productions of the Country can be transported to market with convenience.”29
Blount formed a company with several land speculators called the “Cumberland
Association.” The company hired a surveyor named Moses Fisk to lay out certain West
Tennessee lands. Blount instructed Fisk: “You are to sell to actual settlers only, and not
exceeding six thousand four hundred acres until further orders, at not less than one dollar an
acre.” Fisk could accept interest payments on short terms. Execution of a deed would occur
when the first installment was paid and when the occupant mortgaged the land for security of the
remaining payments. Fisk could also form townships, pay taxes, and contract for the building of
grist mills, saw mills, roads, and schoolhouses.30
One of the most audacious efforts involved a renewal of the Muscle Shoals speculation.
In 1797 the state of Georgia, having rescinded the original sale because of popular discontent,
again sold its Yazoo lands to several companies, one of which was Sevier’s Tennessee Yazoo
Company. One of Sevier’s associates named Zachariah Cox directed the company’s affairs and
secured the purchase from Georgia. Sevier in turn purchased titles from the company on April
27, September 2, and September 4 for 10,000, 20,000, and 20,000 acres, respectively. The
company’s reservation to his title indicated Sevier’s shrewd choice of location, as well as the
company’s intentions: “reserving the right of passing such canals, as shall facilitate the

29

John Sevier to the General Assembly, April 1, 1796, John Sevier to Arnoldus Vanderhorst, June 7, 1796, and John
Sevier to the General Assembly, August 2, 1796, in “Executive Journal of Governor John Sevier,” ed. Williams,
ETHS Publications, no. 1 (1929): 101, 109-110, 117; John Sevier to the General Assembly, October 4, 1797,
“Executive Journal of Governor John Sevier,” ed. Williams, ETHS Publications, no. 3 (1931): 155.
30
The Cumberland Association to Moses Fisk, August 17, 1796, in William Blount Papers, 1783-1823, Microfilm,
TSLA.

96

intercourse between the Tennesse, and those rivers, falling into the Tombigbee, or Mobile bay.”
If a canal connected the Tennessee River with the Tombigbee River, thus giving Tennessee
direct access to the port of Mobile, the cumbersome overland routes to Baltimore, or the insecure
and circuitous route to New Orleans, would be negated.31
Most Tennesseans accepted these activities. Private ventures of Blount, Sevier, and other
speculators blended with public desires for land and development. It is true that Tennesseans
probably did not understand the depth of unsavory activities involved in the Yazoo purchase,
including bribery of Georgia state legislators. But private speculations were common
knowledge. Cox, for example, placed an advertisement in the Knoxville Gazette informing old
warrant holders of Blount’s Bend of the Tennessee Company that they could receive special
deeds of conveyance.32
The first political test Sevier faced while in office showed the similitude of private-public
interests. This episode involved a dispute with the federal government and the Cherokees over
the boundary lines of the Treaty of Holston. While he was territorial governor, Blount had failed
(or shrewdly neglected) to run the treaty’s boundaries. Such failure prompted the federal
government to run the line in July 1797, and many whites living south of the French Broad and
Holston Rivers were found on the Cherokee’s side. Tennesseans balked at this attempt to check
their expansion. The state legislature sent a remonstrance to Congress in protest. Sevier spent
much of the next year convincing the federal government that the boundary should be extended
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via treaty, which was subsequently done. He also entertained hopes that the crisis would in the
end secure settlement of the Muscle Shoals region. He wrote to the state’s congressional
members that “the preventation of a settlement at or near the Muscle Shoals is a manifest injury
done the whole western country; and, as long as it is the case, we should be debared from the
navigation which, by way of Moabile, is perhaps an outlet to commerce equal if not superior to
any in the United States.” He extolled “the great scale of western commerce, that must ere long
be equal if not greatly superior to any in all America, may I not say in the whole world!” He
concluded, echoing the thoughts of many Tennesseans, by asking “will the American Congress
cramp and refuse to the Western Americans the great natural advantages Providence has
designated for, and placed before them?” The actual results of the treaty were less grand. It did
secure the disputed territory for whites, but the Muscle Shoals venture again withered.33
Whatever the fate of his private ventures, Sevier continued to urge the legislature to
support internal improvements. He said, “I now proceed to enjoin on you the great necessity of
promoting and encouraging manufactories, the establishing of warehouses and inspections of
various kinds. It will give a spring to industry, and enable the agricultural part of the community
to export and dispose of all the surplus part of their bulky and heavy articles.” He envisioned a
burgeoning state whose growth would be rooted in the agricultural staples of wheat, hemp,
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cotton, and tobacco and whose commerce would expand prosperity and develop manufacturing
in ores and minerals. Legislative patronage could assist these efforts.34
Influential merchants also attempted to prod the legislature into action. One group, led
by Sevier’s associate James Ore, lamented “the great sum of Money expended for the
Importation of Goods Wars and Merchandize from foreign Nations by Land carriage into this
State.” Their remedy was Sevier’s long-cherished canal between the Muscle Shoals and the
Tombigbee River. They asked the state government to petition Congress to make appropriate
treaties with the Cherokees and Creeks, construct roads, and establish a military post at the
anticipated trading town near the Muscle Shoals canal. Merchants in Nashville asked for
government support of a new cotton manufactory. Andrew Jackson, James Robertson, and
several other petitioners suggested “the expediency of granting a Bounty of five hundred dollars
to the first Cotton Manufactory that shall be erected in two years in this District.” The lack of
infrastructure proved so troublesome that many Tennesseans left the state and settled in Natchez
along the Mississippi River, thereby easing access to the market. The problem was so bad that
the editor of the Tennessee Gazette encouraged Nashville’s residents to stay.35
Little help came from the state legislature because it was chronically short of money.
Construction of county and interstate roads continued to be the favored political method to
support commerce. These roads were primitive, often nothing more than paths cleared of trees
and underbrush, but they were enough to support wagons carrying goods to market. A road from
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Tellico Blockhouse to Georgia was completed in 1805. Other roads connected Tennessee to
North Carolina through Greene County and Nashville to the Mississippi Territory. Often the
individuals who cleared roads found it necessary to personally finance the venture and then seek
reimbursement from the legislature. Such was the case of Isaac Baker and Thomas Wilson, who
had expended $500 to clear a road in Greene County over Paint Rock Mountain. Their petition,
supported by Andrew Jackson, John Tipton, and John Sevier, asserted that “before they effected
said improvement loaded wagons could not pass over the Paint Mountain; whereas at present,
wagons laden with 2500 pounds daily pass and repays with facility.” Counties not situated along
reliable waterways or not endowed with willing investors languished. Petitioners from Carter
County asked that the legislature attend to their isolated situation via the construction of a wagon
road. They lived along the rarely navigable Watauga River, and the perilous mountains to the
east made land carriage cumbersome and expensive. They lamented that they “must thereby be
subjected to the deprivation of many of the comforts and conveniences of life, which they might
otherwise enjoy.”36
Legislators gave some support to cotton manufacturing, though hardly the support the
petitioners sought. The legislature enacted a contract with Eli Whitney to pay patent fees for the
use of the cotton gin in their state. The fees were funded via a tax on cotton gin owners. Thus
manufacturers could use a productive invention for a price, while they did not receive the
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subsidies to encourage their business. Gin owners would later complain of this tax because of
the scarcity of money in the state.37
Individuals and partnerships attempted to rectify the effects of governmental penury.
Merchants proliferated at the turn of the century to supply the needs and wants of the expanding
state. Two travelers found Knoxville a place of intense mercantile competition. Another said of
Nashville that “the inhabitants (like all those in the new settled towns) are chiefly concerned in
some way of business: a storekeeper is the general denomination of such persons.” The barter
economy still characterized business. Merchants usually formed small partnerships that bought
goods from Philadelphia or Baltimore, sold them to Tennessee customers, and took in payment
the agricultural produce of their customers. William Tait and William Stothart, for example,
operated a store in Nashville in which they sold goods for cash or cotton. A few merchants
attempted to meet the unmet demand for money. George M. Deaderick and Anthony Foster
advertised that “the subscribers reflecting with regret on the present mode of carrying on the
business of Merchandize in this District, by which both the individuals and state are deprived of
the necessary circulating medium of cash … have entered into co-partnership, the object of
which is, to procure a large and general assortment of Merchandize, which they propose vending
in the town of Nashville, for Cotton, Hemp, Tobacco, and Flour, for which the highest prices will
be given.” Andrew Jackson entered the mercantile trade with John Hutchings and John Coffee.
Their business suffered from the vicissitudes of the market and competition, however, and ended
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in 1807. Approximately 20 mercantile firms operated in Davidson County alone during the early
1800s.38
These efforts, if not spectacular, proved generally beneficial. Town residents, especially
in the primary ones of Nashville and Knoxville, directly enjoyed the benefits of commerce. The
merchants who quickened trade and the land speculators who made settlement attractive
contributed to the growth of other economic ventures in the towns. In Nashville, advertisements
appeared for boot and shoe makers, iron works, a cotton spinning establishment, a tailoring
business, and a blacksmith. In Knoxville, blacksmiths, gold and silversmiths, cabinet makers,
shoe makers, tailors, and clock and watch makers found employment. Some of them, like the
merchants, promised to take agricultural products like corn, flour, cotton, or pork in payment.
Many of these businesses wanted permanent journeymen or apprentices. Willie Barrow
advertised to hire a young man for 12-15 months who could hew and saw flat-bottomed boats.
William Carroll, a future governor, announced the opening of a nail factory and advertised
ploughs, axes, shingles, window glass, shoes, and tin wares. A shoemaker named William Heath
advertised a need for two apprentices. A blacksmith named Samuel Andrew advertised for a
journeyman who needed constant employment and good wages.39
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Commerce extended beyond the commercial centers. Speculators often initiated this
process, enticed by the verdant opportunities of the wilderness. For example, the first permanent
settlements along the Elk River in southern Tennessee appeared in 1806 and 1807. The counties
of Giles and Maury were later created here. Virtually all the first arrivals brought slaves with
them and used them to accelerate economic development. James McCallum, a resident of Giles
County during this time, remembered that one man “sent his hands out from Davidson County,
improved the place and made a crop, but did not move out his family until the latter part of the
year [1809].” This pattern was followed by most adventurers moving from West Tennessee or
East Tennessee. All early settlers raised corn at first, but the use of slaves was a boon to cotton
production. By 1811, John Laird was able to invest in a mill, a store, a young clerk, and a cotton
gin. Merchants, physicians, taverns, and tan yards grew in number.40
McCallum remembered a quick transformation from frontier subsistence to a more
specialized economy based on cotton. The speculators, the merchants, and the improvers
provided tangible benefits to the community around them. Merchants built flat-bottomed boats
at Pulaski to ship surplus produce down Richland Creek to the Elk River, thence to the
Tennessee River, thence to the Mississippi River, and thence to New Orleans. Shipping goods in
this way took about six weeks. Boat hands earned $50 for making the trip and received their
wages at New Orleans. Before the advent of steamships, most of the boat hands walked home.
McCallum recalled that “Many young men who had never been out of the county availed
themselves of this opportunity to see ‘the world.’ The marvelous stories they told on their return
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were listened to by the boys with as much interest as if they had made a tour to the Holy Land.”
Many sought opportunities to escape isolation and broaden perspectives.41
All wished to participate in the market economy. How to better integrate with that
economy remained the question. Several editorials posed solutions for the scarcity of money and
lack of infrastructure. Some berated their fellow citizens for not adopting industrious habits.
“A” in the Tennessee Gazette argued that “it is our own industry and perseverance that must
produce an order of things that will rescue us from contempt.” He said that “money is scarce
every body cries, yet no body pursues the practical means of acquiring it.” Tennesseans needed
to develop surplus commodities, especially cotton, that could support an export market.42
“Cato” more tactfully, and probably more accurately, pointed to the disadvantageous
geographic locations of the western settlers, including Tennesseans. The commercial potential of
the West was hampered by a diffuse population, distance from sea ports, and limited access to
the New Orleans market. Cato argued that “an effort ought to be made to condense [the
population], that the farmers may be enabled to bear the burden of making better roads and
improving the navigation, which is too great an expense for scattered population to bear.” This
could be done by encouraging domestic manufactures, albeit manufactures which remained a
“family affair, unlike the factory system in England.” Cato believed that cotton would best
support both agriculture and manufactures. Such mutually beneficial trade could support
investment in internal improvements.43
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Some editorials expressed ambivalence about commerce. Celebrating the Louisiana
Purchase, “Aristides” said that the new territory would provide America with a boundless
capital. He said that “upon the profits of such a boundless commerce, the life of man will enjoy
all its comforts of whatever is ornamental or necessary, through the generations of the most
remote periods of time.” Yet in subsequent numbers he criticized farmers for being too indolent
to produce their own clothes. Rather, he said, “the agricultural class, in general, has consumed
almost every thing they have made, and besides this run in debt for foreign articles of
consumption.” The mercantile class, for their part, had done nothing to open markets or enrich
the country.44
Another editorial written by “A Farmer,” appearing first in the Democratic Clarion and
Tennessee Gazette (Nashville) and later in Wilson’s Knoxville Gazette and The Review, outlined
a system whereby the state would become the public carrier of the surplus produce of its citizens.
The legislature would provide two places of deposit, one at Nashville and one at New Orleans,
and two agents, one at each city. The Nashville agent would receive merchantable produce and
grant the growers a receipt. The New Orleans agent would sell on the world market, send an
account to Nashville, and pay to each farmer the return of his produce. Storage, freight, and
commission fees would provide profits for the state’s treasury. “A Farmer” presented this
system as an alternative to private merchants because “it does not comport with the interest and
policy of the merchants of Tennessee to be the carriers of farmers produce; because they trade
directly with Philadelphia, which is a distance of sixteen hundred miles diametrically the
opposite course from New Orleans, to which our produce is obliged to go.” Such a system
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would strengthen commerce and provide exchanges for the betterment of life. “A Farmer”
rhetorically asked “would not money which has always been scarce in this country, and which
has never found its way here (except by emigrants) soon become plenty among us?”
Improvement, he concluded, would “enable us to buy land, settle our families, to build houses
better than our present miserable huts, and to educate our rising offspring.”45
Growing tension with Great Britain strengthened the call for a diversified market. “A
Friend to Internal Improvement” said that “to be independent, to be happy, to be great, we must
rely upon ourselves … American manufactures, internal commerce, inland navigation, must be
resorted to as a substitute for that portion of external trade which is snatched from us by the
tyrant of the ocean.” Thus a canal between the Hiwassee River in Tennessee and the Coosa
River in Alabama would make possible an outlet to the Gulf of Mexico. “Argus” argued
likewise that trade with Britain should be avoided. He said, “British Goods will become scarce,
our citizens will learn to consume less of them, and be thus led to look for a supply from their
own industry.”46
Tennesseans, as they changed from territorial residents to state citizens, held vibrant hope
for the future. Liberal suffrage and widespread property ownership bolstered an optimistic
outlook. This optimism supported a mercantile trade that supplied the needs and wants of
isolated communities. It also enabled individuals to seek opportunities. Anxieties existed too,
particularly as related to establishing more secure channels for commerce and better means for
manufactures. Internal improvements aided these efforts, though the scarcity of money limited

Wilson’s Knoxville Gazette, May 19, May 26, June 2, June 9, June 16, July 7, 1810, Microfilm, McClung
Collection; The Review (Nashville), June 1, June 8, July 6, June 29, August 10, August 17, August 24, August 31,
October 5, October 12, October 26, 1810, Microfilm, McClung Collection.
46
Wilson’s Knoxville Gazette, September 23, 1809, April 15, 1811, Microfilm, McClung Collection.
45

106

their effectiveness. Tennesseans thus sought ways to detach themselves from eastern trade,
which they believed drained them of the money necessary for more enduring prosperity.
Proposals abounded on how to achieve this goal. It happened that Tennessee democracy turned
to banks.
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Chapter 3

Origins of the Bank War in Tennessee1

Banking in Tennessee began under the guardianship of the select group of speculators
and merchants that had dominated western settlement and state politics. They soon found that
their control could not last. William Blount’s political machine, formed by him as territorial
governor, supplied the first bankers. Blount himself had died in 1800, and his faction was now
led by one of his appointees, John Overton, who had become one of the foremost land lawyers in
Tennessee. Overton acted behind the scenes. Legislative and policy groundwork primarily came
from Pleasant M. Miller, a son-in-law of Blount, and Hugh Lawson White, a brother-in-law of
Overton. These men shaped Tennessee’s banking policy as bankers and legislators. This faction
heavily influenced legislative charters and succeeded in naming its own to positions of power.
Overton, Miller, and White sought to concentrate banking operations in Knoxville and Nashville,
where the state’s commercial activity was strongest. These “state concentrators” wished to
exclude branch banks or independent banks. Their preeminence, however, was short-lived. In
1815 two new groups emerged to attain their own access to credit. The first group consisted of
politicians and investors united primarily by their wish to multiply banking establishments across
the state. They wanted banks for their own towns, preferably operating as branches of the banks
in Nashville or Knoxville. These “state unifiers” sought to tie their localities to the commercial
A modified version of this chapter appears as an article entitled “Unifiers, Concentrators, and Scoundrels:
Tennessee Democracy and Its Banking Aristocracies, 1807-1817,” in The Journal of East Tennessee History 90
(2018): 40-59. I thank the journal’s editor, Aaron D. Purcell, for his insightful comments and criticism.
1
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activity of Tennessee’s two most influential towns. The second group, emerging in 1816,
consisted of a new class of merchants in Nashville who wished to establish a branch of the Bank
of the United States. These “national unifiers”, joined by a few state unifiers, hoped to supplant
the state banking system through the national bank. The political battles over these banks
became fiercer as these groups coalesced into more definite factions. The Overton group
generally controlled the legislative process of the first two banks chartered—the Nashville Bank
in 1807 and the State Bank of Tennessee, located in Knoxville, in 1811. The only opposition to
these banks originated in geographic divisions, with East Tennesseans and West Tennesseans
voting against each other’s bank. By 1815, the battle had become more economic, and by 1817
the Overton group was overwhelmed by demands from the counties for a unified state banking
system connected by local branches. At no point in any of these debates did a definite antibanking group emerge. The political question always concerned the type of banking system
Tennessee would develop, not whether to have banks at all.2
Tennessee’s banking system as it developed over the next two decades performed two
primary functions. First, the banks discounted notes. Discounting performed the modern
function of loaning, except that discounting involved three parties rather than two. A merchant,
for example, may have held $1,000 in promissory notes or IOUs from a farmer or planter who
had bought supplies on credit and had promised to pay for them out of the proceeds of his crop.
The merchant often would not wait for the notes to run to maturity, but rather take them to a
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bank to obtain funds. The bank would charge interest immediately and loan the remainder to the
merchant by issuing its own notes; if the bank charged 6% interest, for example, then the
merchant would receive $940. Most banks during the early nineteenth century issued their own
notes against specie (gold and silver) reserves, for specie was the national legal tender and was
the universally recognized medium of exchange among commercial nations. Bank paper
represented promises to pay in specie. The farmer or planter was still obliged to fulfill the
promissory notes, but in case of default the merchant as an endorser of the notes might be held
liable for payment. Promissory notes were usually made payable at the borrower’s home, place
of business, or local bank.3
The second function of banks was the purchase of bills of exchange. Agricultural cycles
and the mode of transport for crops made this function essential for the middling sort of farmers
and planters. They harvested during late fall, but their produce did not ship until February or
March, when early spring rains swelled the rivers. During the interim planters consigned their
crops to commission merchants in the towns. The merchants went to a local bank and drew a bill
of domestic exchange on a mercantile or factorage firm in New Orleans, for virtually the entire
produce of the Mississippi Valley passed through that city. A bill of exchange was an order
made by the drawer (in this case the local merchant) instructing the drawee (the New Orleans
firm) to pay, on a specific date, the bearer. Bills of exchange designated a specific distant
location, usually a bank or place of business, where payment would be made. The drawer or
drawee was liable for the final redemption. Bills based on the southern and western agricultural
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University Press, 2003), 48. See O. Howard Wolfe, Elementary Banking (1915; reprint, South Yarra, Victoria,
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trade usually amounted to about half the market value of the produce to be shipped. The local
bank purchased this bill, issuing its own notes and charging a 6%-8% interest rate and a 1%-2%
exchange fee. With the proceeds the merchant shipped the produce, charged a commission fee
of 2%-3%, and remitted the remainder to the planters. Planters thus realized immediate returns,
albeit at a cost, and used the notes acquired to purchase goods in New Orleans or in eastern
cities. The local bank remitted the bill to the New Orleans firm. When the firm made the final
sale, it took up the bill, deducted a 2%-3% commission fee, and credited the local merchant’s
account in a New Orleans bank or an account with the firm itself. The local merchant drew a bill
at the local bank on the New Orleans account. After deducting expenses and commissions, the
local merchant credited the planters’ accounts.4
Tennessee sellers were also buyers of manufactured goods. As New Orleans firms
fulfilled the bills of exchange received from Tennessee, they credited the accounts of Tennessee
merchants and banks. The Tennessee merchants and banks, in turn, drew on these accounts to
finance purchases of groceries, hardware, and other finished goods for their local customers.5
This system tended to generate inflationary pressure. When Tennessee banks issued their
notes for discounting local commercial bills or promissory notes, these notes found their way to
New Orleans or an eastern city as certainly as the notes issued for bills of exchange. Local loans,
unlike loans on bills of exchange, did not acquire credits in these cities. When the notes
appeared in New Orleans, for example, no bank, firm, or merchant in that city had assets to
offset them. Whoever held the notes, to obtain payment, had to ship them back to the bank of
issue in Tennessee because the notes themselves were not legal tender, only promises to pay

4
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legal tender at the issuing bank. The note holder faced delay, transportation costs, and the
possibility that the issuing bank would refuse to honor the note. Notes of distant banks thus
circulated at a discount but they tended to stay in circulation because they depreciated less than
the cost of shipping specie. Tennessee banks, and banks throughout the South and West, could
generate a large quantity of notes without an immediate corresponding pressure to redeem them.
Excessive issues by these banks contributed to the Panic of 1819.6
Large planters and yeomen farmers tended to shun banks. Wealthy planters often had
enough means to obviate the need for borrowing, while poor yeomen benefitted only indirectly
from banking services. Andrew Jackson’s vast operation at the Hermitage, for example, allowed
him to ship his crops directly to New Orleans merchants, and he received their remittances in
like manner. Jackson’s means allowed him to bear the responsibility of shipping and the cost of
waiting several months to receive his profits. Yeomen, by contrast, did not sell enough goods for
a merchant to take a profitable consignment. They instead sold to country merchants or local
stores and received paper redeemable in specie or goods in payment. These farmers benefitted in
that the merchants or storekeepers procured their supplies and marketed their crops. They
suffered, however, when banks suspended specie payments because of the difficulties in
acquiring the legal tender for the payment of taxes.7
The very first bank chartered by the legislature was the Nashville Bank in 1807. The
final vote approved the charter 13-12 in the House (the tally in the Senate was not recorded). Of
those who voted yea, five represented East Tennessee counties, and eight represented West
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Tennessee. Of those who voted no, all but two represented East Tennessee. The two who voted
for the bank probably did so as part of the Overton group. John Tipton, for example, the son of
Sevier’s bitter enemy, voted “yea.” Tipton family ties to the Overton group remained strong
throughout early Tennessee’s history.8
The charter explained the purpose of the bank: “the operations of similar associations
have been found eminently calculated to advance the interest of commerce and navigation—to
encourage a spirit of improvement in agriculture, manufactories, arts and sciences, and to aid the
exertions of honest industry, and to repress the unlawful and pernicious practice of usury.” The
charter incorporated subscribers to the bank’s capital stock until January 1, 1818. The capital
stock was set at $200,000 to be divided into shares of $50 each; $10 on each share was to be paid
at the time of subscription, and an additional $5 was to be paid on each share within 90 days.
These shares were to be paid for in specie. At the end of this period, the bank would commence
operations. The remainder of the installment payments for each share would be paid as the
directors authorized, provided that each payment did not exceed $5 per share. 300 shares of the
capital stock were reserved to the state for two years. Nine directors would oversee operations,
and they would elect one of their number president. The legislature appointed several prominent
merchants to the bank’s first board of directors, including George M. Deaderick, William Tait,
and George Poyzer; Deaderick was subsequently elected president. After January 1, 1809, the
stockholders would elect the directors. The bank could not deal in any trade or stock except gold
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or silver bullion, or in the sale of goods pledged for money lent, and not rendered in due time,
and it could invest in any contingent funds, in the public stocks of the United States, or in any
incorporated institution of the United States. It could lend money but could not take more than
one-half percent per thirty days for its loans and discounts. Dividends were to be declared twice
annually in January and July. The total debts of the bank were not to exceed the capital stock.
Andrew Jackson found no slithering hydras in these provisions. He paid Deaderick a bill for
$500 to pay for his first installment on fifty shares of bank stock on October 24, 1808.9
Four years later, East Tennessee received its own bank, incorporated as the Bank of the
State of Tennessee and established in Knoxville. Pleasant Miller of Knox County introduced the
measure. The debate over this bank strongly reflected regional divisions. The charter passed 158. Of those who voted yea, at least ten represented East Tennessee counties. Of those who voted
no, at least six represented West Tennessee counties. A few still remained in the House who also
had voted on the Nashville Bank. Their votes varied. John Cocke and John Tipton, residing in
the east, had voted for the Nashville Bank and did so for the state bank. William Young and
William Bradley, also residing in the east, had voted against the Nashville Bank but now voted
for the state bank. Of the members residing in the west, John Crawford voted for both banks,
while Robert Edwards voted against both banks; Joel Dyer had voted for the Nashville Bank but
now voted against the state bank. In the Senate, the charter passed 8-4, and this vote was also
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regionally divisive. Of those who voted yea, seven represented East Tennessee Counties. Of
those who voted no, all represented West Tennessee counties.10
The state bank’s charter authorized a greater volume of business than that of the
Nashville Bank. The state bank’s capital stock was set at $400,000, divided into shares of $50.
The legislature directed that subscriptions would open on January 1, 1812. The sale of these
subscriptions was opened exclusively in East Tennessee counties and was overseen by
commissioners, appointed by the legislature. Once the subscriptions were made, nine directors
were to be elected by the stockholders on January 1 of each year. As soon as 4,000 shares were
subscribed and $25,000 paid to the commissioners in gold or silver, the commissioners would
give twenty days’ notice for the election of directors. Only two-thirds of the directors could be
reelected each year, but the president could always be reelected. Stockholders held votes in
direct proportion to their shares, but no individual was entitled to more than thirty votes.
Dividends would be paid twice annually. Bills of exchange, promissory notes, specie, and the
sale of goods were the only assets that could be traded. The rate of interest was limited to 6%.
The state could subscribe $20,000, or 400 shares. The directors could establish branches at
Clarksville, Columbia, and Jonesborough, and they could make the Nashville Bank a branch with
its consent. In the meantime, the Nashville Bank’s capital stock was also increased to $400,000,
and its charter extended until January 1, 1828.11
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The state bank’s higher amount of capital stock probably indicated a desire by the bank’s
supporters to create a central bank for the state. One of the state bank charter’s provisions
allowed the company to acquire debt up to double the amount of its capital stock. Money
deposited in the bank was not to be considered as part of these debts. Thus the bank could
practice an early form of fractional reserve banking; since the state bank’s capital was to be paid
in specie, the restriction of liabilities to double the paid capital was the reciprocal of a
requirement that cash reserves be at least half of its liabilities. This ratio was conservative. In
comparison, the Bank of New York was authorized to treble its debts in relation to its capital
stock, while the Bank of the United States, whose charter had recently expired, had operated
within a five to one ratio.12
The state concentrators remained preeminent in this bank. Several commissioners named
by the legislature to oversee subscriptions to the bank’s stock had ties to Blount’s political
machine, including Thomas Emmerson in Knox County, Valentine Sevier in Greene County, and
James Rhea in Sullivan County. Emmerson in particular assured that events transpired to the
benefit of his cohorts. On March 9, 1812, the commissioners of Knox County announced that
they were extending the deadline for the first installment payment to June 1 so that out-of-state
subscribers could have enough time to send their payments. Many did not meet this deadline.
Before this default was public knowledge, Emmerson, personal friends with both Miller and
Overton, privately wrote to Overton that 5,000 shares had reverted to the bank because of
forfeiture. Emmerson asked Overton to purchase as much stock as possible so that the threshold
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of $25,000 would be reached and the bank could commence operations. Overton agreed.
Whether primarily by his efforts or not, the remaining stock quickly sold. On July 14
newspapers publicly announced the sale of these subscriptions. On the first day of sale
Knoxville residents purchased over 1,000 shares. Apparently there was no great difficulty in
selling the remaining shares, because by August the commissioners announced that 4,000 shares
had been subscribed, $25,000 had been paid to the commissioners, and an election for directors
would be held on September 1 at the Knoxville courthouse. The stockholders elected as directors
John Crozier, James Park, Calvin Morgan, Charles McClung, Robert King, Jr., James Campbell,
and David Keller. Hugh Lawson White was elected president. A ninth director served by
appointment of the governor.13
State banking’s arrival was fortuitous. Flush times followed the War of 1812. Land
prices increased. Tennessee surveyors went to Alabama, bringing lands won by Andrew Jackson
during the Creek War to market. The price of cotton increased to $0.34 per pound. Trade
quickened. The banks in Nashville and Knoxville violated their charters by suspending specie
payments, in part to meet the growing demand for paper currency. Several citizens of Carter
County and East Tennessee summarized the state of affairs in 1815 in a petition to the
legislature. They acknowledged that the war had brought taxes, the destruction of commerce,
and the hampering of agricultural pursuits. But peace had come, and it promised a revival of
trade. They concluded, “we flatter ourselves that the growing trade and intercourse between the
Eastern Section of Tennessee, and its rich and flourishing Sister States … will now most rapidly
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progress to promote this most invaluable object, a circulating medium of Trade, equally certain
among them all.” Their request was the establishment of a bank in, of course, their region.14
Prosperity, or at least its anticipation, made trade and money the focus of Tennessee
politics for the next few years. Tennessee’s General Assembly of 1815 agreed with the Carter
County petitioners that growing trade demanded legislative action with respect to banking. It
was in this session that the state concentrators’ control of banking policy ended. They faced the
nascent coalescing of the state unifiers, interested in multiplying banks and thus widening access
to credit. On the extremes lay those legislators who wholly supported or wholly opposed any
banking measures. The unconditional supporters were John Gibbs, Christian Carriger, William
Edmiston, William King, and Nathan Shipley. The uncompromising opponents were John
Gragg, Sterling Cocke, William B. Lenoir, and James Cryer. Their less ideological, or perhaps
less principled, colleagues fought over this question—whether to increase the capital stock of the
Bank of the State of Tennessee and concentrate control, or to multiply banking establishments
and enlarge the state’s credit network.15
William Edmiston of Lincoln County opened the discussion on October 5. He introduced
a bill to incorporate a bank in Fayetteville—the county seat of his constituency. The bill passed
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its first reading without turmoil. Its second reading the next day engendered opposition. After
some debate, the members rejected the bill in a close vote.16
The concentrators’ triumph did not last. By a shrewd set of compromises, the unifiers
eventually carried the point. The first part of the compromise involved passage of the Holston
Tennessee Bank to be based in Jonesborough. Carriger on October 17 presented the petition of
the citizens of Carter County and East Tennessee, asking for the establishment of a bank in their
county called the “Holston Bank.” The committee on propositions and grievances reviewed the
petition and declared its assent on October 21. Jenkin Whiteside of Davidson County, a
concentrator, attempted to lay it on the table indefinitely. For this vote supporters and opponents
of the bank aligned exactly as they had for the Fayetteville Bank, except that Robert Jarmon
opposed this bank and Jonathan Tipton supported it. The balance was tipped in the unifiers’
favor by three representatives who had not participated in the Fayetteville Bank vote. All voted
to support the Holston Bank. Whiteside’s motion was defeated 18-20, and the House concurred
with the committee’s report.17
The second step in the compromise involved joining the Holston Tennessee Bank
proposal with the heretofore defunct Fayetteville Tennessee Bank bill. When this bill came to
the floor for reconsideration on November 16, Nathan Shipley offered an amendment that
incorporated two banks, one in Fayetteville as the Fayetteville Tennessee Bank and one in
Jonesborough as the Holston Tennessee Bank. Thus southwestern Tennessee and northeastern
Tennessee would each have a bank. The bill passed its second reading as amended. Apparently
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one more compromise was necessary, for the bill as it finally passed incorporated three banks,
one in Fayetteville, one in Jonesborough, and one in Franklin.18
The concentrators met only defeat in their efforts. Leaders of this faction included
Whiteside and Thomas Williamson of Davidson County, James Fentress of Montgomery
County, and Julian Frazier of Knox County. Their interest lay with the Nashville Bank and the
Bank of the State of Tennessee. On the very day that Whiteside voted against the first
Fayetteville bank bill, he introduced a measure to increase the capital stock of the state bank.
The bill passed its first reading. Then it became mired in legislative maneuvering. From
October 7 to November 7, the bill was either laid on the table or withdrawn for amendment. It
was tabled on its second reading. On November 9 the assembly took up the bill for its third and
final reading. The vote generally reflected the inverse of the vote to table the Holston Bank. As
such, the capital stock increase was defeated 17-20. The bill was feebly considered again with
amendments, but it died on the table.19
The new chartered banks closely resembled the Nashville Bank’s structure. Each bank
received a capital stock of $200,000. This stock was divided into shares of $50 each, with $10 to
be paid on each share at the time of subscription. No subsequent installment payment would
exceed $5. Stockholders elected nine directors (except for the first nine directors, who were
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appointed by the legislature) and received votes in proportion to their holdings. The total amount
of debt for each bank could not exceed its capital stock.20
Access to credit motivated the unifiers. The charters of the banks for Fayetteville,
Jonesborough, and Franklin authorized them to become branches of the state bank in Knoxville.
The unifiers essentially re-directed the prospective increase of capital stock from the state bank
to their own banks. Branch banks provided local access, and they created an interest for the state
bank in local areas. The unifiers did loosen restrictions for the state bank by repealing the
portion of its charter prohibiting it from issuing notes for an amount less than $5. In its place the
legislature authorized the state bank to issue notes for an amount not less than $1. Money was in
strong demand in Tennessee.21
Then national events intruded on state banking. The United States government’s
financial situation was critical following the War of 1812. During the war Congress had
authorized the sale of bonds and the issue of treasury notes, but the bond sales were never fully
subscribed, and the treasury notes depreciated almost immediately. Having no common medium
of exchange, the government received taxes in depreciated state bank paper and treasury notes.
Congress and the president responded by creating the Bank of the United States on April 10,
1816. The bank commenced operations on January 7, 1817, capitalized at $35 million. The
Bank was a hybrid institution, performing both public and for-profit functions. The federal
government owned 20% of the Bank’s capital, and the president of the United States appointed
5% of the board of directors. The Bank served as a depository of government funds, assisted in

20

Tennessee General Assembly, Chapter 198, Acts Passed at the First Session of the Eleventh General Assembly
[…], session convened 1815 (Nashville: T.G. Bradford, n. d.), 305-320, TSLA.
21
Tennessee General Assembly, Chapter 198, Chapter 35, Acts (1815), 320, 39, TSLA.

121

the collection of taxes, and issued loans to the federal government. It also acted as a commercial
bank for private citizens by issuing loans, discounting debts, and receiving deposits.22
The Bank’s commercial business meant that the directors primarily responded to the
incentive of profits and the threat of losses. The Bank thus did not act as a modern central bank
would, actively implementing monetary policy, directly influencing reserve ratios of member
banks, and serving as a lender of last resort. At times the Bank foreshadowed such practices. It
eventually established a uniform currency acceptable nearly everywhere in the country. It
regulated specie flows, ensuring liquidity throughout the economy. It also influenced state
banks’ reserve ratios by presenting state bank notes for specie redemption, thus preventing the
state banks from overextending note issues. All of these functions, however, were passive in
nature. The Bank responded to changing business conditions, rather than actively pursuing
definite public policies.23
The Bank of the United States found some support in Tennessee, located mainly in
Nashville. Felix Grundy led this group of national unifiers. Grundy had served in the House of
Representatives from Tennessee, and he had supported early efforts to establish a national bank.
William Carroll added his support as a prominent businessman and one of Jackson’s ablest
subordinates during the war. Whiteside also joined, perhaps reckoning that a national bank
would provide a more coordinated banking system than the one he had supported in the 1815
assembly. His stance perhaps cost him his seat, as he did not join the assembly in 1817. Other
prominent members included Jesse Wharton, O. B. Hayes, George W. Gibbs, Alfred Balch, and
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Andrew Hynes. These members saw better than most the opportunities that Tennessee, with its
growing business in cotton, could have with a national bank.24
Enthusiasm for money also persisted among the counties. Numerous petitions came to
the 1817 session of the General Assembly asking for banking establishments in order to increase
trade, secure more money, and commence internal improvements. Citizens of Hawkins County
asked for a bank in Rogersville. They argued that their city especially benefitted from trade with
the eastern coastal cities because it was situated on the public road. They wanted to become a
branch of the state bank. The citizens of Sumner County described the difficulty of trade without
a bank in their county seat of Gallatin. Anyone wishing to acquire money had to make a difficult
journey to Nashville; anyone who made it found money scarce. They said that “the reason your
petitioners suppose that accommodations cannot be had in Nashville is owing, principley [sic], to
a deficiency in bank Capital which is bearly [sic] sufficient to supply the wants of the citizens of
that place and those in its immediate vicinity.” Banks produced general good. They argued that
banks furnished “the means to give the highest prices for all kind of produce to the farmers” and
“employment for mechanicks of every description.” The citizens of Maury County asked for a
bank at their town of Columbia. They informed the legislature that Columbia held $20,000
because of the sale of town lots. They wished to invest the money in bank stock and use the
dividends to begin construction of a bridge across the Duck River. They complained that they
attempted to purchase subscriptions to the bank but none remained. Citizens of Davidson
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County and Bedford County also sent petitions asking for new banks. Banks, at least in the
abstract, offered new opportunities for frontier residents. Many hoped to more actively
participate in the commercial world.25
Tennessee’s General Assembly heeded these calls when it met in September 1817. Two
banking issues now confronted the assemblymen. First, would they allow the national bank to
operate in Tennessee? Second, would they continue to proliferate branch banks, or would they
accede to an increase in capital stock for the state bank? As to the first question the state
concentrators and state unifiers were largely in agreement that the national bank would be a
detriment to Tennessee. Pleasant Miller in the House and Hugh Lawson White in the Senate
personally led this effort, no doubt motivated by their interest in the state bank. A few state
unifiers, however, believed that a national bank, along with their own county banks, would best
promote prosperity. William Young of Hawkins County, for instance, had strongly supported
county banks in 1815; he would do so again in 1817 while also leading the national group in the
House. Like the petitioners from his county, Hawkins believed that Rogersville stood to gain
mightily from connections with eastern merchants and a national market unified by a national
bank. As to the second question the state concentrators, with Miller and White again taking the
lead, and the state unifiers split much as they had in 1815. Tennessee would continue to
maintain an expansionary policy.26
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Miller and White had small difficulty in rousing opposition to the national bank. Most of
the assemblymen, and most Tennesseans, viewed any outside influence with suspicion. They
feared that the national bank, eastern merchants, and foreign countries might drain the state of
specie and make money even scarcer. White in 1815 had written to Governor Willie Blount
explaining why the Bank of the State of Tennessee had suspended specie payments. He said that
events in Europe had created a massive demand for specie in Great Britain. Large sums had
already shipped from the United States. White said that “people of other states, and in our own,
having found this the only Bank acceptable to them, have procured our notes, and as we have
reason to believe are in search of more with a view to draw the amount in specie and carry it to
places from which we can expect no return.” If such demands continued, the bank would be
forced to call in specie from its debtors.27
The Bank of the United States heightened these concerns. The Bank appeared to many
Tennesseans as an institution designed to drain specie from the states. Editorials that defended
the national bank had to answer these charges. “Sidney” in the Nashville Whig and Tennessee
Advertiser argued that banks increased the wealth of society and enabled all to move ahead. A
national currency would assure money’s quantity and quality. “Cassius” in the same paper
likewise argued for the beneficial effects of a branch bank in Nashville. It would loan money to
the purchasers of produce and lend great support to the Mississippi trade. A national bank, far
from draining specie from the state, would ensure healthy trade without harmful speculation.
Prohibiting the national bank from Tennessee amounted to financial mercantilism. “Cassius”
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asked, “are you prepared to adopt this course of Spanish policy, and close your doors on all other
capitalists—to the end, that these men [state bankers], may monopolize the whole interest of the
country, and live like vultures tearing your vitals—genius of my country forbid it—forbid it
heaven!!” These editorials probably had little effect. Most voters appreciated public officials
haranguing the Bank of the United States as a danger to material independence. This perception
existed almost as conventional wisdom. The Democratic Clarion and Tennessee Gazette ran a
report, not an editorial, matter-of-factly stating that “the Leviathen [sic] Bank or U.S.B. had
voted to establish branches in Chilicothe, Louisville, and Pittsburgh.”28
The proposal to defeat Leviathan produced acrimonious yet crafty debate among
assemblymen and the general populace. Miller introduced the first resolution concerning the
Bank of the United States. He read several accusations, searing in their denunciations of the
banking system of the United States, but discriminating in their focus on the national system
only. After all, Miller himself had introduced the Bank of the State of Tennessee’s charter in
1811, and at the very moment he rose to attack the national bank and the paper system, he was
one of the directors of the state bank. He said that “the paper system within the United States,
has … an irresistible tendency to combine and array the wealthy and powerful classes of the
community, against the labouring classes.” It “had a perpetual tendency to change the
proprietors of real estates, from the laboring classes, to those who do not labor.” Moreover, “the
establishment of a monied institution within the limits of this state, the capital stock of such
institution not being owned by the citizens thereof will afford the means of withdrawing semi-
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annually the whole profits of such institution from the good people of this state and placing the
same in the hands of persons unknown, without any adequate return therefore.” Miller finally
resolved that no bank or monied institution not chartered by the laws of the state should be
permitted to establish itself in Tennessee. The assembly for now laid the resolution on the
table.29
For their part the national unifiers made some appeals to the national bank as a positive
good, but they also used Miller’s tactic of casting banking—state banking—as a tyrannical ploy.
Representative Young made the positive appeal. Young believed that a national bank supported
the government and benefitted the people. He argued that “the stability of national credit is
secured; the mutual ties of the states is increased by the strong ligaments of pecuniary interest,
and the trade and prosperity of individuals are enlarged by a notorious and uniform circulating
medium.” The editorialist “Cassius” provided the negative appeal. He asked whether the public
good would be better served by a unified national banking system, or by independent banks
limited in their influence, concluding that the state system operated “by creating local interests,
sacrificing the permanent interests of the people at large, to promote the sinister designs of a few
monied capitalists, who have procured charters to enlarge the interests of their purses, before
they had learnt to extend the benevolent principles of their hearts.”30
Miller’s argument held sway. The bill as it took shape placed a $50,000 tax on every
bank or moneyed institution not chartered by the laws of the state. This proposal easily passed
the House; the final vote carried 26-6. Even more moderate proposals to reduce the amount of
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the tax were overwhelmingly defeated. The vote was likewise easy in the Senate. White ensured
that Miller’s resolution in the House became a joint resolution with the Senate. Tennessee had
committed to state banking.31
Just what kind of state banking remained uncertain. The state concentrators faced heavy
opposition in their desire to keep control in Knoxville and Nashville. Petitions for banks from
across the state came to the General Assembly on a weekly basis. Soon the state unifiers had
guided legislation through first and second readings that created new banks in Gallatin,
Nashville, Rogersville, and Shelbyville. Final support for these banks came from small
compromises with moderate concentrators. One compromise came from Samuel Anderson of
Rutherford County, who proposed that the Nashville Bank and the state bank would receive an
increase of capital stock, the several towns seeking banks would be authorized to open
subscriptions, and the new banks could then be received as branches of the first two banks. The
increase of capital stock did not pass, but the proposal to make it possible for the new banks to
become branches of the Nashville Bank or the state bank did. Senator George Coalter of Lincoln
and Giles Counties, for example, had misgivings about chartering so many banks. He apparently
felt pressure to vote yes, however, because he later wrote that “the current was so strong from all
quarters, which, when united, and made a common cause, it was impossible to be resisted.” He
also hoped that if the banks should become branches “a great portion of the evil consequences
will … be averted.”32
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The state unifiers bolstered their support by applying to the concentrators what they had
both applied to the Bank of the United States. The unifiers argued that their plan had the
advantage of diffusing power. They emphasized how a multiplicity of banks would assure that
no one bank could gain a monopoly. The petitioners from Sumner County, for example, felt it
somewhat unnecessary to defend the banking system because many now operated in the state.
Monopoly could no longer be used as an objection because the banks’ “increase will in some
degree obviate that objection, by making the advantage more general.”33
Eventually the state unifiers combined the separate proposals for local banks into a single
act entitled “An Act to Incorporate Banking Associations.” This bill came to its final reading on
November 14 and its final vote the next day. The state concentrators mounted a last attempt to
secure better terms for their banks. During its final reading Miller moved that the capital stock
of the Bank of the State of Tennessee be increased by $400,000. This motion lost 16-22. The
next day the incorporation act passed 19-17. All but three representatives who voted to increase
the capital stock of the state bank voted to reject the banking associations bill; Miller himself
voted no. Of those who voted against the state bank’s capital stock increase, all but six voted for
the banking associations bill. The three representatives who voted with the unifiers—
Williamson, Bryan, and Willis—apparently believed the state banks would benefit from several
local branches. Of the six who voted against both measures, two—Easley and Taylor—had
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supported pro-bank measures elsewhere. Easley had voted for an increase of the state bank’s
capital stock in 1815, and Taylor voted against the foreign bank tax in the current session.34
The state concentrators in the Senate, led by White, also fought unsuccessfully against
the banking associations bill. When the bill was taken up on November 5, 1817, White proposed
an amendment to increase the capital stock of the Bank of the State of Tennessee by 10,000
additional shares. Jonathan Tipton countered by proposing that the capital stock could not be
increased until the directors of the state bank should establish branches at such places as
specified by the act. This amendment passed over White’s objection, and he was forced to
withdraw the consolidated amendments. The next day he attempted to allay concerns of
monopoly by proposing that any subscriptions resulting from an increase in capital stock could
only be bought by Knox County residents. This amendment failed 9-10; those who had voted for
Tipton’s amendment voted against White’s amendment here, except for one senator who joined
the concentrators and one who did not vote. Adam Huntsman of Overton, Jackson, and White
Counties offered a different amendment, attempting to make state bank influence more palatable
to the unifiers. He proposed that if the state bank or the Nashville Bank accepted two or more
banks created by the bill, then the two former banks could open subscriptions for 10,000 shares.
If they accepted four or more branches, then they could open 20,000 shares. Such increases
could be used by any of the branches. The unifiers rejected this proposal 13-6. Thus the banking
associations bill passed largely as its proponents intended, with capital stocks independent from
the state bank, yet having the ability to join the Nashville Bank or the state bank if they chose.
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The vote was overwhelming, with sixteen for and three against, including White. White’s
attempt to prevent branch banking had failed.35
The bill included all sorts of expansionary measures. Ten banks were created. The three
banks chartered in 1815 each received an increase of their capital stock to $400,000. The state
bank received an increase of $8,000 to its capital stock, though these subscriptions would take
place in outlying counties; the legislation also authorized any bank not accepted as a branch by
the state bank to remain independent. It repealed a provision of the Fayetteville Tennessee
Bank’s charter that forced delinquent stockholders to forfeit their shares and payments to the
company, instead providing that dividends would be forfeited until payment was made. Each
bank was authorized to issue notes for as little as $1. Only the charters themselves remained
conservative, in that the restrictions placed on each bank followed the restrictions placed on the
state bank in 1811. Capital stocks were set at $400,000, the banks could not take on debt greater
than double the amount of their capital stocks, and interest rates were limited to 1% for sixty
days.36
The national unifiers gained a small victory. One of its members added the Farmers and
Mechanics Bank of Nashville as one of the ten banks chartered. Its directors included Thomas
Hill, William Carroll, Felix Robertson, and Jenkin Whiteside. They established the bank in the
building intended for the branch of the Bank of the United States. Whiteside also attended a
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meeting by several prominent merchants of Nashville, including Grundy, that produced
resolutions declaring the foreign bank tax unconstitutional and inviting the Bank of the United
States to establish a branch anyway.37
Most of the new banks became branches of the Nashville Bank or the Bank of the State
of Tennessee. The banks at Murfreesborough, Shelbyville, Gallatin, Winchester, and Rogersville
joined with the Nashville Bank. The state bank received branches at Clarksville, Columbia,
Jonesborough (the Holston Tennessee Bank, now renamed the Eastern Bank of Tennessee),
Carthage, Franklin, and Nashville. Overton directed the Nashville branch.38
Political battles aside, banking in Tennessee had to this point performed well. Business
grew. Dividends paid to the stockholders of the state bank increased from 4% in 1817 to 8% in
1818. William H. Stockton advertised his services as an independent agent who could transact
business at the state bank for those who lived far away. The Farmers and Mechanics Bank
commenced business in August 1818. The Nashville Bank received installments for
subscriptions to its branch banks. Bank notes provided a reliable medium of exchange. The
proprietors of the Bent Creek Store in East Tennessee recorded fewer transactions in barter.
Many customers now bought their farm implements, dry goods, and books in “bank notes.”
Others used bank notes as a partial payment, fulfilling their obligations by paying in goods or
labor.39
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Scarcity of money had been a constant complaint in Tennessee. The War of 1812 and its
aftermath promoted land speculation, cotton, and trade. Enthusiasm for banks followed. That
enthusiasm created political turmoil as groups vied for access to financial resources and fought
over what type of banking system to adopt. Behind every anti-bank appeal lay a pro-bank
motivation. It is small wonder that such political animosity arose. At stake was the possibility
of material improvement.
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Chapter 4

Panicked Speculators Turned Debtors

Optimism turned to despair. Plenty turned to want. Extravagance turned to ruin. The
spectre of aristocracy loomed. So it seemed to certain petitioners from Warren County,
Tennessee. The county’s seat, McMinnville, had not been given a bank by the state legislature
during the preceding years, and so much the better as it seemed to these petitioners. They said
that “our former legislators have rather been copying after the customs of foreign nations, than
guarding our natural, just and constitutional rights and liberties.” Banks had been granted
privileges not available to individuals. Bankers had gained “Hereditary Honors, Titles,
Privileges and Emoluments, by which means they have monopolized and shut up in Bank, all our
Gold and Silver and left us no alternative.” They asked that all stockholders be held responsible
in their persons and property for the redemption of bank notes. The Panic of 1819 had ended the
banking mania.1
The panic forced Tennesseans to reconsider the pursuit of prosperity. It seemed that the
present banks had not funded internal improvements, supported commerce, aided landowners, or
provided the means to ameliorate the distress. A relief faction emerged in Tennessee, ostensibly
committed to reducing creditors’ ability to execute judgments against debtors and inflating the
currency. This faction succeeded in these efforts, passing laws suspending execution of debts in
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1819 and chartering a loan office, deceptively christened the (new) Bank of the State of
Tennessee, in 1820. Public confidence in the state banking system declined apace. The state’s
private-public banks, headed by the Overton faction’s Nashville Bank and (old) Bank of the
State of Tennessee in Knoxville, and creditors generally bore the blame for hard times.
Arguments that had been utilized by the state concentrators, state unifiers, and national unifiers
against the other’s banks now appeared as broadsides against all banks, or the banking system as
practiced.2
The relief effort in Tennessee, however, was not wholly of the levelling sort, nor did it
seek a return to republican simplicity. The most prominent relief leaders, Felix Grundy and
William Carroll, had fought for banks as part of the national unifiers during the banking mania.
Grundy established himself in Nashville as a merchant and lawyer after moving from Kentucky.
Carroll made himself one of the most prominent merchants and manufacturers in Nashville after
a modest upbringing in Pennsylvania. He operated a nail factory and owned the first steamboat
that churned the Cumberland River all the way to Nashville. The relief faction’s base,
furthermore, often consisted of speculators who had become debtors because of the distress—
relief efforts would in fact cause a renewed split between East Tennessee and West Tennessee
assemblymen because the westerners had plunged the deepest. The relief faction coalesced
around a general sense of anxiety, but its agents also maintained a belief in material progress.
Some called for prosperity on a more secure basis, via a balanced development of agriculture,
commerce, and manufacturing. The tripartite structure would sustain a sound circulating
medium. Others embraced the new Bank of the State of Tennessee because it seemed that this
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bank could do what the state unifiers had hoped the old banks would do—sustain development
throughout the state and make a stable circulating medium ubiquitous. Some hoped the new
bank would expand the money supply and thus assist the debtor. A few decried paper currency
of any kind, though sometimes their actions, as in the case of Andrew Jackson, cast doubt on
their words. Development and improvement always remained the aim. The people would have
their say in the gubernatorial election of 1821. They would overwhelmingly support the
candidate who promised a way forward, rather than the old blessings of republican simplicity.3
Banking as practiced in the South and West contributed to the severity of the Panic of
1819. The difficulty lay in the avidity for a circulating medium and a concomitant suspicion of
the restraining influence of the Bank of the United States—that it to say, it lay in the very
conditions that produced Tennessee’s banking bonanza. Several other southern and western
states had caught the commercial passion. Georgia, North Carolina, Maryland, Kentucky, and
Ohio enacted taxes on any corporation not chartered by them. Indiana in 1816 and Illinois in
1818 prohibited all but state banks in their first constitutions. Western branches of the Bank of
the United States nevertheless operated in South Carolina, North Carolina, and Ohio. These
branches, combined with state banking, faced high demand for paper to fund development. So
long as good times bolstered belief in the banks’ credit, their notes facilitated exchange and
investment. The good times ended in 1819, and banks simultaneously faced borrowers faltering
in their payments and depositors anxious to redeem their paper. State banks contracted their note
issues, and they indirectly faced pressure from the Bank of the United States because it
demanded that its branches begin regular settlement of balances held against the state banks.
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The pressure became so great that southern and western banks suspended specie payments; in
Tennessee all of the banks suspended except for Hugh Lawson White’s state bank. The
contraction did not stop there. Business activity declined to such depths that the national bank
repossessed large areas of Cincinnati, Ohio. By the middle of 1819, it appeared that southern
and western suspicions of the Bank of the United States were vindicated.4
Tennesseans joined many westerners in renewing harangues against the federal
government and its bank. Most prominent among these voices was the Clarion. An editorial
charged that the government practiced partiality in its disbursement of the public revenue,
refusing to finance military schools, industries, or shipyards in the western states while
burdening westerners with one-third of the import duties. Another editorial claimed of the Bank
of the United States that “a few ‘knowing ones’ took a large amount of stock in single shares, in
other person’s names, and … by the means of proxies thousands of votes were given by one
man.” Anger heightened in response to the McCullough v. Maryland decision, in which the
Supreme Court ruled that no state could tax the Bank of the United States. The Clarion said that
“the determination at Washington city for the moment is to honor commercial men, and the
intrigues and ambition of the secretary of the treasury and the power of the bank of the U. States
will be wielded to bankrupt the state banks and cripple the states themselves.” Tennessee
politicians proclaimed their republican virtues, ready to protect state authority from the
“Mammoth” bank’s consolidating influence. The bank as scapegoat provided easy, though not
wholly untrue, explanations of the distress.5
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The Clarion also bludgeoned Tennessee’s banking system—the paper’s patronage
coming from political enemies of the Overton faction. An editorial lamented that banks had
multiplied within Tennessee and, indeed, within most states. Banks had encouraged people to
purchase “unprofitable and ruinous finery.” The writer said that “before Banks were located all
over the country, the specie could not be commanded for exportation—it was in the hands of
those who would not part with it for such purposes.” Tennesseans had long feared trade
imbalances, believing that the purchase of luxuries drained the state of money, and many would
support the loan office in 1820 to support intrastate commerce.6
In the meantime many Tennesseans believed that domestic manufacturing could correct
the trade imbalance. The Clarion supported this effort. It reprinted articles from northeastern
states proposing such solutions. “Agricola” in a New York newspaper argued that bank currency
was based in speculation and thus deleterious to active industry. He said that “it is not to be
expected, that the man of great monied capital, will leave commercial cities, to engage in the
laborious calling of a farmer, or manufactuerer … nor will he be induced to loan his money, to
encourage national industry, so long as he can employ it in bank stock and commercial
speculations, to such enormous advantage.” If bankers were to help farmers and mechanics, then
national industry must be developed and foreign consumption must be reduced; otherwise, “bank
loans in a few short years will establish a monied aristocracy in our country.” A reprinted
editorial from the Pittsburgh Gazette similarly decried the money spent on foreign luxuries. It
called for tariffs to support American industry and discourage the importation of goods.7
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Some called for an end to paper currency. “Cobbett” argued in the Clarion that
Tennessee actually suffered from too much money rather than too little. The real wealth of
society, he argued, consisted of its goods. “Every nation, according to the worth of its valuable
things and traffic, will have its share [of specie], without any extra natural effort, or any positive
regulation.” Paper money currency tended to corrupt the natural operations of trade. Paper
money had no standard of value and could be infinitely expanded, unlike precious metals, whose
scarcity prevented depreciation and manipulation. Cobbett asked, “How can people venture to
make contracts for time? Who can trust his property to valuation upon any article having itself
no value?” If paper money disappeared, then “there would no longer be any bankers to live on
the losses sustained by the farmers and tradesmen in consequence of the failures and other
rogueries of those bankers.” The Clarion’s editor said that “it contains more argument, more in
elucidation of the evils of banking than we ever expected to see comprised in the same
compass.”8
Even the Clarion, however, found banking’s precise evil difficult to define. Some
Clarion editorials attacked banks for being too stringent with their discounts. “Belisarius”
attacked the Nashville Bank specifically. He said that “you are calling on your debtors, as if we
were in the full enjoyment of the most prosperous times we ever had.” The bank had no
necessity to press so heavily for redemption of their notes. In another editorial, “T” agreed that
banks needed to be more generous. Whether these opinions stemmed from a desire for monetary
expansion, a desire for capital, or both, they hardly portended a return to the precious metals.9
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These general criticisms of banking and the credit system represented an effort to build
prosperity on a more secure foundation. The distress required remedies, but no ideological
consensus existed as to the correct ones. The Clarion sometimes took up the cause of debtors.
Its editor, for example, reprinted a story from Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, describing the wretched
condition of the debtors living there, most of whom were mechanics and laborers. The story
said, “let the public fancy themselves, a laboring man, with a wife and five or six half naked
children, laboring for their support at the wages of a dollar or seventy-five cents per day—
thrown into prison for a debt of five or six dollars.” The same paper had no fear of the Farmers’
and Mechanics’ Bank oppressing debtors in this way. Its writers gave strong support to that
bank, still operated by the national unifiers Jenkin Whiteside, William Carroll, and Thomas Hill.
The paper supported this bank’s suspension of specie payment. The directors argued that “there
has been a ruinous trade carried on by us [Tennessee], in importing foreign goods … which debts
are now Collected to the destruction of the community.” The paper also supported the directors
in their effort to have their bank’s notes accepted by the Nashville Bank and state bank.10
The Nashville Whig took a more moderate approach to the distress. This paper was
friendlier to the Overton banks, though it by no means exempted them from criticism. One
editorial appeared signed “A Philadelphian,” in which the author complained of the Clarion’s
support of debtors. He said that eastern creditors “only ask the payment of debts which are justly
due them—which they would be justifiable in doing, independent of the extreme necessity.”11
Former debts may have been just, but the Nashville Whig nevertheless supported reform
of the state’s and nation’s banking system. “A Farmer” wanted a consolidated banking system.
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This editorialist also argued that overtrading in foreign commerce had produced the distress. He
said that banks operated to “withdraw specie from diffusive and general circulation; and its
accumulation in the vaults of the banks, thereby rendering it more accessible to brokers and
others, who wish to get hold of it.” The multiplication of banks in Tennessee had worsened the
problem. State bank paper increased, its value decreased, and the price of property rose.
Because bank paper could be used to pay domestic debt, but not foreign debt, price increases at
home did not correspond to price increases of exports in foreign markets. “A Farmer”
recommended that all state banks become auxiliaries of a national bank—“not a brokers office,
such as is the present existing one, where private advancement … is regarded, but a great
national institution … a bank … where the government shall own a part of the stock, and each of
the states a part proportioned to the strength of their population.” Paper money had become
necessary to commerce. A public bank would restrain excessive issues and control fluctuations.
Such a bank would reduce foreign consumption, encourage manufactures, and lessen
expenditures.12
The General Assembly met in 1819 with relief and banking of primary concern. Many
representatives had been elected on a relief platform, including Felix Grundy of Davidson
County and Joseph Brittain of Bedford County. Relief candidates had been especially popular in
West Tennessee counties, for Tennesseans had most recklessly speculated there. East Tennessee
generally opposed relief, with Pleasant M. Miller again assuming lead of this faction. It should
be noted that eastern opposition was not entirely consistent, for its representatives had
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continually delayed interest payments on land sales due from settlers living south of the French
Broad and Holston Rivers to the state.13
The relief faction demonstrated the persistent ambiguity in Tennessee between speculator
and debtor. Here again the debtors who wanted relief had been speculators only a few years
before, their speculations fueled by the state banks. Grundy’s relief bill, entitled “An Act
Regulating Proceedings on Judgments and for Other Purposes,” attempted to provide debtor
relief and banking support at the same time. The bill provided that no court clerk or justice of
the peace could issue an execution on behalf of a creditor until two years following the
judgment. The creditor could receive immediate payment, however, if he chose to accept notes
of the state bank, the Nashville bank, or any of their branches. The eastern counties mounted
feeble opposition, and the bill easily passed. Grundy also worked on behalf of the Farmers’ and
Mechanics’ Bank. He chaired a committee that reported the bank’s debts well-secured. He
apparently intended to encourage the circulation of the bank’s notes in Nashville, as the
Nashville Bank and the branch of the state bank had heretofore refused to accept that bank’s
notes.14
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Miller stymied portions of Grundy’s speculative program. He first introduced a measure
that proposed to make bank stockholders liable in their real and personal property for redemption
of bank notes if the bank refused to redeem them in specie. Such a bill threatened to destroy
Grundy’s effort to support bank paper, and it threatened to destroy the banks themselves.
Because nearly all banks in Tennessee had suspended specie payments, including the Nashville
Bank and Grundy’s Farmers’ and Mechanics’ Bank, the bill amounted to a death sentence to all
of Tennessee’s banks, save one—the Bank of the State of Tennessee in Knoxville. Under the
management of Hugh Lawson White, the state bank never failed to meet its obligations after the
suspension of 1815, and it closed in 1828, not because of financial collapse, but because White
was elected to serve in the United States Senate. Miller thus had no fear in proposing such a
truculent plan. The ensuing debate revealed the contradictory factions within the relief coalition.
One faction, Grundy among them, wanted to support the state banking system, while others
wanted some sort of relief until a viable alternative to the present system could be devised.
Grundy attempted but failed to soften Miller’s bill by making the stockholders liable only for
debts the banks would thereafter incur. Miller’s version passed the House 20-14. Every member
except three who voted against this bill had voted for the relief bill. Those who had voted
against the relief bill now joined with the remnant of those who had voted for it in an attack
against the state banking system. The assembly divisions bore a resemblance to those of the
1817 banking associations vote, in which the state concentrators had joined with a handful of
anti-bank members in opposition. Now this group prevailed with the addition of some

143

disillusioned state unifiers of 1817. In the end the measure failed to pass the Senate, but hostility
toward the old state banks would never abate.15
Miller also led a majority in securing occupancy rights to settlers living west of the
Tennessee River. The land had been ceded by the Chickasaws to the state in 1818. During
debate John Clack of Giles County introduced an amendment that provided for preferential entry
to all current occupants. If any occupants because of their poverty could not obtain a warrant,
then the speculator entering such lands was to compensate the occupant for all improvements.
The amendment passed 21-16. Grundy joined several other relief members in opposition, while
all but one of the relief opponents helped carry the measure. Grundy then proposed, not
unreasonably, that no salt spring should be entered on an occupant claim, which proposal passed
easily. Such speculative measures were apparently not enough for Grundy, as he joined three
other members in futile opposition to the final bill. Perhaps because of these limitations on
speculation, the bill passed by only one vote in the Senate. This episode later provided fodder
for charges of corruption in the papers. Miller charged that Grundy’s associate Joseph Brittain
held a thousand-acre warrant and thus had voted against occupancy protections. Miller said that
after Grundy rose to speak against the occupancy amendment, “Mr. Brittain seemed to have as
much love and affection for Mr. Grundy, as housewives commonly have for their lords.”
Brittain responded, “I appear before you [the people] in the garb of a plain farmer; I may not be
able to write so prettily and wittily as Mr. Miller, yet nevertheless if I tell the truth I must
convince.” He charged that Miller and Peter Kindall colluded to gain their own salt spring on the
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Chickasaw lands through unscrupulous legislative means. He assured the people that he had
confronted them and had indeed used the word “rascality” to condemn their illicit gains, “and
although it was a rough expression, yet it was ‘suiting the word to the action.’” Wherever the
truth lay, the protection of occupancy depended greatly on Miller, whose interest lay with the old
banking system. Grundy, the relief candidate and enemy of the old banks, pursued the
speculative course. The protections worked as intended. The land act gave occupants
preferential rights for 160 acres, a precedent from which the state government never departed,
except to raise the preferred amount to 200 acres in 1826. Even if speculators managed to win
ejectment proceedings, the law guaranteed defendants the value of their improvements.16
Miller, on the other hand, joined with Grundy in keeping the credit system for land
purchases. James C. Mitchell of Rhea County, a member of the House land committee,
suggested that, instead of offering state lands at auction to the highest bidder, above a fixed
minimum, an entry-taker’s office should be opened for the receipt of entries of all the lands
subject to appropriation by the state. All land would be sectioned after the manner of the United
States’ land offices. Occupants would be granted priority of entry for a price for a limited time,
and if not claimed by the occupant, then the land would be subject to entry by anyone at the same
price for a limited time. All lands entered within the first six months, whether by occupants or
others, would be sold at a maximum price. Every six months, the price per acre would decrease
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by $0.25 or $0.50 until a minimum of $0.12½ was reached. The occupant would receive
preference for a limited time at the beginning of each six-month period.17
Grundy, Miller, and most of the assemblymen rejected this proposal. They passed a law
establishing a program of land sales for the Hiwassee District in southeastern Tennessee, recently
ceded by Cherokee Indians. The program followed the credit system of the United States. Land
would be sold at auction to the highest bidder for a minimum of $2.00 per acre. Purchasers
needed one-fourth of the price paid up front, with ten years’ credit extended to them for the
balance. Representatives and senators took no heed to occupant rights. Land sales in 1820
amounted to $480,000, at an average price of $4 per acre. The sum actually paid into the
treasury amounted to $250,000. Hiwassee District land sales became the foundation of the next
proposal by the relief faction—a new Bank of the State of Tennessee.18
Relief measures failed to enliven trade. Discontent bubbled. Some believed that
stopping executions on judgments had helped speculators while doing little for the poorer sort.
Petitioners from Jackson County and Smith County argued that relief amounted to nothing more
than interest legislation. Jackson County petitioners asserted that “amongst the poorer class of
the people the general distress is pretty well Subsided—and that a stop Law or an Extension of
the Stay Law would not have an Equal bearing on the people at Large—but would Injure the
poor to the Bynifit of the Rich.” Petitioners from Hawkins County also opposed impeding
contracts “for the sake of favoring a man, who has contracted debts, by embarking into,
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frequently, wild and hazardous Speculations; who has branched out in business beyond his
Capital.” The grand jury of Sumner County opposed more relief legislation. They asked, “Who
… will be benefited by such a law? Not the poor and needy. The debts due from them were of
small amount, under the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace.” If a creditor had executed a
judgment upon these small debtors, then their property had already been taken from them. They
had been unwise, in the first place, to take on debt beyond their means of raising money without
sacrificing property. Relief legislation now would encourage speculators in their recklessness. It
would destroy the state’s credit, end lending, and extinguish commerce. These petitions asked
for more equitable relief. Smith County petitioners said that “if … anything can constitutionally
be done to relieve the general distress so as to have an equal Bearing on all classes of society it
will meet our approbation.”19
Tennessee’s banking policy had always been a response to strong demand for a
circulating medium. Now that the panic had discredited the old banks, and the relief law had
done nothing to regain that credit, new financial arrangements seemed necessary, even vital.
Political enemies of the Overton group, those disaffected with the state banking system, and new
politicians like Grundy began to propose the establishment of a loan office. Such an institution
promised a departure from banking as it had been practiced in Tennessee to this point. One
difference was that the loan office’s notes would circulate on the faith and credit of the
government rather than on specie. Another difference was that a loan office could, in theory,
better support farmers and boosters in their borrowing. The present banks in Tennessee had
mainly lent to merchants. This practice supported farmers indirectly. Merchants with funds
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might make their capital active by depositing money in the bank and thereby increase the
aggregate capital available for borrowing. Merchants who lacked funds might immediately
apply to the bank for a loan and thereby be able to purchase farmers’ goods. Banks issued notes
that usually matured within 30 or 60 days. These short term credit transactions were generally
safe and self-liquidating because they were based on the actual sale of goods. But Tennesseans
hardly felt safe. The banks, it seemed, had aggravated the distress and drained the state of
money. Farmers and boosters wanted more than passive support for their activities, if indeed the
banks had supported them at all. They desired long-term credit—credit that would mature after
months or years. In modern parlance, they wanted capital investment in fixed assets, such as real
estate or internal improvements. The state banks had refused to accommodate these demands.
Lenders believed that securing loans via fixed assets was too risky because the assets could not
be easily liquidated. Land took a long time to sell; long credits increased the risks to default; the
status of land titles in Tennessee made loans even riskier. These reasons were financially sound,
but they had failed to meet the needs of needy borrowers. Safe monetary practices, more
importantly, had not prevented or ameliorated the distress of the panic.20
The loan office offered a new way toward improvement. Its supporters pointed to the
state banks’ unwillingness to lend to farmers. “One of the People” argued that a loan office
would more effectively benefit agriculture and commerce. A loan office could meet the high
demand among farmers for capital. He said that “the reason why farmers cannot borrow money
to improve their farms, are obvious … the existing institutions have not been willing to
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accommodate, and even if they had, a loan for sixty days could not have been advantageous.”
He believed that borrowers should be able to “obtain loans for considerable periods, and to be
paid in reasonable instalments.” Only an institution with a sufficiently large capital could
undertake such loans. Another editorialist argued that a loan office would save the people from
unnecessary taxation and encourage internal improvements. A loan office operated by the state
would issue interest-bearing notes. The interest would be received by the treasury, and the funds
would “enable the government to undertake and prosecute with effect, extensive plans of
improvement and public utility.” Rivers would be cleared, bridges would be built, seminaries
would be funded, and progress would be assured.21
Supporters of the loan office embraced its potential to reinvigorate enterprise. One
editorial said that opponents of the bank ascribed “birth of the bill to the uproar created by the
broken traders of Nashville.” The writer did not deny the charge, although he did deny that
Nashville alone suffered from the distress. He said that “we do not pretend to justify many of
our citizens in all their venturers—we know however that be the result to themselves as
disastrous as it may, the community derived much benefit from their enterprise, and the liberal
prices they have for country produce encouraged farmers to raise it, and thus devote the time that
would have been lost to idleness to much profit.”22
Even opponents of bank paper placed their hopes in loan office paper. Some residents of
Warren County who had decried how banks monopolized specie now signed their names to a
petition demanding a loan office. They agreed with those in Jackson County and Smith County
that stoppage of executions would not stop the distress. They wanted an extension of the
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circulating medium by the creation of a loan office, which “would not only give relief to the
people in a great degree but produce such a revenue as would cause a diminution of Taxation and
enable the State to make internal improvements.” The Grand Jury of Davidson County said that
even men of wealth “are threatened with destruction, for the want of a proper circulating
medium, and total inability to dispose of their real estate, and the fruits of their labor at fair
prices.” Other petitioners from Davidson County believed that the present banking system had
become intolerable. Echoing Miller, they called for bank stockholders to be held liable in their
real and personal property for bank obligations.23
Governor McMinn felt enough pressure to call for a special session of the legislature to
meet during the summer of 1820. Support for the session came almost entirely from West
Tennessee. West Tennesseans saw great opportunity. The western part of the state was in the
ascendancy, and any new financial institution had greatest potential for business in Nashville.
West Tennessee candidates overwhelmingly favored a loan office, both those who had favored
relief and those who had opposed relief, those who had favored punishing bank stockholders and
those who had opposed such punishment. Grundy once again ran and won as the supposed
enemy of Nashville’s monied aristocracy; most West Tennessee candidates apparently followed
this pattern, portraying a loan office as the best means to wrest control away from the old
banking interests. Eight western assemblymen who had voted in 1817 on the banking
associations bill kept their seats. All except one, Peter Kendall, supported the loan office.
Kendall was the only one who opposed both the banks and the loan office. Three who had
opposed the banks in 1817, namely William Earley, Robert Edwards, and William Locke, now
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joined former bank supporters Samuel Anderson, Hugh M. Blake, Littleberry Hughes, and
Robert Jetton to support the loan office. William Young, one of only three East Tennessee
candidates who supported the loan office, had been the national bank’s staunchest defender in
1817. Others who had supported the national bank in 1817 and who now supported the loan
office included Jesse Wharton, George W. Gibbs, and Andrew Hynes. The loan office coalition,
in short, represented those who had sought to expand Tennessee’s banking operations outside the
cities of Nashville and Knoxville and those who had entirely distrusted the old banking system.
The East Tennessee opposition was joined by five West Tennessee assemblymen. Pleasant M.
Miller once again loomed as the most formidable opponent.24
The General Assembly convened on June 26. McMinn’s first address provided concrete
recommendations for the loan office. His proposals appealed to the relief coalition as a whole.
The office would be big enough to compete with the old banks and support a circulating
medium, but it would operate under the exclusive authority of the legislature. It would have
authority to issue state treasury certificates to serve as the circulating medium. The credit of the
state government would support these certificates, and they would rest for their final redemption
on land sales from the Hiwassee District, a section of land recently ceded by Cherokees and
located in the southeastern portion of the state, and from ordinary tax revenue. Payment for land
would be made in specie, so this last proposal aimed to make the scheme constitutional, in that
the notes would ostensibly be tied to the constitutional legal tender of gold and silver. The loan
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office would have power to “establish as many subordinate branches … as a due regard to the
security of the institution and the equal accommodation of the people might require.” All
Tennesseans would have reasonable access to loans.25
Loan office supporters followed McMinn’s recommendations. Grundy, Young, and
Anderson primarily shaped the charter. The loan office would be a public institution. The
legislature, not stockholders, would appoint directors; indeed, stockholders were not needed
because of the nature of the capital—public land sales plus the ordinary public revenue. The
loan office was established “on the funds of the state for the purpose of relieving the distresses of
the community and improving the revenue of the state.” Capitalization began at $750,000, and
was subsequently increased by Anderson to $1,000,000 during debate. The parent bank at
Nashville would receive $600,000, and a branch at Knoxville would receive $400,000. The
office could issue notes in denominations between $1 and $100. In reducing the minimum
denomination to $1, legislators intended to meet the public demand for more money. The capital
“shall be emitted on the credit and security of the borrowers.” Such provision apparently aimed
to create equal opportunity in lending, as opposed to the parochial parsimony of the existing
banks. Citizens could obtain loans upon bills of exchange, notes, and real and personal property.
Payment in paper would be secured by endorsement, and payment in property would be secured
by mortgages. Interest was set at 6%. Each county would obtain an agency, and each agency
could fund loans in proportion to taxes paid by the county’s residents into the public treasury.
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No loan to an individual could exceed $500. Prospective land sales from the Hiwassee District
would support the bills’ values and ensure final redemption.26
East Tennessee representatives wanted nothing of this scheme. Their opposition arose
from both interest and principle. All easterners did not want a new powerful financial institution
in the western part of the state, especially one whose notes would circulate on the basis of
revenue from the eastern part of the state. Some also feared the inflationary aspects of the loan
office. Such considerations compelled Pleasant M. Miller to rise in vociferous opposition. He
used several arguments. The existing banks could not accept the notes of the loan office without
endangering themselves. The treasury certificates would therefore depreciate. Public money
should only be used for purposes benefitting the public, such as education and internal
improvements. Private use of public money was unjust because the benefits accrued only to the
individual. Corruption would engulf the loan office. Its local agents would be tempted to
appropriate disbursements for themselves. The loan office was unconstitutional, in that it would
in reality issue bills of credit and make them a legal tender, which action by the states was
expressly prohibited by the Constitution of the United States and the state constitution. Finally,
the credit of the state would fail at the critical moment. Purchasers of land, when pressed to
redeem their obligation, would ask and likely succeed in obtaining relief, thus destroying the
value of the loan office currency.27
A considerable number of West Tennesseans likewise opposed the loan office.
Petitioners from Sumner County gave several reasons for their opposition. A loan office would
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be unconstitutional because it would emit bills of credit, rather than making gold or silver the
legal tender. The policy of currency expansion was bad too. Bills issued on any basis but specie
encouraged danger. Such paper issues would give property an inflated value, simultaneously
encouraging extravagance and discouraging investment in manufactures and sale of exports
abroad.28
West Tennessee’s most ferocious yet enigmatic critic was Andrew Jackson. Jackson’s
opposition seems to have been the first time he took interest in Tennessee’s banking policy. He
perhaps still owned the Nashville Bank stock he had purchased in 1808. He certainly
appreciated that bank’s efforts to support him and his troops during the War of 1812. At that
time Governor Willie Blount had ordered Jackson to march his division to New Orleans and
await instructions from the national government. Considerable difficulty ensued. The troops
could not be provisioned or paid because of the scarcity of a circulating medium. Government
bond sales had been insufficient to cover these expenses. Jackson said that “application was
made to the Nashville Bank, whose directors has made every exertion to procure the funds
necessary and the indefatigable attention and industry of the Cashier, and clerk, has furnished as
many post notes as will complete the payment of the Troops in a few days.” He concluded, “the
directors exerted every nerve and deserved that thanks of the government.” He even suggested
to Secretary of State James Monroe that Congress should establish magazine stores in every
frontier state, asking “would not government find a great convenience in placing funds in the
State banks, to enable the banks at all times to accommodate [state militias] in times of war[?]”29
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Jackson’s opposition to the loan office seems to have arisen from opposition to that
institution in particular. He was perhaps influenced by his political association with the Overton
faction. Jackson had nothing to say during the bank mania following the war. His only action
regarding banks before the panic came as military governor of Florida, when he transmitted a
petition from citizens of Pensacola to Langdon Cheves, the president of the Bank of the United
States, asking for a branch of the bank to be established in their city. His return to Tennessee
coincided with the growing distress of the panic. Hard times no doubt reminded him of his own
business ventures which had nearly ruined him. Just as he had met his obligations, he now
believed that the only recourse to Tennessee’s ills was a firm commitment to contractual
obligations. Relief would beget more profligacy. Thus he wrote to William B. Lewis that “you
know my opion as to the Banks, that is, that the Constitution of our State, as well as the
Constitution of the United States prohibited the Establishment of Banks in any state.” Yet he
also suggested that “the only way that the friends of the Bank can keep them in existance is to
unite and put a Stop to the loan office law.” Killing the loan office bill “might enable the Banks
to lend more relief than this wicked law will do to the distressed.” The loan office would bring
commercial ruin. “No merchant will be creditted abroad and every cent of current money will be
shut up, this law destroying all confidence at home between man and man.” It should be noted
that Jackson’s constitutional scruples did not prevent him from depositing his pay as a military
officer in the branch of Hugh Lawson White’s bank in Nashville, or from overseeing funds
deposited in the bank for use in Indian treaties. Nor did it prevent him from sending funds from
the parent bank in Knoxville to Andrew Jackson Donelson, his wife’s nephew, for university
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expenses. It was better, apparently, to utilize the unconstitutional outgrowths of a commercial
society than to maintain strict republican independence.30
Whatever his personal feelings on banks, Jackson, along with Edward Ward and several
other citizens of Davidson County, delivered a scorching remonstrance to the state senate
regarding the loan office. The remonstrance harangued the senators by reminding them that they
had taken an oath to “vote without favor, affection, partiality, or prejudice … or consent to any
act to lesson or abridge their rights and priviledges.” The loan office, the petitioners argued, was
unconstitutional because it would violate the Constitution’s prohibition against the states using
paper as legal tender, and because it would provide an unsafe currency not founded on specie.
They also made pro-commercial arguments by arguing that banks “depress our manufactories by
keeping up the high price of labour; and have produced the bankruptcy of many of our
enterprising commercial adventurers, by raising the production of the country too high to make
advantageous sales in markets abroad.” Banks disrupted the proper balance between trade and
frugality. Jackson reinforced these sentiments by personally confronting several assemblymen
and telling them that “any member who voted for [the loan office] would perjure himself, and
that if the law did pass, twelve honest jurymen upon oath would convict those who voted for the
measure of perjury.” Pro-loan office senators angrily laid this remonstrance on the table.31
Jackson’s push almost roused enough opposition. The third and final reading of the bill
in the House passed 20-19; the final reading in the Senate, where the bill had always had more
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support, passed 11-5. In the House the three eastern representatives who defected from their
geographic bloc carried the measure. The loan office was perhaps made more palatable when the
Senate changed the name of the institution to the “Bank of the State of Tennessee.” Such a
change aesthetically addressed the charge that the loan office was unconstitutional, in that a bank
ostensibly had the constitutional basis of gold and silver as its currency, while a loan office
issued unconstitutional bills of credit. The name also associated the loan office with Hugh
Lawson White’s Bank of the State of Tennessee in Knoxville, which had a good reputation
among Tennesseans. Henceforth White’s bank was styled the “old state bank,” while the loan
office was styled the “new state bank.” Several directors chosen by the legislature declined to
serve, including John McNairy and David McGavock. George W. Gibbs eventually gained the
presidency, while Jackson’s friend John H. Eaton became a director.32
Bitter arguments continued through autumn. “Hamilton” published a lengthy critique in
the Clarion, declaring that the new state bank “is a monster so unnatural, it stands alone …
bearing some resemblance, however, to the many headed Hydra.” “Hamilton” repeated the
argument that the loan office was unconstitutional because it issued bills of credit. Its notes, he
continued, hardly deserved the name “bills of credit” because the state government had no credit
whatsoever. The General Assembly had continually stripped money appropriated for the funding
of schools and colleges. It had granted extensions to land speculators and occupants who could
not meet their installment payments for their mortgages. “Hamilton” concluded that anticipated
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revenue from land sales and the ordinary revenue made tenuous security for the redemption of
the notes. Loan office notes would depreciate and fail to relieve the distress.33
“Coriolanus” continued the attack in the Nashville Whig. “The hydra” had no secure
basis for the circulation of its notes. The credit and security of borrowers was insufficient to
redeem bills of credit. All notes and bills should be secured by true money—specie. The new
state bank would not help farmers, mechanics, or merchants because the notes could not be used
to liquidate debts contracted abroad. It would divert funds away from internal improvements. It
dispensed the money of the public treasury for private purposes. “Coriolanus” pleaded with his
fellow republicans to remember that Patrick Henry had opposed loan offices (he did not say
whether Henry preferred specie-paying banks).34
Supporters of the loan office had cogent response to these charges. Most defenders
emphasized the new bank’s public nature. “Atticus,” who wrote in direct response to
“Coriolanus,” said that the establishment of the new state bank represented “a contest between a
public corporation, and two private ones, for predominance.” He argued that, although the new
bank’s loans would be used for private purposes, the benefits would accrue to the public more
generally than had the loans of the old banks, whose profits went to individual stockholders. The
Grand Jury of Wilson County agreed with “Atticus,” celebrating the establishment of “an
institution founded on the public funds, and the issuance of paper currency so well secured that
its holders could not become losers by its depreciation; the profits of which institution were to
belong to the citizens at large, and not to a few stockholders.”35
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New bank writers made brilliant defenses against other charges. One correspondent
believed that it was a point in the bank’s favor that its notes could not be used to pay foreign
debts. Excessive importations had drained the state of money and led to the distress. As for the
old banks, “they have ruined the country to build towns—and ruined the towns, to import goods
they have produced a monied aristocracy which makes the rich more rich—and the poor more
poor.” By limiting the amount that the bank could loan to a single individual, the legislature had
assured that loans would be diffuse, rather than concentrated in the towns. The writer also
pointed out that the old banks could not redeem their notes in specie, making the new bank no
different in practice from the old ones. Other writers emphasized this last argument. One
editorialist said, “Those now inimical to the bank pretend that it will not have money on hand to
pay the notes it will issue. This must be a wonderful discovery! Where is there a bank in the
state that has specie to pay the demands on it?” The new bank, alternatively, would create a
more robust capital and provide a sufficient circulating medium. “Brutus” likewise said that the
old banks were not founded on specie capital. These writers were correct, for the former bank
charters had usually allowed commencement of operations with only 10% of the capital stock
actually paid. The new bank, said “Brutus,” was “strong as Sampson; as generous as a Lion; as
keen eyed as an Eagle,” while the old banks were “vultures of prey; the oppressors of the
unfortunate; the widows curse; the orphans enemy.”36
Opponents of the loan office had it right in the long run. The new state bank could offer
nothing new. Anticipated revenues from Hiwassee lands had little basis in reality. During this
very session the legislature received a petition from Hiwassee settlers asking for relief from their
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obligations to the state. They said that “very few if any commodious settlements can be obtained
without the purchase of such a quantity of poor Land that the wealthy wil not and the poor
cannot purchase on which they can support their Familys.” The new bank’s paper was destined
to depreciate. Its public character gave little incentive for its directors and agents to run it
properly. Mismanagement and corruption would overcome the bank in time.37
The new bank’s financial insufficiency almost immediately manifested. Its loans could
not keep pace with demand. Opponents took full advantage. One writer said that legislators had
mistakenly believed that the cause of the distress had been the withdrawal of currency by all the
old banks. The loan office now issued paper in abundance, and “the effect of the remedy, now
palpable, is an aggravation of the disease.” Prices had increased and investment had become
more difficult. Supporters of the new state bank found it difficult to refute these arguments.
“Common Sense” defended the new bank mainly by recalling the “privileged orders” of private
interest that prevailed in 1815 and 1817 and asserting the superiority of the new bank’s public
character. He did not defend the bank’s balance sheet, its loans, or the general state of trade. He
blamed the old banks for keeping their notes in circulation rather than allowing the new state
bank to assume their obligations. The notes would return to their par value, and the old banks
could end their business.38
The panic, the relief measures, and the depressed business of the state’s financial
institutions made for an intense gubernatorial campaign in 1821. Two new candidates would vie
for the governorship, as McMinn had served the maximum number of consecutive terms allowed
under the state constitution. Edward Ward was an educated and wealthy planter, a former
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member of the state senate, and a friend of Jackson, who supported him throughout the election.
Ward had run for governor in 1819 and now returned with his formidable political experience.
His opponent William Carroll was a merchant, the owner of the first steamboat to tread the rivers
of Tennessee, and an accomplished military officer. He had served under Jackson during the
War of 1812, and his fame in Tennessee was second only to Jackson because his unit had
withstood the brunt of the British attack at New Orleans. Carroll was successful in business both
before and after the war, but his ventures had collapsed during the panic. He ran as the people’s
candidate.39
Both candidates issued circulars in the newspapers declaring their platform. Ward’s
platform was both politically inept and pessimistically idyllic. He said that the people and their
legislators had believed that “the monied institutions not discounting with sufficient liberality,
was the cause of the distresses that prevailed; and to remedy the existing evils, established a
‘State Bank.’” He questioned the efficacy of the new state bank, saying that “I am certain, that
no increased emission of paper currency beyond the point at which it will maintain its correct
value, can be of service to the community.” A large emission of paper money might enable the
debtor to extricate himself from difficulties, but it did injustice to the creditor, and hampered
development. He said that “it will be perceived that I am no great advocate for Banking
institutions of any sort,” though he allowed that some good might result “by enabling the
mercantile class to anticipate their funds, give a spur to industry, and activity to other pursuits.”
Farmers, however, “can never trade with banks but to their injury and loss.” Ward then
recommended that all state banks be consolidated into one institution in order to end ruinous
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competition. After all, banks acted in their interest, just as private mercantile firms sought to
undermine their competitors. This platform probably managed to alienate several factions—
those who had sought relief from the new state bank, those who sought investment from the new
state bank, and those who wanted a diffusion of credit access. In short Ward alienated those
groups that had the heaviest influence on Tennessee’s banking policy. He alienated them further
by having the temerity to blame the distress on the extravagance of the people. He said that
“formerly the young men of the country toiled in the field with their fathers for the support of the
family; the daughters too engaged in spinning and weaving, and other branches of housewifry,
and thro’ these means many things were done which saved expense, and brought in money to the
family.” Families had become too dependent on their luxuries, especially foreign luxuries.
Trade should be restricted to discourage dissipation. Household manufactures should once again
prevail. He said that “in former times when simplicity and economy prevailed, each [family
member] in articles of dress, expended say fifty dollars; in these times of fashion and
extravagance, it is no unreasonable assertion to make, that double this amount is wasted on dress
and in the altered modes of life.” The implication was clear. The people at large should practice
economy, allowing those in the towns to handle commercial exchange. Ward concluded with
calls for internal improvement and a strengthening of manufacturing, but they contrasted with his
main message that the time was returning when “men will learn to be contented with moderate
gain.”40
Carroll’s circular proved politically adept, in that it played to the public angst yet
remained optimistic in tone. He focused his attacks on the old state banks. He made no mention
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of the new state bank. He blamed the severity of the distress on the sudden increase of the
circulating medium and its sudden contraction by failure of many institutions. This former
director of the Farmers’ and Mechanics’ Bank said that “I cannot, in candour, conceal, fellow
citizens, that I am no friend of banks. I have watched their progress—I have seen their
operations, and I think we would … have done better, if we had never seen one in the state.”
Nevertheless, the banks had been established, and their sudden destruction would injure the
people. He concluded, “In mercy, then, to ourselves, we should permit them to proceed in their
operations, keeping at the same time a watchful eye on their every act.—One thing is certain
however, that, for the purpose of having a sound currency it is essentially necessary that all those
institutions should keep constantly in view, the resumption of specie payments, as soon as the
state of the country will permit.” Carroll did not pine for the old days of simplicity, nor did he
berate the people for their extravagance, but rather said that “the picture of our distresses in a
general point of view, is by some too strongly drawn.” He called for industry and frugality with
the aim of encouraging material progress: “Let us not look back too much at the precipice over
which we have passed—let us look forward—there is a goodly prospect before us—we are
free—we have a fruitful soil—a healthful climate—and most of us hands that are accustomed to
toil. Some of us were born poor, and have acquired an independence, and we can maintain it if
we have it, or if we have lost it, we can acquire it again.” To aid this enterprise Carroll proposed
a general education system and state-sponsored internal improvements. In America all could
aspire to the “first offices” through “integrity, talents, and industry.”41
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Many Carroll supporters looked favorably on enterprise. “Commentator” in the Nashville
Whig found it ridiculous that Ward, who claimed to be no defender of banks, also claimed that
no difference existed between banks and mercantile firms. “Commentator” said, “then it
follows, if there be no difference between Banks and mercantile firms … we must suppose him
not very kindly disposed towards mercantile firms, and consequently an enemy to commerce.”
Moreover, since Ward said that farmers could never trade profitably with a bank, then they could
not trade profitably with merchants either. The very characterization of competition was
ludicrous because “the directors are blamed if they withhold loans, and they are denounced if
they increase their accommodations.” “Commentator” also criticized Ward’s proposed
suppression of foreign trade. Perhaps alluding to Carroll’s ventures, the writer said that “the
Steam-Boat is an American invention; though now, in consequence of the intercourse which
exists between us and foreign nations, it is used on all the principal rivers of Europe; and had no
intercourse existed, that portion of the world would still have been without the important benefits
resulting from this invention.” Farmers benefitted from trade; otherwise, “it would be to no
purpose that our farmers rear more produce than domestic consumption requires.”42
Other writers reinforced Carroll’s industrious virtues, many by satirizing Ward. “W. D.”
called Ward’s consolidated bank a “double headed monster” and said, “vote for the wel educated
college bred gentleman, born to a large fortune, and imported from the country [Virginia] which
has always been remarkable for distinguished statesmen and fleet race horses, and who is willing
to direct both the politics and finances of your state.” Another writer, sarcastically styling
himself “A Big Fish,” said that he would not vote for Carroll because he was an “upstart” who
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went over the heads of the nobility and had attained success without patronage. Most
importantly he claimed, “I will not vote for him because he was broke, and because the impudent
fellow wont stay so.” Others found Ward’s call for simplicity galling, precisely because of his
wealth and comfortable status. “Rumford” said that “I cannot, for the life of me, teach my
household economy, but I know they will pattern after so great and so learned a man as Col.
Ward.” Disgust ran deep against Ward who, as it seemed, believed that commerce and
investment should be the purview of a select few in the large towns, while the common sort were
expected to live in austerity.43
Debtor interests constituted another bloc of support for Carroll. Debtors, or at least those
who claimed to speak for debtors, were enraged at Ward’s proposal for speedier judgments on
debts. The Clarion especially emphasized this issue, which became all the more aggravated
when the state supreme court overturned the relief law during the summer. In the Nashville
Whig “Annotator” said that government had always had nothing to give the debtor, but it always
had much to give the creditor. If no relief could be had, then, he said, “the property of ninetenths
of the community is to be sacrificed, in order that a few misers who have hoarded up specie may
glut their avarice.” Even as a debtor, “Annotator” found Ward’s lack of enthusiasm for internal
improvements troubling.44
Most attacks against Carroll redounded to his benefit. Ward supporters attacked Carroll’s
political inexperience, his supposed prodigality, and his unseemly ambition. “Philocles” admired
the courage of Carroll, but, he said, martial skill could not replace “the place of solid wisdom,
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cool and cautious reflection, long experience, and an extensive knowledge of the moral causes
that influence the conduct of men.” He concluded “this is a species of wisdom that camps cannot
furnish, nor boys acquire.” Such haughtiness hardly needed a reply from Carroll partisans. They
needed only to parade these accusations in the newspapers. “A Militia Man” argued that
Carroll’s military career affirmed his readiness for responsibilities, having been appointed
brigade major of the army by Jackson. Carroll’s ambition, moreover, was of the kind that
impelled individuals to greatness and virtue. The Grand Jury of Montgomery County resolved to
support Carroll in the election because of his military service and faithfulness in fulfilling his
duties. Stellar military service made Carroll’s appeal insurmountable.45
What should have been the most effective attacks against Carroll failed to make any
impression. “A Voter,” probably from East Tennessee, described Carroll’s history in supporting
banks and his recent support of the relief effort. He said that the people were more concerned
with removal of the agencies, which they believed “is but another word for withdrawing the
money too … if for no other purpose … of centering the capital of the whole country at two or
more places—say Knoxville and Nashville.” “A Farmer’s Son” likewise pointed out Carroll’s
previous involvement in state banks. General perception allowed Carroll, as the people’s
candidate, the benefit of the doubt in these matters.46
Tennesseans voted for development. Carroll won the election 41,044-11,171. The panic
two years before had certainly shaken the people’s faith in the old state banks. It seemed that
they could no longer support prosperity. A stay law and a loan office offered hope to lessen the
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distress. Many debtors, however, looked for new prospects, and they listened to Carroll’s
encouragement that “if we have lost it, we can acquire it again.” They believed that the loan
office could provide support for enterprise and infrastructure throughout the state. They wanted
capital which the old banks had failed to provide. Opposition arose because of ever-present
sectional jealousies between East Tennessee and West Tennessee. Some in the opposition, like
Pleasant M. Miller, had reasonable concerns that banks operating outside the towns of Nashville
and Knoxville, where most commercial transactions took place, would create ruinous debt.
Tennesseans were too restless for such limitations. They yearned to improve their livelihoods
through commerce and investment. In 1821 they elected a governor whose example exuded
ambition, determination, and industriousness.47
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Chapter 5

Jacksonian Producers

Tennessee experienced a slow recovery during the first half of the 1820s. Legislators,
editorialists, and petitioners crafted recommendations to enliven commerce. All complained of
the scarcity of money. Banks, somewhat unfairly, garnered the blame. Voters expressed their
disapproval of the banks’ conduct by electing new representatives in the General Assembly and
by electing Carroll as the “people’s candidate” for governor. These new politicians unified in
their belief that all state-chartered banks must resume specie payments. This program placed
them at odds with the remaining members of the Overton faction and any others still interested in
the state banks, for the financial pressure that resumption would bring might be disastrous.
Resumption supporters differed over how to best promote prosperity, and whether to utilize
banks in this aim. At first many wished that the new state bank would provide more capital. The
bank’s inadequate funding quashed this hope. Three other proposals gained credence. The first
involved private banking, in which the institutions would operate without legislative sanction.
The second involved repeal of the foreign bank tax of 1817 and the entry of the Bank of the
United States into Tennessee. Planters and merchants took the most interest in this debate
because it involved the mechanism by which their produce would reach market. The third
involved ridding the state of banks in favor of state funding of internal improvements or legal
reforms to lower entry barriers to trades and ensure renumeration of labor. Even if anti-bank,
these proposals sought pro-commercial ends. Internal improvements and legal reforms appealed
168

to the middling sorts who found themselves on the edges of the commercial world. Internal
improvements appealed to East Tennesseans, who remained geographically isolated. Legal
protections and reforms appealed to mechanics and small merchants looking to establish their
livelihoods. Legislators paid less heed to these requests, at least for the time being. But a
fundamental belief in commerce’s benefits remained. If Tennessee was not to have banks,
Tennesseans still sought to make their state one in which commerce gave a spring to agriculture
and enabled consumption.
Once he assumed office, Governor Carroll recommended definite hard money policies.
His policies made sense given the precarious state of the banks. Allowing them to continue
unsound business would only worsen matters. He rejected property laws that would compel
creditors to take property in payment of debts, arguing that the Constitution made only gold or
silver legal tender in payment of debts. He also rejected arguments to expand paper currency.
Such issues would find their natural levels without chartered, privileged banks. He said that “the
commerce of a state will always command the quantity or amount of circulating medium
necessary for it.” Excessive note issues had depreciated note values, increased commodity
prices, and made the paper worthless for exchange outside the state. Carroll’s conclusion
resonated with his voters, who remained angry at bankers and speculators: “the cultivation of
industrious habits and the practice of rigid economy are the only means by which individuals
generally can be relieved from pecuniary embarrassments.” He recommended passage of a law
setting a date for resumption of specie payments by the banks.1
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Resumption quickly passed. Voters’ elections of new representatives and senators
produced change. The candidates, said one commentator, had used “the ordinary cant of the
electioneering raider against Banks who wishes to ride into office upon the excited feelings, and
sudden zeal of the people against an evil which all alike deplore.” Raiders they may have been,
but their depredations aimed only to raze the current banks. Their leader in the House was
Andrew Erwin of Bedford County, a planter, merchant, and speculator, a general foe of the
Overton faction, and a particular foe of Andrew Jackson. Erwin introduced the resumption bill
in the House. All banks, including the new state bank, would be required to pay specie.
Resumption under present economic circumstances, as its sponsors knew, would place
Tennessee banks under tremendous pressure. Even the new state bank suffered from slow land
sales, and it lacked the means to meet its obligations. Grundy and the bank’s other supporters
reached a compromise date with the Erwin group, setting resumption on April 5, 1824. The bill
became law with Senate approval. Carroll’s hard money precepts signaled his approval as well.
His animus against the old banks of the Overton faction stemmed from his days as a director of
the Farmers’ and Mechanics’ Bank. Later the legislature delayed resumption until 1826.2
Legislators considered two other major proposals related to banking and the currency.
First, the assembly added new obligations to the new state bank by instructing its directors to
issue $50,000 in denominations of less than $1. The law was intended to supply money for daily
transactions. Second, the assembly entertained proposals for a new state constitution. Economic
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stagnation energized this movement. A new constitution did not pass until 1834, but a few
proposals indicate sources of discontent. Another newcomer, Senator Theoderick F. Bradford of
Bedford County, introduced the resolutions. First, reformers wanted an increase in the number
of representatives and senators in the General Assembly. Second, they wanted to overhaul
taxation rates. The state still taxed land at a uniform rate per 100 acres. This system had always
benefitted speculators, but it made some sense when most of Tennessee land remained
unimproved. Now, however, owners of the most valuable town lots and plantation lands paid the
same rate as those of the poorest, most unproductive lands. Third, advocates wanted to prohibit
the incorporation of banks, composed of directors whose private property was not liable for
payment of the bank’s debts. This last proposal was another shot at the old state banks.
Bradford was no hard money man; he later voted to allow private banks to operate in Tennessee.3
Bank discipline and currency expansion reflected the will of the voters. Sound banks
could meld these practices into healthy issues of credit. Tennessee banks, overextended as they
were, could not do both. Since the state banks had suspended, Tennessee currency circulated at a
fraction of its face value. It was almost worthless outside the state, as noted by Carroll.
Tennesseans holding state currency thus faced a heavy premium when acquiring eastern notes or
specie to pay for goods shipped from Philadelphia, New York, or New Orleans. Stockholders in
the Carthage branch of the old bank complained that “the paper received by your memorialists
for causes unknown, but certainly not chargable to them, cannot be converted into specie, or pay
a foreign debt without a loss of twenty five per cent.” Voters expressed their displeasure.
Merchants from Nashville petitioned the legislature to address the high exchange rate.
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Memorialists from Maury County objected to the influx of bank notes throughout the state. They
argued that “in all countries that have emitted paper it has depreciated and been scaled and
reduced to the standard value of the precious metals.” These petitioners urged a return to first
principles and moral integrity. They said that “a general disgust has burst forth against those
legalized frauds and the nation would rejoice to see a course taken that would compel all to gain
their substance by honest labor.”4
A return to first principles apparently involved strengthening the new state bank and
expanding its currency. The Maury County petitioners lauded the bank’s public nature. They
argued that “[the bank is] produced on different principles (viz) the emmoloments [sic] of the
one goes to the state of the others [the old banks] to privileged companies.” The old banks,
artificially enriched by the privileges granted by their charters, promoted trade at the expense of
the citizenry. The new state bank could assure an equal circulation of money for everyone’s
pursuits. The petitioners said that “could the legislature devise the circulation of smal [sic]
change it would be an accommodation to the citizens and particularly to travelers and
innkeepers.”5
Lack of money was ubiquitous. Certain citizens of Cocke County in East Tennessee said
that “from the decline of commerce and the consequent, almost total disappearance of a
Circulating medium particularly as to the inferior Classes of the Agricultural Portion of the
People, we presume the oldest of your Honorable Body never witnessed as great and as general
pecuniary embarrasments [sic] as at present exists.” They accurately assessed that East
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Tennesseans suffered more from this situation because they, unlike the West Tennesseans, did
not have staple crops like cotton that could be exchanged for money. They asked for temporary
relief from government taxes. This petition hinted at a problem that would hinder East
Tennessee’s development until after the Civil War. Tennessee’s mountainous region could not
support staple agriculture, especially cotton, and it did not provide efficient means to get produce
to market. It needed other economic sectors to create economic dynamism. Whether such
sectors would emerge depended in part on the contemporary arguments over banking.6
Another group of petitioners asked that the new state bank perform the dual purpose of
inflating the currency and providing long-term credit. Gold and silver could not be acquired and
low prices for produce and labor prevailed under the current conditions. The petitioners thus
asked for an additional issue of $1,000,000 in new state bank bills and relief from state taxes.
They said that the notes “be loaned out at the rate of six percent per annum for twelve months …
as loans for a shorter period is but [laborious] placed as we are.” Supporters for the bank still
hoped to find relief from personal debts and investment for personal improvement.7
Citizens of Franklin complained about the lack of small change. They wrote, “the specie
change, formerly so plenty in our country, on account of the great difference in the value of
specie and our common currency, has been almost entirely withdrawn from circulation without
leaving any proper substitute.” They had resorted to using out-of-state bills. They wanted the
General Assembly to authorize the mayor and aldermen of their town to issue promissory notes
under $1.8
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Petitioners from Giles County wished to eschew the old and new state banks. They wrote
the General Assembly of their willingness to accept the notes of a new, private mercantile firm
called Yeatman, Woods, and Company in payment of debts or for any merchandise or produce
that they sold. The state banks’ currencies had depreciated and could not support commerce.
Even during the good times, their commitment to short-term credit failed to satisfy the needs of
the community. The petitioners argued that “the present augmented productions and commerce
of our state did never more need an augmented circulating medium to add vigor to our
agricultural professional and commercial pursuits,” and that “the cautious policy heretofore
pursued by the incorporated banks of the state will afford if persevered in but little facilities to
those great interest[s] of the country.”9
Yeatman, Woods, and Company’s prestige came from its good reputation, not from
legislative charter. Thomas Yeatman arrived in Nashville in 1810 to operate as a commission
merchant. The brothers Joseph and Robert Woods, having operated a commission partnership at
the mouth of the Cumberland River, arrived in town a short time later. Their firms remained
separate at first. They received and forwarded various goods and their ventures met with
success. Perhaps because of the boom times following the War of 1812, they formed a new
partnership, built a warehouse, and purchased several steamboats to enlarge their exchange in
cotton, tobacco, and eastern goods. This was the state of the firm when the Giles County
petitioners wrote to the General Assembly in 1821. No action seems to have been taken by the
legislature. Although not involved directly in politics, Yeatman was son-in-law to Andrew
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Erwin, and his firm represented an alternative to state banking interests. These undercurrents
would emerge in short order.10
Though complaints abounded, the banks had marginal success in alleviating economic
hardship. Funds were available for a price. Christian Dycke, for example, petitioned the
legislature concerning his father, Henry Dycke. According to Dycke, his father “became some
what embarrassed in his circumstances and was compelled to borrow money to save his property
from total sacrifice.” His loan of $600 came from the branch bank of the old Bank of the State
of Tennessee at Jonesborough. He gave as his securities Hugh Carter and John Snapp and
executed a mortgage for them for four parcels of land in Greene County. Henry died before the
loan was repaid, Carter and Snapp sought to foreclose the mortgage, and Christian wrote the
legislature in an effort to keep 58 acres of the mortgaged land that had been inherited from his
father. The bank loan carried a price, of course, but the problem came from Henry’s death rather
than the oppressive nature of the loan itself. Banks provided a last resort to individuals who
faced ruin or a sacrifice of property. Foreclosure was probably done as a last resort too, for it
was often difficult to sell even valuable real estate. John M. Preston, for example, complained to
the legislature that he could not sell 53 acres of salt land and thus the taxes on the land would
soon amount to more than its market value. Other than these small loans, however, the state
banks could not develop facilities for long-term credit.11
Petitioners from Bledsoe County felt the paradoxical effect of banks, finding in them a
source of credit but also a source of indebtedness. They wanted a paper currency founded on

10

W. Woodford Clayton, History of Davidson County, Tennessee, with Illustrations and Biographical Sketches of its
Prominent Men and Pioneers (Philadelphia: J. W. Lewis and Company, 1880), 203, Hodges Library; Sellers,
“Banking and Politics,” 77-78.
11
Petition 55-1824-1 and Petition 15-1832-1, Tennessee Legislative Petitions, Microfilm, TSLA.

175

better principles. They said that “we have a few hundred dollars Loaned to us by the bank and
when discount days come round to Renew our notes we stand in need of another bank to Borrow
money from to pay up the call and Interest of the first Bank.” The source of their trouble lay in
the prices of their produce. Nothing would bring cash. The petitioners also outlined a plan to
ease the cash shortage involving the new state bank. They proposed that the state construct
public warehouses in each county, where citizens could take their produce in exchange for a
voucher. At present, argued the petitioners, planters and farmers had to sell at whatever price
prevailed when their produce reached market. “This is not the case with your bank,” they said,
“you are allways able to command a price by waiting untill you can obtain your price.” Profit
would then be assured for all parties—the agents and banks would profit from commissions and
exchange, and the farmer would receive remittance from the bank via the voucher. The
petitioners believed that this scheme would make lands valuable, increase immigration, and bring
sound currency—gold, silver, and notes of the Bank of the United States—to Tennessee.12
Even the new state bank, the relief bank, could not provide long-term credit or a
circulating medium. Roger B. Sappington, for example, asked that the legislature authorize the
bank to loan him $2,000 for a period of 1-3 years. Sappington owned a farm near Nashville and
operated grist mills and a distillery. These improvements provided services “greatly useful to the
neighborhood,” but the panic had turned strain to distress. He said that “the difficulty of selling
property to raise money is almost insurmountable.” The drafted bill proposed to loan him the
requested amount, with one-half to be paid with interest at the end of one year and the other half
with interest to be paid on April 1, 1824. This bill was ultimately rejected. Another petitioner,
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John Lawry of Blount County, requested a loan of $1500, with use of the loan until April 1,
1824, and renewable at the discretion of the bank after that date. This too failed.13
Industrialists, like agriculturalists, found long-term credit lacking for their ventures. A
Dickson County industrialist named Montgomery Bell applied to the new state bank via the
legislature for a loan to expand his operations. Bell was born in Chester County, Pennsylvania,
and spent his youth around the vibrant iron industry of that locale. He had moved to Lexington,
Kentucky, in 1789, where he learned how to select sites for mills to harness water power. He
came to Montgomery County, Tennessee, in 1802 to manage the Cumberland Iron Works,
established by James Robertson in 1793. By 1804, Dickson County had been created out of
Montgomery County, and Bell purchased the firm outright. Bell manufactured munitions for
Andrew Jackson’s troops during the War of 1812 and expanded his operations after the war. In
1820, following the panic, he sold the Cumberland Iron Works for $50,000.14
Bell sold out in an effort to raise capital for other interests. One potential investment
involved a site he owned on the Harpeth River between Nashville and Franklin. In his petition
Bell said that “to erect such works as could be successfully and profitably erected at said Scite
would require a capital much more extensive than your memorialist has at command, or at least
the erection of proper works on his own capital would require the tardy delay of many years.”
He asked for a loan of $12,000, and an additional $12,000 after 6 months. He wanted these
funds for 6 years, paying interest annually, with the loan secured by mortgages on improved real
estate. The committee that considered Bell’s petition acknowledged the merit of his plan, but its
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members said that “it is unsafe and unwise for this Legislature to exhaust the resources of the
Bank of the State of Tennessee by large Loans of money upon any security whatsoever,” because
of the coming resumption of specie payments. The new state bank had too little funds to support
agriculture or manufacturing.15
Robust investment was an impossibility for the new state bank. The value of its notes
ultimately rested on Hiwassee District land sales, which remained slow. They were so slow, in
fact, that legislators changed the district’s land purchase system. In 1820, the first year of sales,
the amount received by the East Tennessee treasury was $250,000, a quarter of the bank’s
capitalization. By 1828, the sum reached about $500,000. Funds available to the government
could not redeem the bank’s paper. Nor was the Hiwassee District during these early years
productive. Legislators’ failure to secure occupancy rights in 1819 depressed industriousness.
District residents found that they could not purchase land under the credit system, and they
became tenants to landlords. Some residents believed that nine-tenths of the people living in the
Hiwassee District were poor, yet land had gone to speculators. They claimed that “landed
property fall into the hands of the few, the majority have to rent on any terms the landholder
please terms are always hard the tenant has no land to improve … he sees an insurmountable
barrier to his ever becoming a landholder and unable to school his children.” Other Hiwassee
residents faced similar circumstances. One group said that “at the time of the land sales of this
district money was moderately plenty and could be procured by the Industrious part of the
Community.” The first settlers had been forced to give up their possessions or purchase their
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land. Those who had remained faced installment payments that they could not sustain and they
asked for relief.16
Conditions eased for some Hiwassee District residents later in the 1820s. In 1823 the
General Assembly ended the credit system for land purchases for the district. No longer would
land be auctioned to the highest bidder, beginning at a minimum price of $2.00 per acre. The
graduated system took its place, exactly as James C. Mitchell had proposed in 1819. Pressure
from constituents seems to have changed legislators’ minds. More importantly, revenue
remained below legislators’ expectations. Much of the district’s land remained unsold, and it
was for these unappropriated lands that the assembly applied the graduated system. The
assembly had considered graduated land prices in 1821 and 1822, both times passing in the
House but failing in the Senate, before finally becoming law in 1823. The new system operated
to increase the number of freeholders. It also increased tax revenue. Two reasons accounted for
this development. First, the law ended the practice under the credit system of auctioning land to
the highest bidder, beginning at a minimum price of $2.00 per acre. Removing the price floor
allowed the costs of the lands to better reflect their values. As Mitchell later wrote, “the refuse
hills and mountains which lay north and east of the congressional reservation line for half a
century, and viewed as worth nothing, have been appropriated by the people under the
graduating system of [Tennessee], from which a handsome sum of money has been raised to the
State by the entrance money, and an annual revenue will be constantly derived to her from them
by way of land tax.” The law gave occupants a six-month period in which they possessed the
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sole right to enter the land upon which they had established improvements at $1.50 per acre.
Only after six months did the land go on the market, for the same price as was available to
occupants. Lands not entered after the first six months decreased in price to $1.00 per acre,
occupants once again enjoying a three-month period in which they possessed the sole right to
make claim for the land. This graduated decrease would continue until it reached a minimum of
$0.12½ per acre. The system gave a spur to industry. Nathaniel Smith, entry-taker for the
district, reported that “at fifty cents per acre, [purchasers] got on their horse, rode him to
Georgia, and sold him, and walked back with their cash in their pockets, and entered their land
that they are now making a good living on.” The revenue generated had no effect on the new
state bank. Nor did it adequately support the common schools, as the legislators appropriated
only those funds that came from sales of lands at the minimum price. Aspiring freeholders
nevertheless had a good chance of owning land even in the impoverished Hiwassee District.17
Relief thus never came from the new state bank. The whole scheme was a boondoggle.
East Tennesseans understood this best. Greene County petitioners in 1825 scorned the
impotence of the bank. It had brought relief, they said, “but not for the farmer and labouring part
of the Community of Tennessee But for the merchant and Swindler not only of Tennessee But
for all who wish to Give us a Call.” More petitioners from the county blamed the bank for
scarcity of money in 1827. The promise of the bank in 1820 had come to naught. It had become
clear that the bank could neither stabilize money circulation, enliven commerce, or foster
economic diversification.18
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Petitioners universally complained of the scarcity of money, and many blamed the banks
for this condition, but those petitioners who addressed the price of produce came closer to the
truth in diagnosing their struggles. Tennessee’s prosperity depended largely on its staple crops,
and crop prices remained low throughout the 1820s. Tennessee banks did not create the
recession. Prices simply relayed the message that Tennessee produce had too many sellers or too
few buyers. It is true that Tennessee banks, goaded by nearly the whole community, had
overextended their issues during the good times. Carroll was essentially correct when he argued
for resumption and the concomitant payment of foreign and domestic debt. Allowing default,
not granting relief, would purge the economy’s prodigal elements. Not all who asked for relief
suffered under the harsh conditions of landlords, as those who lived in the Hiwassee District did.
Many engaged in trade, or owned cotton plantations, or speculated in land. Tennessee banks
offered some assistance as lenders of last resort to distressed individuals. Failure was inevitable,
however. Trade could not be sustained at the levels it reached following the War of 1812, at
least for the time being, and the banks’ own precariousness meant that they could not prime trade
until prices recovered.19
Despite their grievances, Tennesseans still believed in personal and material
improvement. It was in that spirit that many petitioners asked for a stable currency. Even the
most distressed petitioners, like those of the Hiwassee District, spoke of earning their keep
through industry, if only the state would allow that industry to be rewarded. They hoped that
their industry, in turn, would produce schools for their children. They complained that the lack
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of schools meant that, except in time of crops, their children sunk “in Idleness, dissipation, and
ignorence throughout the year.”20
Industriousness and competition appealed to common folk looking to enter certain trades.
These petitioners particularly disliked license fees that controlled the privilege to operate as
merchants or petty retailers. In 1819 the legislature had passed a law requiring “hawkers and
pedlars” to obtain a license from the court of the county in which they operated. The license cost
$50 and had to be renewed annually. The legislature passed another law encompassing
wholesalers and retailers. It made clear that all such sellers must pay the tax “whether he open a
trading house, or sell and deal at his waggon, boat, craft, or otherwise.” These entry fees worked
to the disadvantage of newcomers. One group of petitioners in 1825 asked for the repeal of the
license tax on merchants. They said that the tax was “only calculated to benefit a few wealthy
merchants or capitalists.” Petitioners from Rhea County in 1829 also argued that the tax
operated oppressively “on men who are trading on small capitals.” Legislators did cut in half the
license tax for pedlars in 1822 but took no further action during the 1820s.21
Other workers took matters into their own hands. Many apprentices or journeymen in
Nashville left their mechanic-masters to pursue their own ventures. Some proposed to take in
work on their own. Others left to employ themselves in other industries. Labor’s mobility
embittered established mechanics throughout the western states. The Louisville Herald
(Kentucky) complained that “apprentices seem to think that they are bound by no other
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obligation than their own will.” Runaways found employment in shops or wherever they
pleased, and their new employers protected them from legal repercussions for abandoning their
term of service.22
Competitive trade increased in Nashville. Town aldermen or the county court set
regulations designating the times and places for a “market house,” an area in which vendors
could come to sell their wares. At first the public square served as the market area, but business
volume increased to the point that upper crust townsfolk began to complain of the grubby scene.
The Davidson County Court, no doubt at the behest of some of these influential carpers, at one
point removed the market to a more secluded location. Now it was the vendors’ turn to
complain. One editorialist signed “A Citizen” suggested new locations for the market such that
“the distance between the court-house and market-house would then be so great, that neither the
auditory, nor the olfactory organs of the sensitive gentlemen of the bar and the bench would be
affected, and public convenience subserved.” No sooner had the market house been returned to
the square than the town aldermen allowed the establishment of a second market house on Broad
Street. Henceforth market days on the public square were Tuesday, Thursday, and Saturday, and
market days on Broad Street were Monday, Wednesday, and Friday. The new arrangement
stoked the jealousy of the property owners and business interests on the public square, but it
granted entry to new competitors.23
Small private construction projects remained steady during the 1820s. Many apparently
continued even through the panic, for a state law passed in 1825 sought to assure that mechanics
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received just compensation for their labor if their customers failed to pay. The law gave
mechanics a one-year lien on the buildings they constructed and on the land it was constructed
upon. The lien was to be “for the just value of [the mechanic’s] labor and materials furnished by
such mechanic for constructing such house or houses.” Housing construction occurred in some
measure outside the towns too. In 1829 mechanics from Knox County complained that the law
was too limited, in that it protected mechanics who constructed buildings within town limits.
They also asked that the law be expanded to include anyone who applied labor or furnished
materials, because the current protection extended only to the mechanic who completed the
building. Petitions for the protection of earnings, or for the lowering of entry barriers, were
optimistic queries for relief. Such petitioners asked for chances to participate in the wider
commercial world.24
Tennesseans continued to enjoy necessities and amenities that commerce made available
to them. The scarcity of money and the license tax failed to stifle this trade. Carroll complained
of excessive spending by Tennessee farmers every time he addressed the legislature. In his
September 20, 1824, address he argued that the instability of money’s value “induces [the
agriculturalist] to purchase many things which the wants of his family do not require, and for
which he has very little use.” In 1825 he said that citizens should practice “a system of industry
and economy, which will lead to wealth and prosperity, without the aid of loans from Banks, or
otherwise; always ruinous to the best interests of the agricultural part of the community.” In
1826 he acknowledged that prices for staples might support only “a reasonable portion of the
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good things of life,” and he discouraged “extravagant importations of foreign goods.” Carroll’s
farewell message in 1827, marking the end of his first stint as governor, struck the same tone.
He warned that “it should be deeply impressed upon the mind of the farmer, that the profits of
his farm will not authorize him to borrow money and interest.” The farmer, he said, should not
anticipate his proceeds by borrowing on credit: “if he does he will buy many articles, which the
necessities of his family do not require, pay higher for them, and be frequently harassed with
expensive lawsuits.” Carroll’s reprimands illustrate that farmers still wanted to borrow money
for improvements and to purchase amenities for enjoyment.25
Advertisements throughout the 1820s offered the luxuries that Carroll berated. Most
advertisers consisted of wholesalers encouraging “country merchants,” the merchants who
connected the hinterlands with larger exchange networks, to seek their selection of groceries,
implements, and luxuries fresh from Philadelphia, New York, Baltimore, or New Orleans.
Yeatman, Woods, and Company was one such wholesaler; their advertisement stated that “as the
goods will be sold cheap, credits cannot be given, and it is requested credit will not be asked
for.” The company’s selection included nails, groceries, and a cream-colored glazed
earthenware called queensware. James Stewart and Company advertised goods from Great
Britain, France, and India, as well as domestically manufactured goods. In addition to
queensware, they sold boots, shoes, bonnets, hats, hatters’ trimmings, furs, hardware, glass,
coffee, sugar, spices, and paper. Drug stores offered not only medicines, but paints, dyes, and
glass furniture. A wholesaler signed M. Watson invited country merchants’ attention to his
assortment of cutlery, whiskey, salt, gunpowder, window glass, iron, and castings. Another
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wholesaler named T. F. Adams informed country merchants of his selection of blankets, shawls,
hats, and cloaks. These firms competed for prompt arrival of their goods. Bedford and
Company bragged of their goods as “only thirty days from Philadelphia.” Demand remained
strong for amenities that eased life for an agricultural people.26
Public support for internal improvements was inversely related to the ease of access of
these commercial goods. Middle Tennessee residents, having ample access to waterways to ship
their cotton, did not need to undertake large scale projects for commercial access. State aid and
federal aid cleared obstructions from the Cumberland River, making travel to New Orleans
easier, and all the more so as steamboats became the most popular mode of transport. East
Tennessee residents, on the other hand, believed that internal improvements could overcome
their region’s mountainous isolation. Prominent men from the counties of Cocke, Sevier,
Jefferson, and Knox argued that the bank had turned the people of Tennessee “into a harassed
and abject class of money hunters, instead of … a race of independent, industrious and thrifty
agriculturalists.” Even if the proceeds of the loan went to the construction of improvements,
then “the borrowers, who are ordinarily, the most oppressed part of the community would be
exclusively paying the expenses of the improvement … to the exclusion of the wealthy and
independent.” Petitioners from Rhea County argued that internal improvements would assist
aspiring landowners from capricious speculators. They said that “we are all In debt to one
another and times is so hard we Cannot git money for clothing nor for our labor exepting you
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would imbark into sum internal improvements and give us sum Chance to git money for our
labour and bredstuffs.”27
Legislators’ focus remained on reform of the credit system. Middle and West Tennessee
assemblymen were especially insistent on this program because of cotton’s ascendance in their
region as the primary staple crop. Governor Carroll and the General Assembly addressed this
question in earnest beginning in 1823. Carroll kept a hard line against all the state banks. He
encouraged the legislators to remain firm in holding the resumption date in April 1824. Nothing
short of resumption would purge the rottenness from Tennessee’s currency. Yet Carroll also
requested that the legislature report on the ability of banks to resume payments and, if found
unable to do so, he recommended a plan whereby the banks would pay what they could bear in
specie and provide an interest-bearing certificate, payable at a future date, for the balance. Banks
would thus gain time to wind up their business, and noteholders would be protected. But the
banks had to resume, come what may. Carroll spoke of the “evil which has ever resulted from
the emission of bank paper, without a specie basis for its redemption.” Allowing trade to find its
level via resumption would remove those banks, merchants, and businesses whose unsound
practices had contributed to the panic. Carroll perhaps wanted to clear the way for the
establishment of a branch of the Bank of the United States. He certainly supported private
banking establishments, that is to say, establishments that operated without legislative charters.
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What the state needed, he believed, was a banking system grounded in specie and thus tied to the
legitimate, not speculative, needs of trade.28
Legislators heeded the essence of Carroll’s recommendations. A Joint Committee on
Banking, chaired by Aaron V. Brown of Giles County, set the tone. The committee correctly
diagnosed the crisis. Committee members acknowledged banking malpractice, but also noted
that some banks had acted with integrity. They also pointed to general support among
Tennesseans for banking establishments and credit during the prosperity of 1815-1818.
According to the report, “many of our steadiest farmers engaged in speculations, and became
borrowers of sums which the proceeds of their farms were insufficient to repay.” It added that
“more than once considerable excitement existed against those institutions, for not being more
liberal in their accommodations.” The committee then addressed two issues regarding the future
of the chartered banks in Tennessee. First, the report concluded that the purpose of the
redemption law of 1821 was not to immediately revoke the charter of any bank who failed to
resume at assigned date, but rather to serve notice to the banks that more severe penalties,
including revocation, would follow. Second, the report claimed that the old state bank and the
Nashville Bank were solvent. They could bear resumption. The committee attributed the
depreciation of these banks’ notes, especially those of the Nashville Bank, to the lack of
knowledge about the banks’ solvency among the community, the intrigue of brokers, and (as
always) the excessive importation of foreign merchandise. In this the committee was less correct
in its diagnosis. The community’s belief in the banks’ paper values was more knowledgeable
than the committee indicated. The old state bank deserved confidence, for it never failed to pay
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specie, but the Nashville Bank’s situation was more precarious, as it would demonstrate in
1826.29
Wrangling over the governor’s recommendations and the committee’s report produced a
law that extended the final deadline for resumption until June 1, 1826. It also specified,
however, graduated rates of resumption in 1824 and 1825 to ease the transition. If any bank
failed to meet these requirements at any point, then the noteholder could obtain judgment against
the bank for the amount of the note plus 6% interest. This law provided the middle ground
recommended by Carroll, although it did not conform to every particular of his plan. It assured
that the currency would return to a sound basis, while also allowing the banks to avoid sudden
calls for repayment of debts to meet their obligations.30
Brown also initiated an attempt to bring a branch of the Bank of the United States to
Tennessee. Complaints of the scarcity of money, of the lack of specie-secured paper, and of the
inadequacy of the state banks to furnish credit placed the national bank in a new light. Perhaps
the bank would bring stability to commerce rather than exploitation. Support among legislators
came from those who had associated with Erwin for resumption in 1821, although Erwin himself
was no longer a representative. The Nashville Whig, which came under the editorship of one of
Erwin’s sons around this time, ran an editorial that stated “I would gladly see but one great
National Bank, founded on solid means, supported by the will of the people and the laws of the
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country.” Supporters of the national bank did not yet have the numbers to enact a repeal of the
foreign bank tax of 1817. The proposal passed two readings but never made it to a final vote.31
Before more action could be taken on the national bank, a new banking establishment
came to Tennessee in 1825. This was the private, non-chartered establishment of Yeatman,
Woods, and Company. Its sudden entrance into banking came from the pluck of its proprietors.
Andrew Jackson once complained of an acquaintance that he was “making money in true Yankee
stile,” and this would have been an apt description of the way Yeatman and the Woods brothers
amassed the fortune necessary for banking. During one of his business trips to Philadelphia,
Yeatman learned of a heavy advance in cotton from Europe. He raced home on horseback, beat
the mail, and bought up most of the cotton in Nashville for $0.12½ per pound. Soon afterward
cotton advanced to $0.25 per pound. The partners became the wealthiest merchants in Tennessee
within weeks. The partners sold their warehouse and steamboats, retired as commission
merchants, and became bankers.32
Yeatman and the Woods brothers announced the establishment of their banking house in
the papers. They said that they had first intended to invest their funds in federal government
bonds or eastern bank stock. Their friends reminded them that “our means have been made in
this state, and that to withdraw them would be doing injustice to our country in which we have
made our ‘all,’ and to which we owe so much.” They said that they did not doubt that “there are,
and will be objections made to Banking.” They made several arguments to differentiate
themselves from the state banks. As merchants they had operated with prudence and had earned
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the community’s trust. The company’s private nature meant that “our reputation and honor are
both pledged to make good our engagements when we fail to do this, our credit will sink, and we
shall deservedly be held up to public execration.” No relief laws would be passed in their favor.
Prudential discounts meant that a stable circulating medium would emerge. Capital would
multiply, competition would increase, the merchant would buy more produce, and the planter
would earn more.33
These beneficial effects would nevertheless be limited to an extent. The proprietors
admitted as much. Even as they anticipated objections to a new bank, they also wrote that “we
expect to hear of some complaints, in consequence of our inability to accommodate all who may
apply.” They pledged to be sparing, almost parsimonious, in discounting. Only short-term credit
would be extended. No note would be discounted whose maturity extended past 90 days. Funds
would be available only to merchants and planters ready to ship produce. Loans had to be
punctually paid in full; no renewals would be granted. These stringent policies would expand
trade over time. They assured the bank security in times of distress. Eventually the bank’s
directors would invest in the Cumberland Iron Works in Stewart County and in steamboat
manufactories along the Cumberland River. Credit would not be available, however, for land
speculation or agricultural expansion.34
The new bankers faced danger immediately following their announcement. Several
legislators in the General Assembly introduced a bill to prevent the circulation of private bank
bills or bills by individuals. Jackson was behind this effort; that, at least, was the belief of
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Yeatman’s brother-in-law John P. Erwin. Grundy, no longer serving in the legislature, likewise
supported the measure. Carroll used his considerable influence to counter that of Jackson and
Grundy. Opposition to the proposal in the House coalesced around George W. Gibbs of
Davidson County, an attorney who had been in partnership with Grundy, merchant, and banker.
The prohibition narrowly failed. It passed two readings in the House before being laid on the
table by one vote on the third reading. It passed all three readings in the Senate, with the final
vote passing by a two-to-one margin. If Jackson was behind the measure, it would explain the
close vote. The entire General Assembly, save one member, nominated Jackson for the
presidency during the same session. Gibbs, for example, chaired the reception committee for
Jackson’s acceptance speech. During the debate over private bank bills, Gibbs gave qualified
support to the proposed prohibition. He proposed an amendment after the first reading, probably
to make the bill more palatable. The amendment failed, the bill passed its second reading, but
the House voted to lay it on the table by a single vote on its third reading. The lone dissident to
Jackson’s nomination, Representative Lewis Reneau of Sevier County, opposed the prohibition
throughout the debate.35
Opponents of Yeatman, Woods, and Company also tried to use the 1817 law placing a
$50,000 tax on any banks not chartered by the state. Thomas Crutcher, the treasurer of West
Tennessee, reported the company liable for the tax only 20 days after it commenced operations.
Crutcher had held his office since 1813. He had ties to the old Overton faction via his friendship
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with Jackson. Crutcher’s report went to the Davidson County clerk, who then furnished it to the
sheriff for collection. At this point the company’s counsel sought an injunction against the order.
The court requested an opinion from Andrew Hays, attorney general for the Middle District of
Tennessee. Hays acknowledged that an ordinary and literal reading of the law included the
company. He nevertheless argued that the court should also consider the purpose of the
legislators which, he said, was the exclusion of a branch of the national bank from Tennessee,
based on the fear that “it would produce a press for specie, and thereby force the state banks to
limit their issues of paper, if not to diminish the quantity in circulation.” If the court found this
interpretation of meaning correct, then Hays argued that the judges were bound to grant the
injunction. The court followed Hays’s recommendation. Whatever its legal merits, the judgment
generally benefitted Nashville’s commerce. Yeatman, Woods, and Company continued
undisturbed. While the state banks struggled to prepare for resumption, the company advertised
their ability to redeem notes on presentation. Yet some remained unconvinced. An editorial in
the pro-Jackson Nashville Gazette resented the decision, claiming that “the people have been
deprived of a tax of fifty thousand dollars.” The writer, of course, did not explore the
implications of depriving the people of the company itself.36
Resumption began on June 1, 1826. Hugh Lawson White’s old state bank network bore
the pressure. This network had, said the directors of the branch bank in Nashville, “been always
doing a small, safe, snug business.” But the old state bank and its branches never counted for
much in subsequent commercial development. These banks closed some time after White was
elected to the United States Senate in 1825. The Nashville Bank, by contrast, had done a large
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amount of business—too large, in fact. Resumption revealed that the bank’s depositors had lost
faith in its soundness. It experienced a catastrophic collapse after 72 days. The bank paid
$260,000 in specie and closed within three months. The only viable bank left was Yeatman,
Woods, and Company.37
Banking became a sharp point of conflict when the General Assembly convened in a
called session in 1826. Some legislators hoped the state would henceforth remove itself from all
banking operations. East Tennesseans especially held this position, not to remain aloof from the
market, but because their geographic isolation stymied their market participation. Senator James
Anderson of Knox County echoed many petitioners from his region when he said that “we are
not to look to Banks for permanent relief from our embarrassments.” Anderson argued that
farmers created wealth for society. Goods coupled with the means to transport them constituted
real wealth. To that end Anderson proposed to incorporate a canal company to unite the
Hiwassee and Coosa Rivers and thereby create a channel to Mobile, Alabama. He also wanted to
appropriate funds to clear the Tennessee River. Such improvements had been contemplated
since the days of William Blount. Anderson argued that canals “would at once open an outlet for
our produce, give a new spring to industry, and do more to relieve the distresses of the people
than half a dozen of Banks in our present situation.” Nothing came of these proposals.38
Discussion turned to repeal of the $50,000 tax on banks not chartered by the state. The
contours of the debate followed those of the one in 1817. This time a clear majority in the House
supported the national bank and thus repeal. Gibbs took the lead. His case was generally
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correct, for his points conformed with the reality of the Bank of the United States’s performance
under Nicholas Biddle. The question, he said, “is not whether we shall have banks in the
American states, or in the state of Tennessee, but the inquiry should be, what is the best mode of
banking, or what species of bank paper should be preferred as a substitute for specie circulation.”
He pointed out that the nation’s specie reserves did not reflect the country’s productivity. A
paper currency could expand with the needs of commerce. The national bank’s paper currency
served this need, for its notes could be redeemed for specie on demand and thus maintained its
par value throughout the country. A uniform currency would reduce the exchange rate for
Tennessee produce and, Gibbs said, aid “the farmer and mechanic, who have to mind their farms
and workshops, and have no time to devote to the watching of the money market.” As it stood,
the state bank could not furnish money in the Northeast that would pass, so merchants took
specie from the local banks to purchase acceptable paper. Gibbs rejected fears of foreign
ownership of bank stock. Demand for capital was high. If the state, or the United States as a
whole, became debtors whose interest payments enriched others, so much more would the debtor
be enriched by the increase in productivity. Most importantly the bank would do what everyone
hoped banks would do in 1817—facilitate the cotton trade with New Orleans.39
Peter Parsons of Hawkins County gave the first response. He argued that the branch
banks provided no real capital to the locales in which they operated. The funds that they drew
came from the East, and the money loaned at interest would be returned eastward. Parsons said
that “it is better that Yeatman and Woods, who live among us, should make money by brokerage
than that a President or Cashier from the Eastern states should be sent here to make a profit out
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of us.” He further argued that merchants would charge higher prices for goods if offered
payment in new state bank notes, in order to cover the premium they paid for eastern funds.
Both merchant and farmer would become permanently indebted to the bank under this
arrangement. The bank would accomplish the establishment of a consolidated government,
according to Parson. He said, “We should not be too proud to wear our domestic manufactures.
We should keep our hands out of the mouth of the lion. We should keep the monster as far
distant as possible.” His concerns reflected those of the “state unifiers” in 1817. Capital should
be made available to the entire state, Parsons believed, saying with respect to Gibbs that “The
gentleman seems to think that no commerce is carried on any where but in Nashville. This
amount will not do for the whole state.” The new counties of the Western District would need
capital for expansion, and East Tennessee needed commercial facilities.40
Joseph Kincaid of Bedford County argued that a branch of the Bank of the United States
would not fix the source of the problem, excessive note issue and extravagant importations. If
Tennesseans bought what their produce could pay for, then no large circulating medium would
be needed. Kincaid believed that the bank would help merchants pay their debts, but it would
force the planter to ship his produce, assume all risk, and pay a premium for the money to
discharge his debt to the merchant, although he did not precisely explain why the planter would
be forced to resort to this extreme. He believed, like Parsons, that planters would be forced to
pay a premium with state currency. Also like Parsons, Kincaid was no defender of hard money.
He had voted in 1825 in defense of Yeatman, Woods, and Company.41
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Opponents’ arguments lacked credibility given the last decade of experience with state
banking. In the House repeal of the national bank tax passed 24-14. Several opponents of
Yeatman, Woods, and Company now voted in favor of the national bank; four of these
representatives were from Middle Tennessee, and two were from East Tennessee. Three
representatives who had voted in favor of Yeatman, Woods, and Company now opposed the
national bank. In the Senate the geographic divisions were more pronounced. Repeal passed 109. All but one of its supporters represented Middle or West Tennessee counties. Of the nine
opposed, six represented East Tennessee counties. It seems that East Tennessee senators held to
the general view among their constituents that the bank would offer them no assistance in their
ventures. Senators from Middle and West Tennessee believed the bank would quicken their
already lucrative trade in cotton.42
A branch of the Bank of the United States would come to Nashville in 1827. It remained
to be seen what utility the branch would provide, and how its operations would contribute to
Andrew Jackson’s “war” on the bank during his presidency. Tennessee’s experience with state
banking in the 1820s produced different kinds of discontent that could be turned against the
national bank later. Some, like Representative Parsons, still believed that credit needed to be
general throughout the state and that a national bank would be inadequate for such purposes.
Others, like Representative Kincaid, favored private banking wherein such institutions would
operate on their merits, rather than upon legislative privilege. Still others wanted to eschew
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banking. The source of their hostility was anti-bank, but not anti-commercial. They wanted
direct state funding of internal improvements, access to foreign and domestic luxuries, and ease
of access to compete in trades. These groups, given their interests and experiences, could see the
danger in an aristocratic “hydra,” as Jackson would later describe the national bank.
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Chapter 6

Andrew Jackson, the Bank of the United States, and Tennessee

When the 2nd Session of the 18th Congress convened on December 6, 1824, it was clear
that the people had not met the Constitutional requirements to elect a president. The choice
would thus fall to the House of Representatives, as mandated by the Constitution. In the coming
days, Andrew Jackson, John Quincy Adams, and William H. Crawford emerged as the top three
candidates in the tally of Electoral College votes—Jackson with 99 votes, Adams with 84, and
Crawford with 41. The Speaker of the House of Representatives, Henry Clay, himself a
presidential candidate with 37 electoral votes, would now play kingmaker, using both his status
as candidate and Speaker to influence House members’ votes. Clay’s choice, made before
Congress met, was Adams.1
On February 9, 1825, United States senators and other spectators entered the House of
Representatives to witness the House’s presidential choice. Henry Clay took the Speaker’s chair.
He announced that no presidential candidate had received the necessary majority of electoral
votes and then motioned that the House proceed immediately to the vote. The result stunned the
spectators. Adams received a majority of thirteen states on the first ballot, including votes from
the representatives of Maryland and Illinois, whose constituents had given the popular majority
to Jackson in their states. Kentucky, Ohio, and Missouri, whose voters gave the popular majority
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to Henry Clay, voted for Adams. Crawford received the votes of Delaware, North Carolina,
Georgia, and Virginia. Jackson, who had won electoral majorities in eleven states, received only
seven states in the House.2
Jackson forevermore believed that Adams had bribed Clay for his support. No direct
evidence has emerged to substantiate this “Corrupt Bargain.” Yet when Adams appointed Clay
as his secretary of state, Jackson wrote to William B. Lewis, “so, you see, the Judas of the West
has closed the contract and will receive the thirty pieces of silver—his end will be the same.”
Jackson had just cause for outrage. He had beaten Adams and Clay combined in the popular
vote and had received the most electoral votes of any candidate. His indignation compelled him
to begin campaigning immediately for the presidential election of 1828. And “campaign”
appropriately describes the general’s quest for the presidency. He determined to defeat all of
those he deemed enemies, both of himself and of the people. On becoming president he would
root out corrupt officials and return the federal government to republican simplicity. Only later
would Jackson begin to believe that the Bank of the United States was also corrupting the
political process.3
Jackson’s presidential run began as soon as he returned to Tennessee. At that time, as the
Jackson biographer James Parton writes, the state “welcomed her defeated General home in the
summer of 1825, as conquerors are welcomed.” On October 6, 1825, the Tennessee Senate
unanimously recommended Jackson to the people of the United States for president. The next

2

Parsons, Birth of Modern Politics, 104.
Andrew Jackson to William Berkeley Lewis, February 14, 1825, in Howard D. Moser, J. Clint Clift, and Wyatt C.
Wells, eds., The Papers of Andrew Jackson, vol. 6, 1825-1828 (Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press,
2002), 29-30; “Memorandum on the Bank of the United States,” November 1829, in Daniel Feller, Harold D. Moser,
Laura-Eve Moss, and Thomas Coens, eds., The Papers of Andrew Jackson, vol. 7, 1829 (Knoxville: The University
of Tennessee Press, 2007), 591.
3

200

day the Tennessee House adopted the same resolution with one dissenting vote. On October 14,
Jackson himself appeared before the General Assembly, made a short speech, and submitted his
resignation as United States Senator. In his resignation letter he also outlined, as he believed,
necessary reforms to the federal government. He proposed barring any member of Congress
from appointment to office in the federal government during the term for which he was elected,
or for two years thereafter, except in cases of judicial office. In this way the separation of
powers between the branches of government, and the checks and balances accruing therefrom,
would be bolstered. Congress would be freed from connection with the Executive Department.
Jackson said that “members, instead of being liable to be withdrawn from legislating on the great
interest of the nation, through prospects of executive patronage, would be more liberally
confided in by their constituents, while their vigilance would be less interrupted by party
excitement.” The present system, Jackson warned, would undermine the people’s sovereignty
and enlarge corruption’s scope. He did not specifically mention Henry Clay. He did not need
to.4
The nearly unanimous resolution of the General Assembly to recommend Jackson for the
presidency demonstrates his immense popularity. Jackson men might differ with him on
policy—this same session of the assembly protected Yeatman, Woods and Company in the
matter of the private bank bills, and many would vote for the Nashville branch of the Bank of the
United States in 1826—but almost no one dared oppose Jackson himself. Governor Carroll, for
example, was not a through-and-through Jackson man, as his efforts with the Clay-Erwin faction
on behalf of Yeatman, Woods and Company demonstrated. But for the moment any enmity
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between Jackson and Carroll remained buried. Carroll could not politically afford to break with
Jackson. Jackson did not want to alienate the most popular man in Tennessee besides himself.
Carroll, ineligible for reelection to the governorship in 1827, sought to replace John H. Eaton in
the Senate. He wrote an open letter assuring the public of his intention to do everything in his
power as senator to get Jackson elected to the presidency. The General Assembly reelected
Eaton, leaving Carroll to join Hugh Lawson White, John Overton, George W. Campbell, and
William B. Lewis in advancing Jackson’s campaign. White was elected to replace Jackson as
United States Senator and serve out the remaining four years of the term. He was at this time
one of Jackson’s staunchest and most skillful allies.5
Jackson’s influence swayed Tennessee’s gubernatorial race of 1827. Candidates Sam
Houston and Newton Cannon sought to replace Carroll as governor. Both men had served under
Jackson during the Creek War. Though never directly addressed, voters understood Houston as
Jackson’s preference. Houston, born in Virginia in 1793, had moved with his widowed mother
and eight siblings to a farm in Blount County around 1807. He enlisted in the army in 1813 and
developed a friendship with Jackson based on mutual respect of martial courage. He resigned his
commission in 1818, read and practiced law, and served as state attorney general for the
Nashville district. When Carroll resigned his command of the 2nd Division of the Tennessee
Militia to serve as governor, Houston was voted major general to replace him. In 1823 and 1825
he served in the United States Congress as a representative from the Nashville district. He
remained an ally of Jackson in Congress and a foe of the Adams-Clay faction of the Republican
Party.6
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Newton Cannon, born in North Carolina in 1781, had moved to the Cumberland region in
1790. He learned the saddler’s trade, then established himself as a merchant and wealthy planter
of Williamson County by 1811. In this year he was elected to the state senate. In 1813 he
volunteered as a commander of a company of riflemen. He later became a colonel of a regiment
in General John Coffee’s brigade. The rift with Jackson began when Cannon and his men
returned home after contending that they had fulfilled their three-month enlistment, a contention
that infuriated Jackson. Cannon’s later career in politics further alienated him from Jackson.
Cannon began a long tenure in the United States Congress in 1814 and secured reelection
through 1823.7
Houston won the election. He won 44,426 votes to Cannon’s total of 33,410. Middle
and West Tennessee divided, but East Tennessee voted decidedly for Houston. Houston’s first
message to the General Assembly revealed a developmental attitude among Jacksonians. They
appreciated the progress that had been made since the pioneer days. Houston praised
Tennessee’s improvement in developing surplus products for market and the “artificial facilities”
that facilitated such trade. Constitutional scruples might exist concerning the prerogative of the
national government to undertake internal improvements within the states, but the states
themselves had no such restriction. Houston said on this subject that “all agree that it is a matter
legitimately, if not exclusively within the scope of separate state jurisdiction, and all are equally
agreed, that great and valuable improvements could be made within our State, at a comparatively
moderate expenditure of the public funds.” Houston celebrated the wealth of the middle and
western counties, whose prosperity derived from the natural advantage of the Cumberland River
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and the unobstructed streams that formed the watershed of the Mississippi River. He argued that
East Tennessee could attain a similar level of wealth if the state could improve the navigation of
the Tennessee River and build canals to grant access to Mobile, Alabama.8
This vision of economic progress aligned with Jackson’s. Jackson never denigrated
manufactures, internal improvements, or commerce. He rejoiced at the growth of American
manufacturing, especially as it related to armaments, writing “the means of waging successfully
our defence, will be found to exist amonghst ourselves.” Domestic manufactures also accounted,
Jackson believed, for the strong demand for cotton and other agricultural staples. Internal
improvements, he said, “should be made by the states respectively, and so soon as our national
debt is paid the surplus revenue apportioned amonghst the states for internal improvement and
educating the poor.” As to commerce, Jackson received credit through his factors in New
Orleans, consigned his cotton to them, and received remittances in bills of exchange, specie, and
even notes of the Bank of the United States. Deducted from these remittances were charges for
groceries and other amenities that were brought to Nashville via the technological marvel of the
early nineteenth century, the steamboat. Jackson was enmeshed in networks of paper currency,
market prices, and foreign trade. He utilized the fruits of economic progress. His concern was
that a monied aristocracy would pervert proper political economy. The agricultural interest of
the country, he believed, should be preeminent, and it would be if government refrained from
creating artificial privileges that benefitted the few. He said that “it is principally as
manufactures and commerce tend to increase the value of agricultural productions and to extend
their application to the wants and comforts of society that they deserve the fostering care of
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Government.” Defining the legitimate sphere of government in this manner would create a more
equitable, though not equal, society. Freeholding farmers would produce for their own
consumption and decide for themselves the extent to which they desired to market surplus
produce. Jackson himself acted in this manner. His personal agricultural interest had been
augmented from growth in commerce and manufactures.9
To Jackson, American political economy had been inverted. Executive patronage and
special privileges had artificially concentrated wealth for the benefit of a few capitalists. All
these benefits could be abused for dangerous purposes. To Jackson the “Corrupt Bargain” had
laid bare President Adams’s intent to transform Henry Clay’s American System into a
nationwide effort to bribe the citizenry. Clay, wrote a Jackson supporter, “wishes to form a
party, and for purposes purely selfish, converts, the whole system of Internal Improvement and
the Tariff into a political engine, of management, intrigue and corruption.” Jackson himself
referred to the Clay supporters in Tennessee, which mainly consisted of the Erwin faction, as a
“Junto of calumniators.” Clay’s toadies in Tennessee, as Jackson saw them, would infect state
politics with executive influence. Even the smallest presidential appointments caused outrage
among Jacksonians, as when Adams appointed John Patton Erwin, son of Andrew Erwin, as
Nashville’s postmaster. Any kind of executive action, as it seemed to Jackson and his
supporters, aimed to corrupt the nation through political patronage. “Then,” Jackson said, “the
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people may prepare themselves to become ‘hewers of wood, and drawers of water,’ to those in
power, who with the Treasury at command, will wield by its corrupting influence a majority to
support it.” A monied aristocracy, artificially supported by governmental force, would control
citizens and thus elections. Hugh Lawson White wrote Jackson that his run for the presidency
was “a fearful and unequal contest” in which the virtuous people confronted executive patronage
and the votes it supposedly controlled. Failure to win, according to White, meant rule “under
nominally a Rep[ub]lican government: but practically a monarchy of the worst stamp.”10
Jackson proposed strict construction of the Constitution and retrenchment of public
expenditure to end the administration’s corrupting influence. He believed that internal
improvements undertaken by the federal government should be circumscribed to projects directly
related to the common defense—the building of roads, for example, to facilitate troop
movements. Even other kinds of improvements that were truly national in character could be
undertaken only with the approval of the affected states. Reduction in government expenditures
for internal improvements would enable extinguishment of the public debt. Extinguishing the
public debt in turn would encourage Congress to appropriate money through special acts only,
rather than Congressmen adding riders to bills for the sole benefit of their constituents. Every
government officer would be required to give account of the funds entrusted to him.11
Jackson came to see the Bank of the United States, and its president Nicholas Biddle, as
part of the corrupt Adams-Clay political machine. He had never liked the national bank and had
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always opposed its establishment in Tennessee. Now the stakes were higher. Supporters
reported to Jackson on the Bank’s activities. John Fowler from Kentucky, for example, claimed
that Clay had lost the support of most of the populace “except the Aristocrasy about this place
and the dependencies on the United States Branch Banks, as far as their influence prevails they
will sustain him.” Jackson himself remained publicly silent about the institution during the
campaign. At one point a Bank official asked Jackson to recommend suitable individuals in
Nashville to serve as directors for the city’s branch bank. Jackson remained noncommittal,
writing that “never having been, in any manner, connected with Banks, and having very little to
do with the one here, I feel myself unable to give you any satisfaction about it.” Jackson’s
reticence masked a distrust of the Bank as presently chartered and operated. But he felt the time
was not yet right to confront the institution.12
In any case substantive policy issues played a small part in the election of 1828. Political
vitriol is not a contemporary phenomenon. The partisans of Adams, generally calling themselves
National Republicans, portrayed Jackson as an uncouth backwoodsman, so irascible and
impetuous that he could not be trusted with presidential power. They cited his many duels of
honor as a Tennessee frontiersman and his authorizations as general of eleven military
executions during the War of 1812. They also dredged a story (likely true) that Jackson and his
wife Rachel had lived in adultery soon after Jackson had moved to Tennessee. Jackson had
boarded with Rachel’s family beginning in 1789 near Nashville. Rachel at the time was
estranged yet still legally married to her first husband Lewis Robards. Andrew and Rachel
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developed a relationship and eloped to Natchez in December 1789, returning the following
summer to Nashville. Robards petitioned for a divorce in the fall of 1790.13
Jackson’s followers, generally calling themselves the Democratic Republicans, parried
these accusations, all the while attacking Adams in kind. William B. Lewis formed a committee
in Nashville composed of himself, John Overton, George W. Campbell, John Catron, Josiah
Nichol, John McNairy, and other prominent residents to defend Jackson in the papers against the
charges of adultery and gratuitous military executions. The committee ably defended Jackson,
but such was Jackson’s popularity that their efforts may have been unnecessary. Jackson
fashioned an image of himself as a self-made man and a virtuous leader, and there was much
truth in this image. His military heroism was unquestioned. The Jackson papers recalled the
Battle of New Orleans to great effect. A typical ode to Jackson’s generalship read, “Jackson
coolly and deliberately put to death upward of fifteen hundred British troops on the 8th of
January, 1815, on the plains below New Orleans, for no other offense than that they wished to
sup in the city that night.” Attacks on Adams harped on his “Corrupt Bargain,” his Federalism,
his haughtiness, and his extravagance, including defiling the White House with a billiard table.14
Following the election, the magnitude of Jackson’s victory, and that of his supporters,
became apparent. Jackson won 178 electoral votes to Adams’s 83. His 56 percent of the popular
vote was not exceeded by any presidential candidate until the 20th century. His followers won
both houses of Congress. In Tennessee Jackson won over Adams by 44,193 to 2,240. Jackson’s
support for Tennessee Congressional candidates proved crucial, especially to Felix Grundy’s
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victory in the race for the Seventh District for the United States House of Representatives, as
well as James K. Polk’s victory for the Sixth District. Both men would be important allies
during the Bank War. Even a scandal involving Governor Houston redounded to Jackson’s
benefit. Houston resigned the governorship on April 16, 1829. The immediate cause of his
resignation was a divorce from his wife of less than three months, Eliza Allen, but the
circumstances surrounding this event have remained mysterious. In accordance with the state
constitution, William Hall of Sumner County, as speaker of the state Senate, succeeded to the
governorship. Hall served out the remaining five months of Houston’s term, ensuring the
continuance of the daily operations of Tennessee’s executive branch, but lacking time or
electoral clout to accomplish much else. William Carroll was reelected in the gubernatorial race
of 1829, assuring Jackson had an ally, albeit a fickle one, as governor in his home state.15
Tragedy followed triumph. On December 23, 1828, Rachel Jackson died from a heart
attack. Jackson never entirely recovered from the shock. Unlike his wife, Jackson was not
particularly devout concerning religion, but his wife’s death compelled him to reconsider the
Scriptures and Christian hope. Privately subdued as he was, Jackson became even more resolved
to cleanse the federal government of its corruption. He blamed her death on his political
enemies, and he felt guilt that the attacks she had suffered had been for his sake. As president he
overcame his grief by constructing a sense of purpose in saving republican government. As he
wrote John Donelson, “it was necessary to perpetuate the blessings of liberty to our country, and
to put down misrule.” And to John Overton: “why sacrafice myself thus when I have no hope of
pleasure here—the only consoling reply; my country has required it, and it is a duty I owe that
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country to yield to its wishes.” In the election of 1828, he believed, his voters had acted against
this influence, an influence calculated to corrupt the elective franchise and mold public sentiment
through bribery. Retrenchment of departmental functions would elevate the character of
government and assure a more virtuous and independent citizenry.16
Jackson increasingly believed that republican reform should include reform of the Bank
of the United States. He entered office intending to modify or replace the Bank, not destroy it.
Jackson up to this point had refused to conduct much business with banks and had opposed many
of the paper money schemes of the Tennessee legislature in earlier years. His near-bankruptcy
with a land speculator and business partner named David Allison in 1796 had convinced Jackson
of the danger of banks and paper. His fundamental objection, however, was that the Bank was
unconstitutional. Several elements of the Bank’s charter, Jackson believed, made it so. The
Bank’s corporate status meant that its directors operated for the private aggrandizement of its
stockholders rather than for the public interest. The Bank, as the depository for public funds,
enabled a few individuals to use the public revenue for private profit. Congress and the courts
had granted the Bank exclusive privileges—no other national bank could be chartered during its
existence, the states could not tax the Bank’s branches, and the states could not tax citizens’
Bank stock. The Bank had monopolized real estate through foreclosures and concentrated power
over the currency and the body politic. Such power, Jackson believed, would allow the Bank to
transform independent citizen-voters into dependent Bank clients, thereby creating a political
machine and assuring the rule of a monied aristocracy.
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Yet Jackson privately acknowledged the utility of certain functions of the Bank of the
United States, and he believed some kind of fiscal agency could be created to provide the
benefits of the current banking system without its constitutional, economic, and social
detriments. Among the advantages he considered were the transfer of governmental funds
between commercial towns, the creation of a uniform currency, and the extension of loans during
wartime.17
Unfortunately for Jackson, no widespread hostility existed against the Bank of the United
States. Despite missteps early in its history, the Bank was generally beneficial to the nation’s
economic activity by the time Jackson became president. Even in Tennessee, the Bank had
somewhat mollified the prejudice against it. The origins of Jackson’s war, then, were political,
not economic, and had more to do with Jackson himself than popular discontent. Not wishing to
disrupt the nation’s robust commercial activity, Jackson moved cautiously against the Bank.
During the first two years of his presidency Jackson vacillated as to what type of institution
should replace the Bank. Largely absent in discussions with his advisers was the option of
divorcing bank and state and founding the government on the metallic currencies of gold and
silver (hard money). Hard money as a program came later, as Jackson grew increasingly
frustrated with the intransigence of the Bank’s president, Nicholas Biddle. Jackson never
intended to curb commerce or destroy credit, even after hard money became Jacksonian
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orthodoxy, for Jackson’s own livelihood in the cotton economy depended on both. He sought
only to ensure that private interests would never influence public governance.18
Jacksonian arguments against the Bank had substance, although they were wrong in
many particulars. Jackson and his supporters, for example, objected that the Bank earned
interest on its business, ostensibly removing wealth that belonged to the citizens, and foreign
nationals earning interest via their Bank stock. Also objectionable to the Jacksonians was that
private individuals, both domestic and foreign, augmented their wealth from the public revenue.
These practices, however, benefitted all parties. Borrowers in the several states, including those
in Tennessee, gained capital from Bank and foreign loans, and the lenders received legitimate
returns on their investments. Other objections held more power. Jacksonians believed that no
corporation should be attached to the government and granted exclusive privileges, especially
one entrusted with the nation’s currency and public revenue. Such power could indeed cause the
ruin of many through debt. The Bank’s early history proved that it could feed unwholesome
speculation and hinder the real commercial needs of the country. Whether the Bank acted
beneficially or detrimentally depended on the skill and probity of its administrators. Jacksonians
believed that, whatever temporary good the Bank created, it would eventually devolve into an
oppressive institution. Certain fears were misplaced, but Jacksonian distrust of the Bank was not
irrational.19
Jackson vacillated in determining the best solution to the banking question. The
proposals considered during the first two years of his administration belie his reputation as a
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champion of metallic currency. His first idea involved the substitution of a “National Bank” for
the Bank of the United States. He believed that this alternative was the only way to prevent
recharter of the present Bank. He spoke of the Bank’s influence being “curbed,” but not
destroyed. From these general premises he asked Felix Grundy to formulate particulars. Grundy
responded with a proposal that outlined a bank similar to the new Bank of the State of
Tennessee, the creation of which he had overseen and the destruction of which Jackson had
sought. Grundy seems also to have been influenced by Tennessee’s political conflict between
the “state unifiers” and the “state concentrators.” The capital of Grundy’s bank would be $40
million. The revenue basis would be that of the United States. Half of the capital would go to
the states, proportional to their representation in Congress, and each state would receive a
branch. The profits arising from this portion of the capital could be applied to internal
improvements as directed by Congress and with the state’s consent. In this way the state would
realize the profits of its own branch, thus retaining its sovereignty and ownership of the
improvements. The other half of the capital would be distributed in the large commercial cities
to aid the nation’s exchange and supply its revenue. The parent bank would be located in
Philadelphia, and the directors would be elected by Congress. The selection of the branch
directors presented difficulties. To place the selection in the hands of the parent directors would
be to grant them too much power. Selection by Congress would make the process
unaccountable. Nor could the state legislatures make the selection because in times of crisis
disaffected states might withhold government funds. Grundy finally suggested selection of the
branch directors by the state delegation in Congress.20
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Jackson and his advisers considered Grundy’s entire proposal inexpedient, but elements
of his plan were incorporated into other proposals. Amos Kendall, a pro-Jackson journalist
whose loyalty Jackson had rewarded with an appointment in the Treasury Department, had held
animosity against the Bank of the United States since his days as an editor-in-chief for the
Kentucky newspaper Argus of Western America. Kendall also recommended a national bank
based upon the revenue of the United States and attached to the Treasury. The principal bank
would be located in Philadelphia and oversee branches in every state. The principal bank’s
directors would be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. Branch
directors would be chosen by state legislatures. The bank would deal in exchange, discount
notes, and distribute the public funds to other states and foreign entities. Kendall suggested that
during wartime the bank’s notes could represent the public debt by making them bear a moderate
interest and thus make them an attractive investment to citizens and foreigners.21
Such proposals made the so-called “Hydra of Corruption” look like a common garden
snake. The opportunities for patronage and executive influence exceeded that of the Bank of the
United States, given that the proposed banks would be managed by salaried officers appointed by
the government. Treasury Secretary Samuel Ingham wrote Jackson as much. He objected to a
bank founded solely on government capital with the power to issue notes, for there would be no
private stake on the part of the directors to limit loans. The only safe option for a public bank, he
believed, was a bank of deposit. Ingham seems to have had in mind banking as it was first
practiced in early modern Europe, in which banks accepted deposits from customers, charging a
small fee for safekeeping their funds. Depositors drew on each other by checks, thereby settling
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debts by book credit; such transactions often involved the payment of bills of exchange. Deposit
banks, therefore, aided commerce. Because deposit banks made no loans on deposits, they
maintained a 100% reserve ratio, meaning that all obligations of the bank could be met by specie
in its vaults. All these traits of deposit banking appealed to Jackson—deposit banks were not
incorporated, they were run by public officers, and they supported the marketing of surplus
products without resorting to note issues.22
Jackson’s initial dealings with Nicholas Biddle, president of the Bank of the United
States, confirmed his belief that reform was necessary. Biddle could not have been more
different from Jackson. He was a man of some privilege, but he made the most of the
opportunities given him—born in Philadelphia to a family of some social standing, he graduated
from the College of New Jersey (later Princeton University) at the age of 15, practiced law,
served in the Pennsylvania state legislature, edited the journals of Lewis and Clark, and became a
defender both of the first and second Banks of the United States. His defense of national
banking earned him an appointment by President James Monroe as government director for the
second Bank of the United States in 1819, and the Bank’s board of directors elected him
president in 1822. In this capacity he saved the Bank, making it profitable to the stockholders
and useful to the nation’s business. The Bank’s public reputation was so high by 1828 that
Biddle’s associates recommended an early application for recharter. There was some concern
among the Bank’s friends that Jackson’s administration would be hostile to it. Biddle saw no
danger. He had voted for Jackson and refused to believe that any administration “would venture
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to set the monied concerns of the country afloat as they once were.” His optimism betrayed a
naivety that did not serve him well when dealing with Jackson. Biddle expected that the Bank’s
performance would speak for itself. Consequently, when answering Jackson’s challenges
concerning the Bank’s conduct, Biddle lacked tact.23
Two episodes in 1829 demonstrated Biddle’s frankness and, thus, his political ineptitude.
The first, emerging in January 1829, involved accusations that the Louisville and Lexington
branches of the Bank had extended discounts to Adams supporters but not Jackson supporters.
Senator Richard M. Johnson of Kentucky wrote John McLean, the postmaster general under
John Quincy Adams but a Jackson supporter, and requested that he speak to Biddle regarding the
charges. Johnson included names to consider for appointment as branch directors. McLean
submitted the request and the names to Biddle. “Being friendly to the Bank myself,” he wrote, “I
should regret to see a political crusade got up against it. Some, I know are ready to engage in
this course.” Biddle’s response was too truthful. He first wrote the local branch directors in
question and instructed them to conduct an investigation and make recommendations on the
names given by Johnson. Biddle impressed on them to keep politics out of the Bank’s affairs,
but he refused to believe such conduct had occurred. To McLean Biddle wrote that “I have
never heard of any suspicion even, that any officer of the Bank has intermeddled with politics.”
He pointed out that political biases occurred naturally at the branches—Jackson men, for
example, ran the branch at Nashville, while Adams men ran the branch at Boston. Yet he
For Biddle’s early years see Govan, Nicholas Biddle, 1-77. For the Bank’s popularity see George Hoffman to
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admitted in a separate letter to McLean, marked “confidential” and written the previous day, that
before he became the Bank’s president, the branches in Kentucky had experienced losses
“incurred by loans to prominent politicians of all sides whose influence procured them undue
facilities.” No safeguards besides the integrity of the Bank’s managers prevented abuse. Biddle,
however, could not see how dangerous this appeared to the Jacksonians. He accepted without
question the report of the Louisville and Lexington branches, whose directors reported no
misconduct and rejected the names submitted by Johnson. Biddle had no reason to doubt the
report, for Jackson men served as directors for both branches, but he failed to perceive the
forthcoming political dangers.24
The second episode involved Jackson personally. On July 17, 1829, Isaac Hill, second
Comptroller of the Currency and former editor of the leading Jackson newspaper in New
Hampshire, sent two petitions to the Philadelphia office of the Bank of the United States, one
signed by 58 citizens of Portsmouth, New Hampshire, and the other signed by 56 members of
New Hampshire’s legislature. Both petitions accused Jeremiah Mason, the president of the
branch bank at Portsmouth, of partisan management. About this time Senator Levi Woodbury of
New Hampshire complained of Mason’s conduct to Secretary Ingham. Ingham forwarded the
letter to Biddle, noting that similar complaints of partisan management had been received from
Kentucky and Louisiana. Biddle’s response suggested that the complaints stemmed from
Mason’s efforts to end overly generous discount renewals. In a sweeping assertion of the Bank’s
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integrity he wrote, “I believe that there are not in the whole country, any other five hundred
persons of equal intelligence so abstracted from public affairs, as the five hundred [national and
state branch directors] who are employed in administering the bank; and I am satisfied that no
loan was ever granted to, or withheld from any individual, on account of political partiality or
hostility.” This choice of language raised the ire of Ingham, who reiterated his request for an
investigation and argued that Biddle’s claim of the Bank’s integrity “must be received rather as
evidence of your own feelings, than as conclusive proof of the fact so confidently vouched
for.”25
Biddle traveled to Portsmouth to commence an investigation. In the meantime the
Bank’s directors prejudiced the administration against whatever the investigation found, with
Thomas Cadwalader, the Bank’s acting president, writing to Ingham that the directors would
leave it to Biddle to “determine whether it was necessary to prolong a correspondence, on a topic
not less new than ungracious.” Biddle’s exoneration of Mason, of course, was met with
skepticism by Ingham and Jackson. It should be said that, besides the accusations themselves,
there is no evidence Mason acted improperly or that Biddle managed a cover-up. Biddle
genuinely desired that the Bank abjure political favoritism or party factionalism. Indeed, Biddle
had finally begun to suspect that the attacks against the Portsmouth branch were politically
motivated by Jacksonians in that town. Yet he proved too much when, at the conclusion of his
investigation, he wrote Ingham on September 15 stating that the Bank’s directors “acknowledge
not the slightest responsibility of any description whatsoever to the Secretary of the Treasury

25

Parton, Life of Andrew Jackson, 3: 260-262; Samuel Delucenna Ingham to Nicholas Biddle, July 11, 1829,
Nicholas Biddle to Samuel Delucenna Ingham, July 18, 1829, Samuel Delucenna Ingham to Nicholas Biddle, July
23, 1829, in United States Congress, House of Representatives, United States Congressional Serial Set 227,
Document No. 460, 22nd Congress, 1st Session (1832), pp. 438-439, 440-446, 446-448.

218

touching the political opinions and conduct of their officers—that being a subject on which they
never consult and never desire to know the views of any administration.” Jackson quoted this
sentence in a memorandum as he and Ingham discussed potential responses. Bank officers’
haughty responses to the administration incensed Jackson. He dismissed any defenses Biddle
made of the Bank in his September 15 letter. When, for example, Biddle made reference to the
Bank’s utility in commencing operations to extinguish the public debt, Jackson wrote in
shorthand, “why this so often mentioned—answer for political effect—and newspaper slang.”
Ingham’s official response to Biddle was measured. He accepted the results of the investigation
but affirmed the right of the executive to oversee the Bank.26
The matter appeared resolved. Biddle subsequently received from William B. Lewis
assurances that Jackson had no designs against the Bank. Lewis wrote that Jackson “requests me
to say, that he has too much confidence in you [Biddle] to believe, for a moment, that you should
knowingly tolerate [corruption] in the Branches of your Bank.” Later Lewis indicated that
Jackson might even credit the Bank regarding payment of the national debt. From Matthew L.
Bevan Biddle received even more encouraging news. Bevan claimed that Jackson said that the
Bank “was a blessing to the Country administered as it was, diffusing a healthfull circulation,
sustaining the general credit without partiallity or political bias.” Jackson, according to Bevan,
also praised the Bank’s utility in furnishing the government with funds. Biddle himself
conversed with Jackson, and Jackson expressed full confidence in Biddle’s conduct, though he
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added that “I do not dislike your Bank any more than all banks. But ever since I read the history
of the South Sea bubble I have been afraid of banks.” Jackson’s flattery of Biddle’s personal
conduct notwithstanding, Biddle possessed enough evidence to deduce Jackson’s prejudice, but
he never doubted Jackson would speak positively of the Bank during the upcoming First Annual
Message to Congress.27
Jackson did the opposite. In this he went against most of his Cabinet—even Amos
Kendall advised reticence—because his constitutional objections and his belief that the Bank
would create a political machine of dependent debtors compelled him to act. Two factors,
however, mitigated the severity with which he attacked the Bank in the Annual Message. First,
as Bevan indicated to Biddle, and as the administration’s own policy proposals up to this point
demonstrate, Jackson was not definitely opposed to a national currency or temporary borrowing
by the federal government. He opposed the present system in which the government used a
private bank to achieve these ends, but he vacillated between the establishment of a new national
bank or of a mere government depository. Second, Jackson realized the political prudence in his
advisers’ recommendations for caution, although he came to this realization with difficulty.
Initial Cabinet members’ drafts for the message and Jackson’s own notes all mentioned the
corporate structure of the Bank of the United States, which allowed private individuals to profit
from the public revenue, the exemption of the Bank from state taxation, the Bank’s exclusive
privileges, and its failure to maintain a uniform currency. In paring these objections Jackson’s
primary adviser was James A. Hamilton, a son of Alexander Hamilton but a Jacksonian in
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politics and a friend of the President. Hamilton arrived in Washington from New York City on
November 27, 1829, dining with Jackson that evening at the President’s House. The next day,
following breakfast, Jackson provided Hamilton with a room in which Hamilton, amid scraps
and drafts, edited all day and into the night, finally finishing at four o’clock in the morning. On
that part of the message relating to the Bank of the United States, Hamilton found that the
working draft attacked the Bank of the United States “in a loose, newspaper, slashing style.”
Taking little respite, Hamilton presented his draft to Jackson at eight o’clock. This version
questioned the constitutionality of the Bank and claimed that the Bank had failed to provide a
uniform and sound currency. Hearing this Jackson asked, “Do you think that is all I ought to
say?” Hamilton replied, “I think you ought to say nothing at present about the bank,” to which
Jackson rejoined, “Oh! My friend, I am pledged against the bank, but if you think that is enough,
let it be so.”28
It was enough. In the official First Annual Message to Congress Jackson mentioned the
fact that the Bank’s charter would expire in 1836 and stated his desire to place the question of
renewal before the public so that ample time could be had to decide the issue. Jackson refrained
from his most pointed objections to the Bank, but rather, following Hamilton’s laconic draft,
stated that “both the constitutionality and the expediency of the law creating this bank are well
questioned by a large portion of our fellow citizens, and it must be admitted by all that it has
failed in the great end of establishing a uniform and sound currency.” Jackson added a proposal
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that outlined a national bank founded on the credit of the government that would avoid
constitutional difficulties and secure the advantages supposed to be enjoyed under the present
Bank.29
Proper engagement of the federal government in economic progress continued to occupy
Jackson’s administration during the year 1830. Jackson aimed to eradicate corruption, writing
after his First Annual Message to James Alexander Hamilton that the Bank “was daily gaining
strength, and by its secrete operations was adding to it, by pushing its branches everywhere; and,
by its management, silencing opposition, by its corrupting influence, and preparing for a renewal
of its charter, which I viewed as the death blow to our liberty.” Yet Jackson still concerned
himself with meddling as little as possible with the nation’s commerce. His consistent aim is
evident in a private memorandum which became the basis for his Second Annual Message to
Congress, in which he wrote, “it becomes us to enquire, whether it be not possible to secure the
advantages afforded by the present Bank, through the agency of a Bank of the United States so
modified in its principles and structure as to obviate constitutional and other objections.”30
Absent in these proposals was a holistic hard money program. Senator Thomas Hart
Benton of Missouri, Jackson’s ablest supporter in the Senate, became the Congressional leader in
hard money policy. At first, however, he too proposed to Jackson a substitute for the Bank of the
United States. Benton sent Jackson a plan originally created by John Randolph, a Jeffersonian,
during the debate over recharter of the first Bank of the United States. Randolph’s plan involved
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making the custom houses branches of a national bank of deposit. Receipts of the customs
houses would provide substantial capital for a paper circulation. The government would have
flexibility to meet or, if necessary, finance its obligations, so that, said Randolph, “whensoever
Government might stand in need of a few millions, instead of borrowing their own money from a
knot of Brokers, or the credit of said Brokers, it might, under proper restrictions, issue its own
paper in anticipation of future revenues, or taxes to be laid.” The discounting of private paper
would be left to individuals and would have no connection to the public revenue or a sound
paper currency.31
Moses Dawson, Jacksonian editor of the Cincinnati Advertiser, also supported paper
currency. He agreed with Jackson that the present Bank was unconstitutional, and he supported
the creation of a new national bank. Lending and speculating in money, he believed, should be
left to private citizens. But a national bank could issue paper money to pay government officers
and fulfill government contracts and thus establish a currency that could act as a national
circulating medium. The paper could be used to pay for imports and public lands, thereby
negating any need to redeem it in specie. If branches were created, then drafts or treasury notes
could be issued to local merchants in exchange for specie.32
Jackson himself continued his efforts to craft a new national bank both constitutional and
useful to exchange. He remained committed to a bank owned and operated exclusively by the
government. On this point he disagreed with James Alexander Hamilton. Hamilton maintained
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that a national bank had to be a mixed public-private institution because a measure of private
investment would create an interest in proper management; an entirely public bank founded on
government capital and operated by salaried officers would produce strong enticements to
corruption. Jackson responded that the new bank “should belong to the nation exclusively, all its
emoluments to accrue to the nation, to the whole people, and not to a few monied capitalists.”
Otherwise Jackson believed that his new bank would perform several of the same functions as
the Bank of the United States. As he presented the plan in the Second Annual Message to
Congress, the new bank would be organized as a branch of the Treasury Department. Its capital
would be based on public and individual deposits. This unincorporated institution would have
no stockholders, no debtors, and no property. Its officers would manage the transfer of
government funds. Its expenses would be met by allowing its officers to sell bills of exchange to
private businessmen. During wartime the bank, with Congressional approval, could issue notes
to enlarge the nation’s financial capacity. Under normal conditions paper currency would be
supplied by the states through their own banks. The new national bank, though issuing no paper,
would check the issues of the state banks by taking their notes in deposit and for exchange as
long as such banks redeemed their obligations in specie. These were the beginnings of the Bank
War.33
That Jackson and his advisers felt compelled to devise alternatives to the Bank of the
United States, rather than destroy it outright, testifies to the Bank’s beneficial effects and its
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initial political strength. At the time of Jackson’s First Annual Message, no nationwide hostility
existed against the Bank. In Jackson’s home state, opposition was stronger, but the Bank’s
actual operations in Tennessee had assuaged some public sentiment. The National Banner and
Nashville Whig said that the President’s message regarding the Bank “was perhaps premature,
and unnecessary at present,” although the paper acknowledged that the Bank would inevitably
become a topic of controversy as the charter’s expiration drew closer, so that Jackson’s notice
was appropriate to bring the topic for early consideration. To Biddle may be attributed the rise in
the Bank’s reputation from its nadir during the Panic of 1819. Whatever his shortcomings as a
political operator, Biddle excelled as the Bank’s president. Before Biddle the Bank had hindered
commerce, especially in the South and West. The response of the Bank’s previous president,
Langdon Cheves, to the Panic of 1819 involved the prohibition of its southern and western
branches to issue notes. Dearth of a national currency in the interior meant that merchants in the
coastal cities charged high exchange rates to borrowers living in the interior. High exchange
charges reflected the dubious value of paper money circulating in the West, and it reflected the
risks incidental to agricultural activity, especially crop damages or shortages during the planting
season. Nashville merchants, for example, purchased Tennessee staples at low prices, exchanged
them for Philadelphia goods, and sold them high to Tennessee farmers and planters.
Immediately preceding the establishment of the Nashville branch of the Bank of the United
States Tennessee merchants still paid 9%-12% premium to draw northeastern bills.34
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Under Biddle’s leadership the Bank of the United States became a colossus. It did so by
expanding its operations into the southern and western interior of the country, which included the
cities of Mobile, Natchez, Nashville, Louisville, Lexington, St. Louis, Cincinnati, and Pittsburgh.
The Bank maximized the commercial potential of the Mississippi and Ohio Valleys, and New
Orleans became the entrepot where the goods from these regions were marketed and transported.
King Cotton, later believed by southerners to be an independent monarch, was in fact a tetrarch
appointed by King Finance. Biddle permitted the interior branches to issue notes, but with the
requirement that most of the notes be used to purchase bills of exchange, rather than using them
to discount personal security. The purchase of bills represented a safer loan for the Bank relative
to loans on personal security. The former loan represented a specific commercial transaction for
goods to be sold. If the drawer failed to pay, then the Bank could institute legal proceedings
against any and all endorsers to redeem the bill. The latter loan represented a credit secured only
by the borrower’s personal or real property. If the borrower defaulted, the Bank’s recovery of
the collateral was slow and costly. The purchase of bills had one more advantage. Such loans
were self-liquidating, in that the funds to meet the debts naturally emerged from the sale of the
goods which the bills of exchange represented. Biddle said that his innovations enabled the
Bank to operate “in those sections of the Union where there is less banking capital and where the
productions of the great staples of the country seem to require most assistance in bringing them
into the commercial market.” His policies ensured the Bank’s safety, increased its profitability,
and made its operations useful to American farmers, planters, merchants, and manufacturers.35
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Biddle also created branch drafts. The drafts were like cashiers’ checks. The
Philadelphia office prepared them in blank and distributed them to the branches as the local
directors drew them. Branch directors endorsed the notes payable to bearer and issued them
according to their business needs in denominations of $5, $10, or $20. The drafts circumvented
a provision in the Bank’s charter which required that all notes be signed by the president and
countersigned by the cashier of the Philadelphia office. Neither officer had the time or the
stamina to sign the amount of notes required for the nation’s economic activity. The drafts
succeeded in spreading the work of signing notes and meeting business demand for loans.
Branch drafts completed the process whereby the Bank established a uniform national currency.
The Bank’s interior business grew apace. In 1824 the Bank’s purchases of domestic bills of
exchange amounted to $2,540,000. By 1828 the amount was $8,140,000; in 1831, $27,000,000;
and in 1832, $40,900,000.36
Tennessee planters and merchants, especially those living in Nashville and Middle
Tennessee, benefitted from the expansion of the Bank of the United States into southwestern
agriculture. The Nashville branch of the Bank of the United States, commencing operations in
1827, performed much the same functions as Tennessee’s preceding state and private banks. The
difference was one of scale. Nashville became one of four cities, the others being New Orleans,
Lexington, and Louisville, that performed 80% of the Bank’s interior exchange dealings.
Tennessee’s chartered banks, even during the good times, could never match the national bank’s
network of correspondents, both foreign and domestic, that enforced collections and equalized
exchange rates. National bank branches existed in every region of the country and empowered
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the central office to craft uniform fiscal and monetary policy. The Nashville branch bank
experienced rapid growth and soon made itself into the central node of the cotton trade in Middle
Tennessee and North Alabama. Tennessee merchants shipped products to New Orleans and
drew bills of exchange founded on the sale of goods in that city. The Nashville branch then
either purchased the bills or took them for collection for remission to New Orleans. At this point
both the merchant and the planter either settled previous loans or received Bank notes in
payment.37
The Nashville branch also made purchases of northern and European manufactured goods
easier. Merchants, travelling to an eastern city like Philadelphia, carried Bank notes or drafts on
the Philadelphia office. Either type of paper was acceptable in any city. Eastern purchasers thus
collected Nashville branch paper, creating a balance of indebtedness against that branch. The
debt was settled when eastern purchasers exchanged their Nashville branch paper for drafts on
the New Orleans branch, or for bills of exchange on England or the northeastern cities held by
the New Orleans branch. Such bills arose from the shipment of goods from New Orleans to the
northeast, or from the drawing of domestic bills of exchange on the northern correspondents of
southern merchants to whom foreign bills of exchange had been sent. Instead of paying 9%-12%
premium on northeastern bills, now Tennessee merchants could obtain Bank of the United States
checks at a premium of 0.5%-1%. The national bank’s extent made the shipping of imports and
exports from the state less expensive. Biddle said that “no facilities of traveling and
transportation can so completely abridge the wide spaces which separate the parts of this
extensive country, as the removal of those great barriers which the want of easy commercial
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exchanges interpose to their prosperity.” The only interests not served by this change were the
speculators and brokers who had bought and sold eastern bills for inordinate profit.38
Ideally under Biddle’s system the Bank would concentrate on supplying the means for
national exchange, accepting customers who had exchange to buy or sell. Local and state banks
would provide discounts to borrowers who needed funds but who had no produce to sell.
Tennessee had no such banks. The state-chartered Nashville Bank was defunct, and the old state
bank had closed on the retirement of Hugh Lawson White. Yeatman, Woods and Company
operated with integrity and skill, but because of its private status its owners were liable to the full
amount of the bank’s debts. To make discounts available on a large scale was too risky. That
left the new state bank. Its example was not encouraging. One commentator described
Tennessee’s state banks as “mischievous, grievious, odius, immoral, radically vicious,
injudicious, wreckless, all-devouring, anti-Republican, fraudulent, usurious, oppressive,
monopolizing, and last but not least crazy.” His description was not hyperbole. Debtors paid
from 12%-25% on borrowed money. Borrowers found it difficult to repay the money and had
resorted to renewing their notes rather than redeeming them. The state’s profit margin
approximated 3%. Many of the new state bank’s agents had used the public money for private
gain. These factors induced Governor Carroll to call for the bank to be investigated and closed
in his legislative message of October 5, 1829, at the commencement of the session of the General
Assembly. Senator Adam Huntsman, chairman of the Committee on Banking, followed
Carroll’s recommendation. He proposed, and the General Assembly agreed, that a joint
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committee be empowered to inquire into the situation of the Bank of the State of Tennessee.
Committee members uncovered fraud, the most egregious miscreant being the bank’s cashier,
Joel Parrish. He had embezzled about $200,000, and had allowed friends to overdraw their
accounts or draw upon no accounts at all. Nashville’s community learned of this affair on
January 2, 1830. Parrish fled with the bank’s books the next day. State officials, acting under
the joint committee’s authority, arrested Parrish only after he had hidden the books.39
Pecuniary corruption had come to Tennessee by means of a bank founded on government
capital, managed by salaried agents, and operated, ostensibly, for the public interest rather than
private gain. A more apropos example of Secretary Ingham’s warning to Jackson, that a
government bank with the power to lend was unsafe, can scarcely be imagined. By January 14,
1830, the day the committee presented their report to the General Assembly, the committee
members had obtained the books and placed them in possession of the state. Parrish admitted
under interrogation that he had allowed friends to overdraw on each account to an amount
between $70,000 and $80,000. He relinquished the books only after receiving a promise that he
would not be prosecuted. Several other cashiers had defaulted. Another three years passed
before the legislature settled the accounts and closed the bank.40
The Nashville branch of the Bank of the United States supplied what Tennessee’s state
banks could not. Its directors did so by allowing borrowers to draw on New Orleans. The
borrower was charged for interest and exchange by the Nashville branch at 1.5% premium plus
the regular 6% interest rate and for a fee by the New Orleans branch to accept the draft at 1.5%.
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When the bill matured, usually between 2 to 6 months, the New Orleans branch returned the
draft to Nashville for collection, or the borrower bought a bill in Nashville and sent it to New
Orleans as payment. This was an expensive lending method, and it caused some discontent with
the Bank in Tennessee. Alfred Balch, a neighbor of Jackson’s, wrote the President to describe
this system and said that “so that the object of this immense institution is to make money—to
secure a large dividend for the benefit of the great stockholders on the other side of the Atlantic.”
Yet the branch’s loans were not so expensive as to discourage their use. Balch himself talked of
the borrowers buying expensive houses and clothing their children in the latest fashions. He
feared for the Bank’s customers, writing, “what may remain of the wrecks produced by these
splendid follies, will after a few years be seized on by this Mammoth Bank.” Balch, like
Jackson, believed that the Bank’s only end was corruption, whatever temporary benefits it
produced. Yet he did not consider his own house or Jackson’s Hermitage as extravagant
displays, nor did he consider the credit that he and Jackson used to ship and market their own
cotton impure.41
Growth in the Bank’s financial operations indirectly encouraged personal enterprise and
consumption. A private debt market of accommodation endorsements expanded opportunities in
the growing cotton market. Accommodation endorsements allowed borrowers to enter markets
or purchase amenities that would otherwise be closed to them. These borrowers did not have the
credit by themselves to gain loans from lenders. In such cases a borrower would make a
promissory note made payable to an endorser. The endorser signed the note, thus lending their
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credit, but not their financial capital. Sometimes endorsers would take mortgages on the
borrower’s slaves or other property in consideration. The borrower would then negotiate the
note to a lender. Accommodation endorsers expected remuneration for collateralizing these
loans. Some guaranteed credit in exchange for consignments of crops from small growers.
Others received a percentage of the loan’s proceeds. Borrowers, however, did not use
accommodation endorsements only for farming. Indeed they used endorsements to leave the
farm. Small borrowers bundled their loans, getting endorsers A, B, C, and so forth to endorse for
small amounts separately. Borrowers could then obtain a loan, buy property, pay down what was
borrowed, and obtain a large credit from which they could finance the buying and selling of
goods to the agricultural community. Retail and wholesale store accounts proliferated as
merchants established their own stores or created an account with an existing store from which to
sell produce and buy finished goods for their agricultural clients. Accommodation loans
incensed Judge John Catron, one of the justices on Tennessee’s Supreme Court of Errors and
Appeals. He asked farmers and mechanics, “are you not ridden down by unprincipled
adventurers, in cloth and ruffles, who but the other day, through sheer worthlessness, deserted
the plough … now turned merchants, or mock gentlemen in some form, upon the credit of those,
from whose sides they so lately deserted[?]” Catron proposed outlawing transactions in which
one was bound for the debt of another by endorsement. That plan, however, would have
enervated much of the purchasing power in Nashville, leaving farmers and mechanics to sell to
the few of those wealthy enough to purchase their produce and labor outright. It is doubtful that
Catron wanted his proposal to become law. His main purpose was to attack the Bank of the
United States. He wrote that “the present system of securityship and credit, is heaping into
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masses in the bank” and that cutting off security transactions would “drive those your worst foes
from their monied sanctuaries—credit will then be at an end—they must work as you do, or
starve.” Given that Catron served as a director of the new state bank, some of his opponents
wondered how he would discriminate between loans made on security by his bank and loans
similarly made by the national bank. The cultivators of the soil and the laboring people of
Tennessee, to which Catron made his appeal, perhaps wondered the same.42
The Nashville branch provided useful services to the city’s commercial sector. Jackson’s
casting of the Bank as a hydra, consuming the citizens’ substance and destroying their liberty,
bore no resemblance to how the residents of Nashville experienced day-to-day Bank business.
Tennessee’s agricultural economy depended on the harvest to meet its Bank engagements.
Farming’s hardships and uncertainties, however, could make it difficult to meet debt obligations
taken during the year. In such cases the Bank acted with prudential liberality. On October 25,
1831, for example, an early frost around Nashville had damaged the cotton crop. The sales of
the crop in New Orleans, consequently, were insufficient to cover the bills of exchange that had
been drawn and sold earlier in the year. New Orleans factors drew on their borrowers in
Tennessee for the difference between the proceeds of the crop and the loans advanced earlier in
the year to finance the season’s planting. Rather than return the bills of exchange to New
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Orleans as uncollectable, the Nashville branch directors accommodated borrowers, allowing
them to borrow for the upcoming growing season.43
Extending credit in this way required creative financing. The simplest way to meet the
drafts of the New Orleans merchants would have been for the Nashville branch to pay them in
cash, but, as Josiah Nichol wrote Biddle, “that article is not to be had.” Nichol thus allowed
Tennessee merchants and planters to draw drafts on New Orleans. The branch discounted bills
of exchange payable in six months, when a new crop of cotton and tobacco would finally allow
the liquidation of all the debts. Biddle allowed these indulgences within limits. The branch’s
cashier John Sommerville explained that “the unexampled scarcity of money in both Alabama
and this State, and our refraining from doing business wherein money is to be advanced on either
note or bill, has compelled us to discount safe bills at six months advance, to enable debtors to
the Orleans and other offices to meet the paper deposited with us for collection.” Biddle allowed
these indulgences for a time but worried that too great an extension of these loans would
endanger the Bank. He instructed Nichol to shorten advances on bills of exchange to four
months and reduce discounts on personal notes. These measures ultimately worked. The Bank
and its customers remained unharmed. The Bank recovered its loans and was compensated for
its services by its fees for exchange.44
The Bank’s main failure in the West, if it can be so described, was its inability to meet
the demand for money. Complaints of scarce money appeared in Tennessee newspapers and in
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the petitions sent to the Tennessee General Assembly throughout the early 19th century. Even
when the Nashville branch had increased its circulation to $1,609,000 by April 1832, a note
circulation greater than any office except those in Philadelphia and New Orleans, Sommerville
claimed that “no portion of the Union contains a more suffering population, for lack of
circulating medium, than does the portion of which this office is the focus.” The demand for a
circulating medium was in reality a demand for capital. It was a demand by farmers, planters,
and small entrepreneurs for permanent investment in their ventures to assist in developing
uncultivated land and primitive towns. Senator Thomas Ewing of Ohio described the plight of
the West as a whole in this manner: “In these sections of our country, capital—accumulated
capital—does not, and, in the very nature of things, cannot, exist; and there, of all places else, is
there need of capital to sustain the enterprise and aid the industry of the people.” The Bank
provided what it could, but the demand was too great to be entirely met by its resources.45
Despite the Bank’s beneficial effects on Tennessee’s commerce, it remained more
controversial in Tennessee than in any other state. Several reasons account for this fact,
including the ever-present state banking interests, but Jackson’s influence was significant. His
popularity among Tennesseans gave him legitimacy for any actions he took. He could tap into
latent hostility to the Bank given Tennessee’s troubled banking history. Many Tennessee
politicians in Congress and in the General Assembly might have supported the Bank’s recharter
if they had not feared the repercussions of opposing Jackson. Yet opposition to the Bank was
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strongest in those parts of the state which had no direct business with it. Pleasant M. Miller of
Knox County, for example, called the Bank “this scarlet whore! this beast that is fattening on the
vitals of the laboring class of men!” This opposition existed through much of East Tennessee
and West Tennessee. Only Middle Tennessee representatives, whose region benefitted directly
from the Bank’s operations in cotton agriculture, dared vote in favor of recharter. Opponents of
the Bank, however, agreed only that something had to be done. Some Jackson supporters wanted
the Bank to be modified or replaced. Others wanted to rid the state of the Bank entirely and
make way once again for a state banking system. None spoke against economic improvement.
Many critics attacked the Bank on this point, arguing that it limited the state’s ability to
undertake internal improvement projects.46
Attacks and defenses of the Bank began appearing in the Nashville papers during the
summer of 1829. They continued through 1830 after Jackson’s First Annual Message to
Congress. The editorials dealt not only with the Bank itself, but with the proper policies
necessary for economic improvement. Catron again was prominent, using the Fourth of July to
remind readers of the dangers that the Bank posed to liberty. The Bank had not, Catron argued,
contributed to improvement in the construction of roads, bridges, or schools. He warned that the
Bank would transform the national government into one based on money, with which it would
destroy state sovereignty, purchase the votes of Congress, and oppress the people. This
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argument, Jacksonian in its denunciation of government by the few, had no necessary affiliation
with ideological opposition to banking or commerce. It had often been used by merchants and
state bankers during the previous decade to prevent the national bank’s entry into Tennessee.
Catron, of course, failed to mention that every charge he laid before the Bank of the United
States—that it made debtors dependent, that it hindered development, and that it cost the state
money—could be more aptly charged to the new state bank of which he was a director. Catron
also favored a “national bank” with a framework similar to the proposals considered by the
Jackson administration. Politicking in favor of Jackson’s opposition to the Bank drew Catron
closer to the position of chief justice of the Supreme Court of Errors and Appeals, a position the
legislature subsequently created for him in 1831.47
Other Bank opponents in Tennessee argued that recharter meant an end to state banks,
expansive credit, and internal improvements. They wished to engage in the commercial world
and believed the Bank would stifle economic activity. “Perseus,” for example, believed in the
efficacy of a national bank of deposit, with the right of the states to accept or decline branches of
such an institution, along with the right of the states to charter their own banks. The current
Bank, he feared, sought to monopolize the cotton trade: “perhaps one steam boat and one
warehouse might be maintained by the bank, for the purpose of conveying to New Orleans, the
cotton raised by their white and black slaves.” Even staunch proponents of economic
diversification could oppose the Bank. Henry Ligget, a hat manufacturer based in Kingston,
Tennessee, wrote an editorial in the Knoxville Register lamenting East Tennessee’s lack of a
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robust market. He believed the region would flourish if the state supported manufacturers in iron
ore, coal, and wool. He dismissed the Bank and merchants, both of which had, he believed,
encouraged extravagant purchases on credit leading to perpetual debt.48
Constitutional considerations also influenced the debates over banks and internal
improvements. East Tennesseans had a pointed debate on this question early in 1830. The
national House of Representatives was then considering a bill introduced by Joseph Hemphill of
Pennsylvania, who served as chairman of the Committee on Internal Improvements. The
Hemphill bill proposed a National Road stretching from Buffalo to Washington D. C., and
thence along a western route that would pass through East Tennessee on its way to New Orleans.
The strict constructionist editors of the Knoxville Register opposed federal aid, instead calling on
Tennessee to coordinate with other states to construct the proposed road. The newspaper’s
editors had also been consistent supporters of state aid for opening the Muscle Shoals of the
Tennessee River to steamboat traffic. They believed that these projects would provide
employment and money to the region, preventing the concentration of wealth in banks and the
taxing of Tennessee’s citizens for federal purposes. Proponents of federal aid were more
numerous in the less developed areas surrounding Knoxville, including Jonesborough and the
Hiwassee District. The editor of the Farmers’ Journal in Jonesborough assured his readers that
“Knoxville is not all East Tennessee.” East Tennessee’s general opposition to the Bank of the
United States did not prevent that region from dividing over federal involvement in economic
development.49
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The Bank War in Tennessee had begun in 1817, not 1828, when the General Assembly
passed the prohibitory tax on banks not chartered by the state. That prohibition emerged from a
variety of ideological beliefs and economic interests. Distrust of the Bank appeared justified
during and after the Panic of 1819, as the Bank saved itself at the cost of removing the nation’s
access to its currency. Tennessee’s own experience with banking, however, turned out even
worse, for whereas the national bank became useful in the 1820s, Tennessee’s state banks either
closed or, in the case of the new state bank, became more useful for its officers’ personal
aggrandizement than for general economic activity. Having no other option, and needing credit,
Tennessee permitted the Bank of the United States to establish a branch in Nashville in 1826.
The Nashville branch performed well, financing the growth of the cotton economy and
encouraging borrowers to undertake their own ventures. Discontent remained, however, both
among Tennessee’s populace and, more importantly, with Andrew Jackson. Jackson and his
supporters believed that the Bank was operating to consolidate control of politics, allowing
borrowers to run to excess and thus making them permanent dependents of the Bank. Whatever
temporary good the Bank created would be nothing next to the loss of republican independence.
To this end Jackson considered several alternatives to the Bank of the United States, with each
proposal aiming to end the dangers of the present system without injuring the nation’s
commerce. Debate over the Bank and banking in Tennessee likewise sought the best means to
secure the blessings of improvement.
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Conclusion

The Jacksonian Dissonance

Andrew Jackson eventually succeeded in destroying the Bank of the United States, but its
destruction required that the people be made aware of the peril they faced. When Nicholas
Biddle applied for a recharter in January of 1832, Senator Thomas Hart Benton recalled that
Jackson and his allies decided “to attack incessantly, assail at all points, display the evil of the
institution, rouse the people—and prepare them to sustain the veto.” The stakes were high, for
the presidential election was in 10 months. Jackson’s veto message thus eschewed economic
arguments in favor of political and social ones. Hence Jackson emphasized the supposed
influence of foreign stockholders, the danger of monopoly, and the tendency of government to
“make the rich richer and the potent more powerful.” As the historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr.
noted, Jackson’s “demagogic language” unified his party and his supporters against the Bank
while hiding the fact that opponents of the Bank were not agreed as to how to replace it. The
message was in the end a political success. The 1832 campaign became, in the Jacksonian press,
one of democracy versus aristocracy, laborer versus capitalist, and virtue versus corruption. It
was all propaganda. Jackson was reelected. The subsequent battle for public opinion between
Jackson and Biddle culminated in the former’s removal of the public deposits and the latter’s
curtailment of credit. Biddle and the Bank lost. It became obvious to the public what Jackson
had warned about all along—that the Bank possessed inordinate power over the country’s
business activity. Its national charter ended in 1836, and it closed for good in 1841. Its end
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came not because public opinion demanded it but because Andrew Jackson willed it. In the end
Jackson was perhaps the only politician of his time popular enough to win the Bank War.1
Jackson’s efforts against the Bank did little to curb speculation or prevent exploitation.
The public deposits henceforth went to state banks selected by the administration, and these “pet
banks,” all managed by Democrats, used these new funds to expand their discounts. Much of the
speculative boom that occurred during the last year of Jackson’s presidency can be attributed to
the pet banks. Even when the failure of the pet bank scheme forced Jackson’s successor, Martin
Van Buren, to recommend the Independent Treasury system, bank paper remained the currency
of trade. The American economy without paper funding would have grown much slower than it
did. To the extent that laborers and farmers distrusted paper money, they did so because of
paper’s uncertain value. The Bank of the United States had provided an effective currency,
nearly uniform in value throughout the Union, but its end once again created a plethora of state
and local paper currencies that circulated at varying rates. The ability for employers to pay their
employees, or merchants to pay farmers, in depreciated currency increased apace.2
Jackson and his Democracy were double-minded. Culturally and politically they exalted
agriculture, independence, and virtue, all bulwarks of true republicanism. Yet economically the
Jacksonians sought trade, credit, and advancement. “The people of the United States,” wrote an
editorialist in the National Banner and Nashville Whig, “must and will have commerce.” That
desire existed among Democratic Republicans and National Republicans, Democrats and Whigs.
Jackson’s political forerunner, Thomas Jefferson, had conceded to the reality of American

Benton, Thirty Years’ View, 1: 235; Schlesinger, Age of Jackson, 90; Remini, Jackson and the Bank War, 100-101;
Howe, What Hath God Wrought, 386.
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1
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acquisitiveness, desiring for himself that Americans should remain husbandmen, but realizing
that “our people have a decided taste for navigation and commerce.” Nothing had changed by
the time Jackson became president, except perhaps that the commercial instinct had grown
stronger. Frances Trollope remarked, “every bee in the hive is actively employed in search of
that honey of Hybla, vulgarly called money; neither art, science, learning, nor pleasure, can
seduce them from its pursuit.”3
Jacksonian Democracy’s enduring accomplishment was the curbing of governmental
favoritism, Jackson’s failures regarding the pet banks notwithstanding. Jacksonians primarily
objected to artificial distinctions and distributions of wealth created by law. They did not wish to
uproot commercial exchanges and the market system. William M. Gouge wrote, “where the
distribution of wealth is left to natural and just laws, and the natural connection of cause and
effect is not violated, the tendency of ‘money to beget money,’ or rather wealth to produce
wealth, is not an evil.” Industry and merit should determine the distribution of wealth. Hard
money policy aimed at a metallic circulation for daily transactions, while commercial paper like
bills of exchange would still be used to facilitate large transfers of commodities. Jacksonian
Democracy in Tennessee reflected Jacksonian Democracy in the nation—a movement
ambivalent toward banks but eager to embrace improvement, development, and commerce.4
Jackson’s Bank War as an economic policy failed given the circumstances it addressed.
The Bank produced a stable economic system that bound the nation together. In Tennessee it
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served to rectify the state’s abysmal experience with state banking, and it salvaged its own
reputation to some extent. It gave a spring to industry, financing the expansion of the cotton
economy and indirectly providing liquidity for the private endorsement market. Yet Jackson’s
critique of the Bank as possessing too much power has merit. Even in its own day the Bank
demonstrated its ability for mischief, and its effects on business, whether for good or ill,
depended on the probity of its directors. As Biddle said in response to a Congressional
committee member asking if the Bank had ever oppressed the state banks: “There are very few
banks which might not have been destroyed by an exertion of the power of the bank. None have
been injured.” “This,” Benton later wrote, “was proving entirely too much.” Jackson’s
destruction of the Bank has been blamed for the excesses of the Gilded Age and the so-called
robber barons, but there is no guarantee that the Bank of the United States would have performed
better in this period than did the Federal Reserve in restraining the exuberance of the 1920s or
relieving the distress of the 1930s. Indeed, the modern central bank has become what Jackson
feared most, an institution that finances speculative bubbles, corporate bailouts, and trillions in
national debt. What may be the end of these developments is impossible to know, but the
Jacksonian warning should not go unheeded.5

5
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